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Preface 
This thesis began with the intention to study processes 
of personal 'growth' or 'change'. The idea of change in 
personality is one which has received surprisingly little 
attention despite its centrality as both a theoretical and 
practical problem. Psychotherapy and the rehabilitation 
of prisoners, as well as more personal issues of identity 
and existence, hinge on this problem of personality change. 
And, indeed, there are many examples of people changing as 
a result of having a baby, growing old, taking drugs, getting 
married, experiencing religious conversion, surviving in 
extreme situations, getting an abortion, having a surgical 
operation, starting a new job, becoming unemployed ...•• the 
list is endless. 
The decision to~choose Transcendental Meditation and encounter 
groups as techniques of change to be studied was taken for 
three reasons. Firstly, many of those who have been involved 
in these activities claim to have changed or'grown'as a 
result. Secondly, both are popular and widespread. Therefore 
it seemed reasonable to expect that research would reveal 
wider social implications. Finally, the bias of TM to explain 
meditation effects in terms of physiology and that of encounter 
group theory to talk about individuals offered an opportunity 
to make certain comparisons between them. 
On setting out on this project, however, it very quickly 
became clear that the efficacy of many widely-used research 
methods could not be taken for granted. When the object 
of study is change, moreover, additional problems are 
introduced. For example, most research on personality 
change involves administering the same test before and 
after the change - inducing event. But is the testing 
situation ever really the same the second time? Not only 
does the individual become wise to the test, but he or she 
is also likely to have his or her own ideas about what has 
happened, and try to express this point of view in replying 
to test items. When people have undergone 'growth' 
experiences, they are often very enthusiastic and eager to 
convince others of the value of what they have done, they 
are highly motivated to 'do well' on the re-test. 
But there are other difficulties. The changes in people 
may be too subtle or idiosyncratic to be picked up in group 
tests. Change may even be qualitative rather than quantitave. 
For example, when someone gets divorced after an encounter 
group, will this show up on psychometric tests? 
So much of the work of this thesis has gone into developing 
an adequate methodology. The methodological and philosophical 
framework of the research is set out in some detail 
in Part I. Part II constitues the substantive research itself 
and the conclusions drawn from it. 
There are a few Notes in Appendix A. Although these are matters 
about which something needed to be said, to have included them 
in the body of the text would have resulted in too long 
an excursion from the main track of the thesis. The Notes 
seem to point toward emergent problems and issues. 
Finally, the work which is reported here is on-going. 
It will be clear to the reader that many of the ideas 
introduced could be thought through more fully and much 
of the material gathered might be analysed in more detail. 
Yet this is not the only sense in which the work continues. 
The form of this kind of research is dialogue, and the 
actual contact and 'negotiation of accounts' with those 
who were informants has not been halted by the submission 
of a Ph.D. thesis. Indeed, the articulation of ideas 
and gathering together of sources necessitated by the 
demands of the thesis will allow a further round of 
negotiation and development of the material presented here. 
ABSTRACT 
The thesis is in two parts. Part I 
of a humanistic science of persons. 
examines the possibility 
The failure of the 
psychometric approach to personality research is described. 
It is argued that psychometrics denies the common-sense, 
everyday-life basis of its procedures. Then, with the aim 
of constructing a true science of persons, some of the 
concepts of a philosophy of the person are introduced. 
Finally, it is suggested that a science of persons would 
be a science of interpretation. A methodology for such 
a science is set out, along with the examples of research 
which has exploited these methods. 
In Part II, a programme of substantive research is presented. 
The aim is to investigate those experiences which individuals 
claim lead to their personal 'growth'. Two 'growth' movements 
- Transcendental Meditation and encounter groups - are studied 
as social-psychological phenomena. The methods used are 
personal accounts and participant observation. These activities 
are described as constituting unique identifiable 'regions of 
social reality'. It is concluded that they resemble forms 
of art such as novels or films more than forms of therapy 
or education. The implications of this conclusion are 
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THE FAILURE OF THE PSYCHOMETRIC 
APPROACH TO PERSONALITY RESEARCH 
Introduction 
Despite much criticism (Fiske, 1974; Mischel, 1968, 
1974) the psychometric approach to personality research 
remains the single most widely used method of research in 
this area. In the Seventh Mental Measurements Yearbook, 
Buros (1972) has collected 1897 references for the MMPI, 
754 for the EPPS, 620 for the CPI, 544 for the 16PF, and 
173 for the EPI. In addition, Howarth (1976) reports a 
further 356 references to the EPI between 1970 and 1973. 
Such a volume of research using familiar psychometric 
tests indicates no waning of popularity for this approach 
Indeed, the extent of the psychometric research programme 
is symptomatic of a deep interest in, and need for, sure 
knowledge about human nature and personality. But, as 
we shall see, the psychometric approach is unable to 
deliver such knowledge. It will be shown that the 
psychometric strategy is no more than a formalisation of 
common-sense, pre-theoretical ways of making sense of 
behaviour. And, moreover, in denying that it functions 
in this way, the psychometric approach must relinquish its 
claim to scientific status. This theme will be traced 
through three sources of evidence: the experience of 
doing a test, some research on what it is tests 'measure', 
and, finally, the history of the psychometric movement. 
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The experience of doing a personality test 
By the 'psychometric approach to personality research' is 
here meant research which employs rating scales, 
questionnaires or inventories to measure hypothesised 
"underlying sources of observed behaviour" (Cattell,1965) 
or "permanent possibilities for action" (Allport,1966). 
Trait theorists and psychometricians in general believe 
that their tests allow them to identify stable patterns of 
behaviour in individuals, patterns which could have 
parallels in neural organisation or have been laid down in 
early experience. It is important to emphasise this 
belief in the 'objectivity' of personality traits. As 
Allport(1937) puts it "traits are not creations in the 
mind of the observer, nor are they verbal fictions; they 
are here accepted as physical facts, actual psychophysical 
systems related - though no one yet knows how - to 
persistent neural systems of stress and determination". 
More recently, the large body of work which has attempted 
to give the individual difference conception of personality 
a basis in biology (eg Eysenck,1967) reveals a continuing 
belief in the 'objectivity' of personality dimensions. 
The 'doctrine of objectivity' implies that the strength 
of personality traits, and the relationship between them, 
may be found through observation, since certain behaviour 
is taken to indicate the expression of certain underlying 
predispostions or traits. Mischel(1968,1972) has called 
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this the "indirect sign paradigm". The purpose of 
psychometric tests is to assess the frequency or saliency 
of a particular behaviour, or 'sign' for the person being 
tested. The demand made upon the person actually doing 
the rating, or answering the questions, is to estimate as 
accurately as possible the 'strength' of the relevant 
behaviours. It is an implicit assumption of the psychom: 
etric approach, then, that the person taking the test 
should be an accurate and impartial observer of his own 
or of another's behaviour. This assumption is implied 
by the 'doctrine of objectivity', which states the 
psychometrician's intention to describe patterns of 
behaviour that exist in the external world - "physical 
facts" as Allport would have it - and is given substance 
in the procedures and practices of testing itself. For 
example, while test instructions may emphasise that too 
much time should not be spent thinking about 'items', the 
testing situation is nevertheless defined as 'serious'. 
It is work rather than play, the testee is often invited 
to give up his time in the interests of scientific advance, 
and of course no collusion is allowed between those taking 
the test. Also, there may be 'lie' or 'faking' items 
included in the test. Finally, tests are designed in the 
light of research on the 'social desirability' of answers 
and 'response bias'. In all, although it is seldom 
stated explicitly, it seems to be a fundamental principle 
of psychometric testing that the person taking the test 
should be as honest and objective an observer as possible. 
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Yet when we examine the task the testee is being asked to 
perform, we find that it is very difficult for him or her 
to be accurate, impartial, honest or objective. Firstly, 
there is a limited choice open to the testee. Often he 
or she will be faced with a question and two or three poss: 
ible answers, none of which seem relevant or seem to 'fit' 
his or her experience. Thus the testee may have no option 
but to endorse a meaningless, inaccurate or even false 
statement or category. Secondly, the person can hardly 
reply to at least some of the questions without 
consciously or unconsciously comparing him or herself with 
others (Murray,1938). For example, asked to rate self 
or other on a 'dull-lively' continuum, the person can only 
have recourse to his or her idea of what constitutes 
'liveliness' or 'dullness'. And of course behaviour that 
would be considered 'dull' in one social milieu might well 
be thought rather 'lively' in another. As Poulton (1976) 
has pointed out, to the extent that a person has access to 
a limited social group, his or her reply to a test questio~ 
will lie within a truncated or arbitrary range. 
A third, related, source of difficulty for the testee is 
the use of qualifiers like 'often' or 'sometimes' as in 
'Are you usually carefree?' Clearly, not everyone will 
have the same idea of how frequently something would have 
to happen to make it 'usual'. Fourthly, the structure 
of psychometric tests embody an assumption of cross-
situational consistency of behaviour. For example, the 
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test item - 'Do you enjoy lively parties? Y~s/No' - does 
not give the person the opportunity to reply 'it depends 
on the party' . Similarly, the demands of rating one's 
self or another person on a 'lively' - 'dull' continuum 
disallow the possibility of being 'lively' on one occasion 
and 'dull' on another. The idea of cross-situational 
consistency of behaviour is a central postulate of trait 
or dimension theories of personality (despite evidence 
which supports the opposite stance: eg Argyle and Little, 
1972). This postulate has been designed- in to tests so 
that that person doing the test must interpret self or 
other's behaviour in terms of "stable patterns of behaviour" 
rather than situational influences. It would be impossible 
to complete a rating scale or questionnaire in any other way. 
What we find, then, in even a brief examination of the 
experience of doing a psychometric test, is that there are 
great difficulties facing the testee. He or she may be 
highly motivated to report honestly and objectively on his 
or her own, or another's behaviour, but the degree of 
accuracy which can be achieved is restricted by the test 
itself. The questions may not be appropriate to the 
testee's experience of life. The testee must call upon 
his or her notions of self in relation to others, and of 
the meaning of vague and undefined terms such as 'usually' 
or 'sometimes'. Finally, the structure of tests imposes 
a particular point of view on the testee. The test asks 
the testee to view behaviour in terms of consistencies. 
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These comments are directed to all psychometric test 
procedures. The problems of the testee are an inevitable 
consequence of the psychometric strategy - they cannot be 
alleviated through improved test construction. As Fiske 
(1974) has noted, they are problems arising from the nature 
of language and the psychometric attempt to quantify 
statements in a precise manner. For, if the meaning of 
words depends to a large extent on the context in which they 
are used and to some extent also on the individual people 
who are using them then it will only be possible to achieve 
precision, or a semblance of precision, as the result of a 
process of negotiation. 
The conclusion that personal experience can only be converted 
to 'data' or test 'scores' at the end of a process of 
negotiation or interpretation is substantiated by some 
research conducted within the 'ethnomethodology' school of 
sociology (see Garfinkel,1967; Turner,1974). This work 
shows very clearly that 'facts' such as police or hospital 
statistics are in no simple sense 'descriptions of reality' 
but instead are more adequately thought of as 'accomplish: 
ments'. For example, Garfinkel 1967ch6) has examined 
hospital record keeping procedures. He found that even in 
the relatively enclosed 'behavioural world' of the hospital, 
it was impossible to devise categories for use in rating 
scales or data sheets that would be inclusive of all possible 
contingencies. Garfinkel found that hospital personnel used 
common-sense strategies to fit their experience or 'reading' 
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of the situation on to the alternatives offered by the 
measuring device or report sheet. They were guided by 
what they understood the data would be used for and by 
prior agreements or understandings which had been reached 
regarding the relevance or authority of different sources 
of information. This is to say : when we study in great 
detail the processes which intervene between individual 
experience and the codification of that experience as a 
'social fact' such as a hospital statistic, we discover 
that the 'facts' have as much to do with the practical 
concerns of the fact-ga.therer, his 'practical reasoning' , 
his 'logic-in-use' and the rules of the organisation 
concerned, as they do with 'objective reality'. These 
conclusions have also been reached through studies of 
police records (Cicourel,1968), a welfare agency (Zimmerman, 
1969) and a coroner's office (Garfinkel,1967). 
These ethnomethodological studies offer evidence which 
reinforces the conclusions drawn from our brief analysis 
of the experience of doing a psychometric test - it is 
impossible to complete such a test without drawing heavily 
upon one's understanding of what the test is for, what the 
tester wants, and, at a deeper level, upon one's implicit 
theory or ideas concerning the way people are. Thus, far 
from giving us a reflection of "patterns of behaviour" in 
the external world, the result of a psychometric test gives 
us a reflection of how the testee goes about making sense of 
the external world. As Fiske(1974) puts it: "the behavioural 
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unit being studied is actually the observer's process 
in making his judgement and the observer's response 
recording his judgement provides the datum". 
Psychometric measuring devices rely on what words mean 
to people, and these meanings are in turn bound up with 
the common-sense routines, theories and 'typifications' 
through which people make sense of their own and others' 
behaviour. In cl2.iming to measure "physical facts", 
which have their basis in biology, the psychometricians 
have failed to give enough attention to the experience of 
those participating in their work. When the experience 
of the testee is considered, it becomes clear that the 
common-sense basis of their judgements is also an 
important factor. 
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What do tests 'measure'? 
In analysing the experience of doing a personality test, 
we argued that people doing tests must call upon their 
common-sense knowledge of human behaviour to be able to 
answer items. However, this type of analysis cannot tell 
us how prevalent these strategies are. It may be true that 
the dominant patterns of behaviour in the external world 
are so clear and so powerful that they will be reflected 
in test data in spite of the weaknesses of observers and 
testees. Or it may be that statistical and test 
construction techniques are adequate to combat any 
distortions due to 'common-sense'. 
The question which must be faced, then, is this one: 
what do personality tests measure? Do they reflect 
patterns of behaviour, or the observer's judgement 
processes and common-sense rationality, or some interaction 
or combination of these? At this time, there is not 
enough evidence to be absolutely certain one way or the 
other, but there does appear to be agreement within what: 
ever evidence is available that not only does the "structure 
of personality" derived from factor analysis of rating 
scale or questionnaire answers reflect the person's 
"implicit personality theory", pre-existing conceptual 
scheme or construct system more than it does any pattern 
or organisation of behaviour, but also that there is 
little relationship between the two. That is, it does 
not seem plausible for the defenders of psychometrics to 
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argue that, even though test scores do reflect implicit 
personality theories, these theories in turn are a 
reflection of patterns of behaviour. 
The evidence has unfolded in this way. First of all, 
it was shown that the "personality factors" extracted 
from factor analysis of ratings or questionnaires are 
similar, in both structure and content, for different 
groups of raters and ratees (Cattell,1965; Fiske,1949; 
Norman,1963) and also using different tests. The 
conclusion drawn was that the technique of factor analysis 
enables the researcher to identify source traits of great 
generality and descriptive power. As Cattell himself 
says, "such findings suggest that we are dealing with 
basic traits of general human importance, not just arte: 
facts of a particular culture". 
Unfortunately for Cattell this optimistic note was soon 
to be muted. Mulaik(1964) and D'Andrade(1965) demonstrated 
that when people were asked to rate words rather than other 
people, the same factors emerged. Then Passini and Norman 
(1966) found that ratings of total strangers produced the 
same factor structure as did ratings or people well known 
to the raters. Clearly, if people do not need to observe 
behaviour in order to produce these "personality factors", 
it is obvious that they cannot be in any simple or direct 
way reflections of "stable patterns of behaviour". But 
where did the factors come from? The search turned to 
the meaning of the words used in rating scales and 
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questionnaires. 
Osgood had shown that word meanings could be depicted 
using a three-dimensional "semantic space". Hallworth 
(1966) and Peterson (1965) demonstrated that factors 
derived from personality tests were in fact similar to 
these 'meaning' factors. This research is reviewed by 
Mischel (1968;1974) but in itself it is not conclusive -
it leaves open the possibility that, although ratings 
reflect word rr.eanings, these meanings may in themselves 
be accurate descriptions of what happens in the world. 
Mischel(1974 p264) suggests that the individual 
generates "diverse behaviours in response to diverse 
conditions; the emitted behaviours are observed and 
subsequently integrated cognitively by the performer 
.... and are encoded on semantic dimensions in trait 
terms". 
This is to say that, even though factors derived from 
rating scales and questionnaires rely on pre-existing 
conceptual schemes (eg Osgood's "semantic space"), these 
schemes are themselves derived from regularities in 
behaviour. As D'Andrade puts it "it is possible 
that so-called psychological traits exist both as 
components in the terms used to describe the external 
world and in the external world as well" (D'Andrade, 
1965- emphasis added). This theory suggests that trait 
words "encode" or organise a multitude of different 
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experiences and observations of behaviour into "implicit 
personality theories", which can be seen as being the 
"relative frequencies of joint occurences of various 
personality attributes and behavioural dispositions in 
other persons" (Passini and Norman,1966). 
Here we have the return of the 'doctrine of objectivity'. 
It has been established that people possess conceptual 
schemes or "implicit personality theories" and that it is 
to these that they make reference when they are faced with 
the task of completing personality tests. But now the 
'doctrine of objectivity', and all that goes with it, must 
be saved through the argument that the pre-existing 
schemes etc reflect 'objective reality'. Indeed, this is 
an appealing view. We would be unhappy to have pre-
existing schemes etc which did not reflect objective reality. 
We can imagine that these schemes are necessary generalis: 
ations within which we compute more complex and subtle 
schemes for ourselves and those we know well. 
However, this view is testable, and has been tested. 
The necessary conditions for a test are to compare direct, 
ethological observation of behaviour with ratings of that 
same behaviour. From the direct observation of behaviour 
we can be sure of what goes with what in the external 
world- we can have a clear idea of the patterns of 'actual' 
behaviour. From our ratings we can discover what we think 
goes with what - our implicit personality scheme. By 
comparing the two patterns we can test the 'doctrine of 
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objectivity'. 
The first study which attempted to do this was one 
carried out by Willems and Willems (1965). The Willems 
were interested in the extent to which adolescents 
favoured different places or "behaviour settings". They 
had, in the first place, information on all the behaviour 
settings their research informants had participated in 
over a period of time. This information had been 
obtained by direct, ethological-type recording of 
behaviour as it happened. Then they attempted to measure 
the strength of their informants' "forces towards particip: 
ation". They reasoned that "there would probably be a 
positive relationship between the number of forces and the 
subjects' actual participation in behaviour s.ettings" and 
therefore used the number of settings actually participated 
in as "a criterion of validity for the data on forces" 
(Willems and Willems, 1965 p67). 
Three methods of measuring forces towards participation 
were used. Forty adolescents were asked, in individual 
interviews, to think of behaviour settings and to report 
on what were their reasons for taking part in the activity 
there. Then the same group were given a set of 16 cards 
which had printed on them typical reasons for participation 
- for example, "I was required to go" or "I like that 
activity". They were asked to choose the cards which 
represented their reasons for going. 
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The third method was used with a separate group of 54 
adolescents. For this group the 16 statements which had 
been printed on the cards were printed as a check-list on 
a questionnaire. They were asked to write 'yes' or 'no' 
to indicate whether each item had been a reason for 
participation. 
Thus there were three sources of information about the 
informants' experienced "forces towards participation". 
The first was coded interview data, the second card-sort 
data_and the third check-list data. This data on "forces 
towards participation" was correlated with the actual 
participation of informants in five settings. For interview 
data the correlation between expressed fcrces and actual 
participation was .87; for card-sort data .54; for check-
list data .32. As Willems and Willems (1965 p69) noted -
"there emerged a strong negative relationship between the 
ease of getting the data and the validity of the data". 
What can we co~clude from this study? By comparing 
different methods of collecting the same type of information, 
the Willems study made it possible to observe that the more 
typically 'psychometric' the information-gathering situation 
became, the less valid the information gathered. We might 
suppose that at one extreme the very time consuming and 
difficult procedure of ethological description gives us our 
nearest approximation to 'actual' behaviour, while as we 
make the relationship between tester and testee more remote 
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and constrain the choices open to the informant more and 
more we gradually move away from that ideal. 
However, the Willems study was a direct comparison of 
ratings with actual behaviour, and did not consider the 
dimension of meaning of test items. A similar study by 
Shweder(1976) included this factor. 
Shweder(1976) compared direct observation of actual 
behaviour, ratings of that behaviour, and an analysis of 
the conceptual similarity of items. The data consisted 
primarily of direct observation of the occurence of 26 
items of behaviour in a group of 51 boys at a summer camp. 
The occurence of each behaviour was noted by a camp 
counsellor as soon as possible after its performance. At~ 
the end of the 24-day camp, the counsellor and five other 
observers rated the boy on a five-point scale for each of 
the 26 items. 
observed are : 
Examples of the behaviour being rated or 
Gets up before rising hour 
Engages in group misdemeanour 
Spends more than an hour of the day alone 
On the basis of these observations and ratings it was 
possible to estimate the relationships between actual 
behaviours. However, Shweder also obtained judgements 
on "what conceptually goes with what". That is, he 
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attempted to discover the relationships between the 
semantic meanings of test items. Thus, a separate group 
of judges rated each pair of items for conceptual 
similarity on a 7-point scale (l=very similar conceptually 
?=very dissimilar conceptually). This gave Shweder three 
patterns of inter-correlations 
Actual behaviour: 
Rated behaviour 
'what goes with what in actual 
behaviour, as observed at the time. 
'what goes with what' in ratings 
carried out at the end of the camp. 
Pre-existing conceptual scheme: 
'what conceptually goes with what'. 
The structure of meaning of items. 
The similarity or otherwise of the three patterns could be 
estimated by correlating across them. 
the following results : 
This procedure gave 





.35 Actual behaviour 
Comparison of organisation of items 
when actual behaviour overlaps with 
pre-existing conceptual scheme. 
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-.27 Actual behaviour 
Comparison of organisation of 
items when actual behaviour 
conflicts with pre-existing scheme. 
(from Shweder, 1976 pp405-6). 
Thus we see that, for all items, rated behaviour is much 
more like the pre-existing conceptual scheme than it is the 
actual behaviour. However, we cannot be sure whether the 
correlation of .35 between rated and actual behaviour is due 
to some accuracy in the rating method or whether it is due 
to the domination of ratings by a pre-existing scheme which 
to some extent reflects actual behaviour. (Figure 1). To 
clarify this problem, the following operation was carried 
out: for approximately one third of items, it was found 
that actual behaviour relationships were in conflict with the 
pre-existing conceptual scheme. That is, for these item 
pairs the independent judges' estimations of conceptual 
similarity were at odds with what actually happened. In 
these cases, ratings of behaviour followed the pre-existing 
conceptual scheme rather than the actual behaviour (Figure 2). 
Shweder(1976 p465) concludes that "it is clear that recall-
based judgements on rating forms merely reproduce pre-existing 
conceptual associations with little sensitivity to the 
relationships among items in actual behaviour". 
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It has been necessary to describe the Willems and Shweder 
studies in some detail because, unlike the other studies 
quoted, they have yet to be assimilated into the reviewed 
literature, and also because they are the only available 
studies which compare direct observation of behaviour with 
ratings of that same behaviour. Both studies show clearly 
that ratings of behaviour do not reflect with any adequacy 
actual patterns in that behaviour. Shweder, both in the 
study mentioned and in three other studies reported in the 
same paper, shows that ratings produce factors which are 
similar to those produced from pre-existing conceptual 
schemes or "implicit personality theories", thus adding to 
the evidence reported above on this issue (eg Mulaik,1964; 
D'Andrade,1965; Passini and Norman,1966). Shweder also 
offers us a little information relevant to the question of 
the relationship between actual behaviour and pre-existing 
schemes or constructs. It seems as though there might be 
some overlap between these factors. However, much work 
remains to be done in this area. Shweder(1976 pp479-481) 
discusses some of the problems involved in this undertaking. 
The question of 'what tests measure' can be approached from 
another direction: there has been some research which shows 
that people answering questions on psychometric tests are 
trying to express themselves through the medium of the test. 
Payne and Wiggins(1972) and Koss and Butcher(1973) looked at 
the MMPI protocols of psychiatric patients. In both studies 
they compared the meaning of items endorsed - ie what the 
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patient was saying about him or herself - with what 
clinical staff saw the patients as saying about themselves. 
They found that the patients were tending to report on the 
tests what they were also saying to staff. 
Wiggins (1972 p7) put it: 
As Payne and 
"it may come as no surprise to many clinicians that 
patients who describe themselves in a certain way in 
interviews, and who are described in a similar fashion 
by others (~riends, relatives, social workers or 
clinicians), often say the same things about themselves 
on the MMPI". 
This research confirms once again the theme being pursued 
here - that psychometric tests have their origin in the common-
sense of people taking the tests. These studies show that 
people doing tests are making statements about their person: 
alities, they are describing themselves in tests as they 
would to friends, family or strangers. There is nothing 
special about the information that goes in to tests. It 
is no more than this common-sense way of talking about 
oneself that we all do. 
It is important to bear in mind that there is no reason why 
this common-sense way of talking about oneself should be 
true. In everyday social interaction, we are given situational 
cues and all kinds of opportunity to alter or exchange our 
way of 'labelling' someone, so it is not necessary for our 
personality theories to be correct. It is likely that we 
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have, at this level of describing people, alternative 
theories which may be brought into play as the need 
arises. After all, we are rarely totally surprised by 
someone's behaviour. On reflection, we can usually find 
them a motive or a reason for having acted as they did. 
Also, as Shweder(1976) points out, we may avoid or ignore 
instances of disconfirmation of our personality theories 
or systems of classification: "the intellectual tendency 
to confirm what is 'sensible' and dismiss (forget, reinterpet, 
explain away or fail to retrieve) what 'lacks sense' must 
be overwhelming in everyday affairs" (p480). 
So, while our common-sense theories are fine for 'making 
out' in everday life, especially when combined with other 
strategies, it is not to be expected that they will provide 
anything like an adequate theory on which to predict 
specific behaviour. A recent study by Mirels (1976) helps 
to bring this problem into focus. 
Mirels(l976) tried to find out if people could accurately 
predict how others would reply to personality questionnaire 
items. He took pairs of items, of known "coendorsement 
probability" (that is, he knew, for a large sample, how 
likely it was that a person would answer'Yes'to both items). 
The task of participants in Mirels' study was to predict 
this coendorsement probability. 
the following type of problem: 
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They were confronted with 
"A - My greatest desire is to be independent and 
free. 
B - If I have a problem, I like to work it out alone. 
If a man answers True to Item A, what is the probability 
that he will also answer True to Item B? 
Estimate : % ---- (Mirels, 1976 p472) 
Mirels then compared the estimates of coendorsement with 
the actual coendorsement rates. He found that there was 
little relationship between the two, and concluded that 
there must exist "inferential illusions" - "certain biases 
in the interpretation of trait-relevant data are widely 
shared, and their accuracy confidently assumed" (Mirels, 
1976 p480). What is happening here is that testees' 
implicit personality theories have been shown to~inadequate 
to predict specific behaviour (a similar conclusion to that 
arrived at by Shweder, 1976). 
But what is of particular interest is to set Mirels' study 
alongside others which compared estimates of coendorsement, 
not with actual coendorsement rates, but with the correlation 
between the trait scales represented by the items (Lay and 
Jackson, 1969; Stricker, Jacobs and Kogan, 1974., Shweder, 
1976). In these three studies in which estimates of 
coendorsement or 'what goes with what conceptually' were 
compared with personality factors, it was found that there 
was a goodfit between the implicit personality theory and 
the factor. For example, Stricker et al(1974) found that a 
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cluster analysis of high school girls' classification of 
items from the MMPI Psychopathic Deviate Scale agreed 
substantially with factors obtained in factor analyses 
of self-reports to these items. And Shweder (1976 
Experiments II and III) showed that Bales's three factors 
for describing small-group behaviour could be derived from 
factor analysis of students' judgements concerning the 
similarity in meaning of Bales's items, and that the 
personality factors resulting from the Sears study of 
maternal behaviour could be generated in similar fashion. 
This type of research has been taken to imply that implicit 
personality theories are veridical reflection of actual 
behaviour. Lay and Jackson (1969 p19) write: 
"the high similarity between the inferential structure 
and the empirical structure indicates that judges can, 
on the average, accurately perceive variations in trait 
relationships ......... This accuracy implies that the 
judge bases his inferential judgements to a great 
extent upon the relationships of personality traits 
as he observed them in others". 
But, on the basis of Mirels' data, at least, it becomes clear 
that the "accuracy" of implicit personality theories 
discovered by Lay and Jackson is more apparent than real -
it is, to use Mirels' term, a systematic illusion. An illusion 
because people are unable to make specific predictions. A 
systematic illusion because there is a wide measure of 
agreement in the errors made. How can this happen? 
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Mirels (1976 pp481-483) describes some ways in which 
psychometric test procedure and factor analysis can 
inflate small relationships between conceptually similar 
items into full-blown 'personality dimensions'. Firstly, 
"a .30 item loading the criterion used for 
characterising an item as belonging to a factor - can be 
generated by minimal interitem correlations" (Mirels, 1976 
p482). Secondly, in both the free-sorting and coendorse: 
ment techniques allow the informant to classify items which 
are obviously similar as members of a cluster or as likely 
to be answered in the same direction, and to be non-
committal with respect to less obvious items. And it is 
just such obviously similar items which emerge as the ones 
most likely to covary in questionnaire data (see Mischel, 
1968). Thus the correspondence between implicit theories 
and factors may rest on the similarity of a few items. 
What is being said here is that the technique of factor 
analysis is one which may be uniquely suited to making the 
most of conceptual similarity among questionnaire items. 
But there is another means by which the psychometric model 
makes it likely that research participants will look towards 
their implicit theories rather than towards actual behaviour. 
Typically, questionnaire and rating scales give people very 
little information to work on. As Mirels (1976 p483) puts 
it 
" ..... judgements are based on severely restricted 
informational inputs ...•.. The absence of background, 
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contextual or other types of aggregate information ..... 
undoubtedly serves to heighten subjects' dependence 
on the kinds of interitem associative relationships 
noted earlier ..... " 
Here Mirels refers back to an earlier statement that, in 
his study, an examination of the item pairs which were most 
often coendorsed showed that "semantic and/or metaphorical 
associative relationship between items heavily influenced 
the covariation judgements" (Mirels, 1976 p483). 
The argument that the test situation is one that encourages, 
indeed necessitates the use of common-sense and implicit 
theory, is well stated by Shweder (1976 p477) 
"they are a kind of situation that encourages a 'rush 
to. judgement' even when, as is typical, the respondent 
does not have access to relevant information or the 
relevant information is unavailable, ie the respondent 
either knows too much or too little about the person 
judged. Random guessing under conditions of ignorance 
would, or course, reduce the size of correlations among 
items and not alter the pattern of interitem relation: 
ships, but guesses are never random when the judge has 
a pre-existing understanding of 'what is like what'. 
Random error becomes systematic error by consistently 
erring in the direction of the pre-existing conceptual 
scheme, the result of which is to increase the size of 
interitem correlations while organising it into an 
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erroneous but coherent pattern". 
So, although people doing psychometric tests are trying 
to express their way of seeing the world through the medium 
of scales and answers (Payne and Wiggins,197~ ; Koss and 
Butcher, 1973), the framework of the test is one which distorts 
this vision. In replying to the demands of the test, they are 
forced to stretch their common-sense and implicit theories 
about personality to cover a wide and ill-defined range of 
possibilities. But common-sense and implicit theory does 
not usually have to cope with this demand for precision and 
generalisation. The everyday-life use of common-sense 
theorising about people is complex and subtle. The test 
demands unrealistic oversimplification. What we are left 
with, as the product of the psychometric process, is a set 
of popular illusions. 
So, the results of all this research confirm the conclusions 
drawn from our examination of the experience of doing a 
psychometric test. These conclusions were that psychometric 
tests rely on testees' common-sense strategies for under: 
standing everyday behaviour, and do not present the tester 
with a straightforward reflection of patterns of behaviour. 
The research on 'what tests measure' reinforces the view 
that test scores are the outcome of a process of interpret: 
ation and negotiation. 
But if, as D'Andrade (1965) argues, raters and psychologists 
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have logically confused "propostions about the world with 
propostions about language", how can it be that the psych: 
ometric approach to personality research has been so 
'successful', with hundreds of published papers documenting 
the existence of statistically significant relationships 
between test scores and other behaviour? The psychometrician 
might reasonably assert that, after all, this method does 
'work', so why not use it and allow a finer understanding of 
its complexities emerge in due course? This argument has 
been around for more than 50 years : "In all probability, 
as has been the case with the study of intelligence, we shall 
be able to give precise quantitative results before we 
understand the precise nature of that with which we are 
dealing" (Allport, 1921). 
The question being asked can be put in this form : if it 
is true that psychometric personality tests reflect common-
sense strategies rather than patterns of behaviour, then how 
have they managed to get away with it for so long? Where have 
all the correlations between test scores and other variables 
come from? Several answers can be offered 
1) It is unlikely that "implicit personality theories" are 
totallY inaccurate. They must have some points of contact 
with the lived world; it would be noticeable if they did not 
But, as Shweder (1976 p479) suggests, these principles of 
classification may have less to do with the maintenance of 
ongoing social interaction than with the maintenance of the 
necessary belief in the existence of a stable, predictable 
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social world. This introduces the distinction between 
personal construct systems (Kelly, 1955) and the kind of 
group or cultural construct systems which emerge from 
factor analysis of test data. Kelly (1955) and others would 
have us believe that personal constructs are powerful 
predictors of personal behaviour. To some extent, personal 
constructs will also be shared cultural or group constructs. 
Therefore 'factors' from tests will be important or salient 
personal constructs for some of the testees, and thus will be 
highly relevant to their behaviour. 
2) Many of the reported studies are of correlations between 
different tests. Tests may contain the same items (see 
Mischel,1968, p86), which will inflate the level of associat: 
ion. For example, the CPI shares 178 virtually identical 
items (out of a total of 480) with the MMPI (Magargee,1972). 
3) Correlations between test scores and 'objective' indices 
may have little to do with generalised traits or personality 
dimensions, being rather the result of the influence of 
extreme groups. For example Eysenck(1971) reports 35 studies 
which demonstrate statistically significant relationships 
between the EPI or MPI and 'objective' indices, of which 27 
employed a 'trait' or 'type' model, while only 8 used the 
theoretically (for Eysenck) more appropriate 'dimension' 
model. This is to argue that while the common notion that 
there exist extreme groups of people whom we can label 
'extraversion' or 'intelligence' may be correct, this does 
not imply that 'extraversion' or 'intelligence' is a factor 
or dimension relevant to the whole population. We might 
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surmise that these extreme groups generate many of the 
correlations reported in studies of this nature, since 
they are more likely to see themselves, be seen by others, 
and indeed perform, in terms of cultural stereotypes. Of 
course this can be only a suggestion at present - further 
study and experiment is necessary to establish more clearly 
its validity. 
4) Correlations between psychometric test scores and other 
measurements can be an artefact caused by the use of very 
large samples. Bakan (1967) has demonstrated that if tests 
are administered to large enough numbers of people, illusory 
statistically significant correlations will be produced. 
5) Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) and Orne (1962) have draw 
attention to the effects of experimenter expectancies and 
the demand characteristics of the experimental situation as 
perceived by the 'subject'. Orne (1962 p778) has noted 
that "as far as the subject is able, he will behave in an 
experimental context in a manner designed to play the role 
of a 'good subject' or, in other words, to validate the 
experimental hypothesis". It is conceivable, then, that 
some, as yet unknown extent, the achievements of the psycho: 
metric research programme may rest on this kind of artefact. 
6) Despite the occasional foray into cross-cultural research, 
most studies restrict themselves to limited demographic groups 
- usually college students or psychiatric patients. It is 
therefore difficult to agree with Cattell when he claims that 
such studies produce "basic traits of general human importance, 
-28-
not just artefacts of a particular culture" (Cattell,1965) 
In fact, Loevinger (1972) comments : "we suspect that a 
fair test would show that most factors in other studies 
would not be replicable in new samples which differ 
demographically in ways which, according to reasonable 
assumptions, should not change the trait structure under 
study". 
But there are problems inherent in constructing such a 
"fair test". Different demographic groups are likely to 
constjtute different language communities. Yet, as we 
have seen, psychometric tests embody assumptions and ways 
of talking about the world which are peculiar to our 
Western industrial language community - assumptions about 
terms such as 'usually', an implicit agreement to view the 
world for test purposes as if behaviour was consistent 
across situations, and so on. Although these assumptions 
are perhaps also shared by the groups on whom cross-
cultural research has been carried out, typically students 
or other highly educated 'westernised' groups living in 
ur~an environments, it may be impossible for members of 
language communities very different from our own to 
comprehend these questions in anything like the same way 
as we do. Thus it is suggested that the generality of 
traits across cultures, an important 'sales feature' for 
the psychometricians, has been made possible by the 
selective use of particular demographic groups. 
7) The current policy of journal editors is one of giving 
priority to research reports which report 'positive' 
rather than 'negative' results. Researchers are less 
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likely, in such a climate, to offer for publication 
studies which do not include statistically significant 
results. Thus it may be that many cases of failure of 
psychometric personality tests to correlate with 'objective' 
indices have been concealed. 
8) Finally, the question - how have they managed to get 
away with it for so long? - deserves the answer that they 
had a duty to continue trying to perfect psychometric 
methodology. As Kuhn (1962) points out, it is in the 
very nature of scientific enquiry to persist with a theory 
or 'paradigm', in spite of its weaknesses and errors, until 
something better comes along. The supporters of the 
psychometric research strategy have had to live with the 
criticisms levelled by Mischel (1968) and others until 
they could discover a better way of doing research. 
These are some of the reasons why the psychometric approach 
to personality research has survived in spite of a growing 
body of evidence which strongly suggests that its basic 
tenets are mistaken. None of these reasons is in itself 
sufficient to account for the apparent 'success' of 
psychometrics - the hundreds of published studies which 
document relationships between test scores and other 
measures of behaviour. Taken together, however, they begin 
to allow the poss~bility of doubt, they make it seem 
plausible that perhaps the research work reviewed above is 
correct. Perhaps psychometric tests do have more in 
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common with our common-sense ways of making sense of 
the world than with precision measuring devices. A 
final source of evidence - an examination of the history 
of the psychometric movement - will allow us to confirm 
these suspicions. 
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The history of the psychometric movement 
The origins of the movement to quantify aspects of human 
psychological functioning announce its basis in common-
sense practicality. Enthusiastic historians have detected 
precursors of psychometrics in China during the Han and 
Ming dynasties (Wiggins, 1973 eh 11), in the phrenologists 
and in the work of the sixteenth century Basque physician 
Juan Huarte (McReynolds, 1975). More recently, Robert Owen 
used simple rating scales in evaluating the performance of 
workers in New Harmony Colony (Ellson and Ellson, 1953). 
And Galton exploited his knowledge of meteorology by import: 
ing scales similar to those used to estimate weather conditions 
into his study of the vividness of images (Guilford, 1936, 
p264). 
However, the modern-day psychometric movement dates properly 
from the development of tests of mental abilities in the 
French schools service at the end of the nineteenth century 
and in the use of questionnaires as part of the psychiatric 
screening of military recruits by the US Army in the First 
World War (see Anastasi, 1961; Watson, 1959; Goldberg, 1971). 
The psychometric approach to research in personality can 
truly be said to begin with the use of the Woodworth Personal 
data sheet as a screening instrument for military recruits 
(Guilford, 1936). Woodworth developed the data sheet in 
response to a request for an instrument which would speed 
up psychiatric interviewing. His innovation was first 
of all to reduce the interview questions to a series of 
116 questions which could be answered yes or no, and to 
devise a "technique for combining the responses to 
questionnaire items so as to end up with a single score" 
(Goldberg, 1971 p295). After the war, similar instruments 
began to be used in other settings - education, industry 
and psychiatry. The success of intelligence and ability 
testing had created a market for psychological selection 
techniques, so there were "societal pressures on psychol: 
ogists to forecast significant personal outcomes" (Gold: 
berg, 1971, p320), and they set about constructing 
measures of psychopathology, vocational interests, schol: 
astic potential and the like. 
So it is hardly surprising that these early tests embody 
common-sense notions - they were developed for practical 
purposes of selection and admission, not as research tools. 
Although there was basic research into personality being 
conducted at that time, using experimentally-controlled 
situations (eg Hartshorne and May, 1928), those working 
on questionnaires and rating scales were "much concerned 
with the application of their science to practical 
problems of life, particularly to problems of vocation and 
conduct" (Allport, 1921 p441). For example, Flugel and 
Radclyffe (1928), in spite of constructing a test of 
admittedly meagre reliability, nevertheless state that 
"some such questionnaire as we have here used might very 
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profitably be employed in the case of all entrants into 
training colleges or other large educational or industrial 
institutions" (p127). 
Yet, why did the psychometric testing movement and research 
programme emerge at that time, what were the motives of 
those who developed it, and by what ideas wert they 
influenced? If we can answer these questions, we will 
be a lot closer to an understanding of the present-day use 
of psychometric tests. 
The emergence of the psychometric programme at the beginn: 
ing of the century can be seen as resulting from three 
historical trends. The first is the increasing different: 
iation of social structure in modern society; the second 
is the adoption of bureaucratic procedures for dealing with 
differentiation; the third is the espousal of logical 
positivism and 'scientific method' by psychology. 
To begin with differentiation: in archaic societies 
there exist only a limited number of roles open to members, 
and those that existed would often be filled automatically, 
or ascribed. For example, when a boy reached a certain 
age, he would become a hunter, since all adult males were 
hunters. In modern societies the situation is of course 
quite different. There are a multiplicity of roles open 
to members, each with its special requirements as opposed 
to the very general requirements found in pre-industrial 
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societies. As a result, modern societies have found it 
necessary to restrict or regulate entry into roles or 
social groups through the use of tests of various kinds. 
These tests are not always psychological - entry require: 
ments can be framed in terms of political beliefs, family 
background, health and so on. 
But modern society is also mass society. As a result, 
recruitment and assessment for social roles could not be 
conducted on a personal basis. It became necessary to 
introduce bureaucratic procedures to deal with the large 
number of anonymous applicants for particular roles. We 
can see that this theory certainly accounts for the uses 
to which the early psychometric tests were put - screening 
entrants into special schools, army recruitment and 
psychiatric admission. It is clearly true that these entry 
routines cannot be considered as examples of psychological 
assessment proper, most of which would at that time have 
been carried out in person by psychiatrists. They are 
more correctly seen as examples of bureaucratic procedure 
masquerading as psychology. For, as we shall see, they 
owe more to bureaucracy than they do to psychological 
science. 
Berger, Berger and Kellner (1974) outline the procedures 
commonly adopted by bureaucratic institutions to deal with 
'referrals'. They have coined the phrase ''bureaucratic 
consciousness" to describe the system of thought and action 
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characteristic of such institutions. Psychometric 
testing appears to be an institution heavily saturated 
in "bureaucratic consciousness". 
The first feature of "bureaucratic consciousness" 
identified by Berger et al is the notion of "limited 
competence". Each agency is only competent to deal with 
its assigned sphere of life and set of problems. Similarly, 
psychometric tests are designed to measure specific variables, 
and individual testers are only qualified to use certain tests. 
Then, bureaucracy works within a laid-down set of rules and 
procedures. Similarly, the competent tester must follow a 
pre-ordained sequence of instructions and commands. The 
person is of less concern to the bureaucra~than his 'file' 
- the set of information relevant to the needs of the official. 
Likewise, the psychometrician is frequently interested only 
in his 'subject's' test score. 
Other features of "bureaucratic consciousness" are the 
passive involvement of the client in the information-
gathering process, the assumption that the world can be 
categorised and the assumption that the world is predictable. 
It should be clear that these features also have their 
parallels in psychometric test procedures. In all, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that psychometric testing is a 
particular manifestation of "bureaucratic consciousness", 
a system of processing "referrals" into "disposal categories". 
And perhaps this is as it should be - after all, bureaucracy 
is the way modern society deals with problems. But psycho: 
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psychometric measurement is not only a practical method 
by which institutions regulate their intake. It also 
claims to be a method by which research into "basic 
traits of general human importance" may be pursued. 
This brings us to the third historical force underlying 
the modern-day psychometric movement - the espousal of 
logical positivism and 'scientific method'. For, 
although the common-sense, practical and bureaucratic 
procedures remained - for instance in the development 
of the Pressey Cross-out technique as a research tool 
which carried over the methods of practical testing into 
pure research work - the adoption of a positivist 
philosophy of science gradually became a more important 
factor. This doctrine proposed that advance in 
knowledge could only come about through emulation of 
what were believed to be the methods of the physical 
sciences - quantification, operational definition of 
concepts, experimentation and, above all, the use of 
statistical techniques (see Mackenzie, 1974; Heather, 
1976). Thus, whatever statistical tools available 
were pressed into action. Only recently has it been 
possible to step back from this fascination with 
statistics and suggest that "the whole branch of 
mathematics on which we so trustingly perch may turn 
out to be the wrong branch" (Hudson, 1975) or that 
complex statistical operations may be "camouflaging" 
(Andreski, 1972) the common-sense, pragmatic nature of 
research. 
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The means by which statistical operations may be 
"camouflaging" the common-sense nature of research can 
be revealed through analysis of the methods used to 
construct psychometric tests. For example, Eysenck 
(1944;1947) came to the conclusion that individual 
differences in personality could be largely accounted 
for in terms of two general factors of extraversion and 
neuroticism in the following way : 
" ...... a large scale factorial study was carried out 
on a variety of personality traits whose presence or 
absence in 700 male neurotic soldiers was recorded 
by the psychiatrist in charge of the case. This study 
resulted in the discovery of two main factors, both of 
which bore a close relation to similar factors 
previously discovered in normal subjects by numerous 
investigators" (Eysenck, 1947 p244). 
Eysenck's research illustrates two ways in which judges' 
or raters' pre-existing conceptual schemes, implicit 
personality theories or· common-sense can determine psycho: 
metric test construction. Firstly, it is hardly surprising 
that Eysenck should extract as his largest factor the 
dimension of "neuroticism" - these men all shared the 
psychiatric diagnosis of being neurotic. As Eysenck 
(1947 p257) observes, "'Psychiatric diagnosis-neurotic' 
has the highest saturation for this factor". 
Secondly, the other main factor found by Eysenck - extra: 
version - shows how pre-existing concepts or biases can 
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have an effect on the interpretation of factor analyses. 
Eysenck' extraversion factor was loaded most highly with, 
for example, ratings of anxiety, depression and apathy 
at one pole and "hysterical conversion and "sex anomalies" 
at the other. There is no immediately obvious way to 
interpret this factor. In coming to a final interpretat: 
ion, Eysenck draws upon theories of extraversion and psycho: 
pathology, and on the results of other research. Clearly 
the burden of inference is carried by Eysenck's pre-existing 
understanding of behaviour, not the statistical operations 
performed. 
We can further argue that Eysenck's factors originate more 
in the minds and decision processes of raters and test 
constructors than in the behaviour patterns of soldiers 
when we take into consideration the fact that his 700 
patients were only seen in one situation - the hospital -
by psychiatrists. The brevity of psychiatric interviews 
has been well documented by Scheff(1966). 
The research strategy and test construction methods of 
Cattell also teach us how factors derived from psychometric 
tests are born in common-sense ideas of "what goes with 
what". Cattell(1957) created rating scales based on Allport 
and Odbert's (1936) collection of English-language trait 
names. Cattell's factor analysis of these ratings 
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did no more than establish "what went with what", which 
words had similar meanings in the minds of raters. The 
content of these scales remained as it always had been -
the meanings of these particular words, the common-sense 
notions of members of a culture regarding the way people 
are and the way they might be expected to act. 
Finally, the "camouflaging" function of statistical methods 
and complex processes of test construction is neatly 
revealed by a recent study by Ashton and Goldberg (1973). 
These researchers attempted to discover whether laymen 
or novice psychology students could construct personality 
questionnaires which were as valid as those constructed by 
experts. Their research participants were 15 psychology 
students and 15 individuals with no formal psychological 
training. They were paid to construct 20 - item scales 
to measure Sociability, Achievement of Dominance: 
"each scale developer was given a description of the 
trait to be measured, along with examples of items 
from a scale constructed to measure a different trait 
and some suggestions as to what helps make a 'good' 
item (eg short, concise statements) and a 'good' scale 
(eg an equal number of True and False items" 
(Ashton and Goldberg, 1973 p3). 
There was a time limit of two hours. The scales derived 
from this procedure and similar scales from the CPI (a 
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questionnaire constructed using the most sophisticated 
methods available - see Gough, 2968) were administered 
to 168 students. The validity of the scales was 
estimated by comparing scores with peer rankings. The 
results were that the validity of scales constructed by 
the average psychology student and by the best of the 
laymen were equal to the validity of the CPI scales; the 
best of the psychology students' scales were more valid 
than the CPI scales. 
What have we learned from this excursion into the history 
of the psychometric movement in personality research? 
First of all, we have seen that the earliest tests were 
produced in reply to practical demands of selection and 
assessment, and were no more than a systematic version of 
common-sense routines used for dealing with the same 
problems. Then we recognised the extent to which··psycho: 
metrics shares the assumptions and practices of bureaucracy, 
anot:her set of common-sense routines designed to deal with 
practical matters. Further, a brief examination of the 
methods used in constructing two of the most widely used 
psychometric personality questionnaires - Eysenck's MPI 
and Cattell's 16PF - suggested that sophisticated statist: 
ical operations did no more than "camouflage" the common-
sense basis of raters' decisions. Finally, it was seen 
that adequate questionnaire measures of personality 
variables can be constructed by naive or novice volunteers 
with no help from statistics. 
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What is being said here? In the experience of doing a 
personality test, in the results of recent research wr .. ich 
attempts to discover what it is such tests measure, and 
finally in an analysis of the historical development of 
psychometrics, there has emerged the theme that psycho: 
metric test scores cannot be taken as 'objective' 
indicators a£ patterns of behaviour, but are inextricably 
bound up in the decision making processes, assumptions 
and common-sense of test constructors and test takers. 
The psychometric test score is not a fact, it is an 
accomplishment, it is the outcome of a process of inter: 
pretation and negotiation. 
But this is not to say that a scientific approach to the 
problems of personality should not be interested in common-
sense and the everyday-life use of concepts. It is 
essential that such a science should be interested in these 
processes. Douglas' (1970 p3) suggestion for sociology 
applies equally well to the study of personality: 
"all of sociology necessarily begins with the under: 
standing of everyday-life, and all of sociology is 
directed either to increasing our understanding of 
everyday-life, or, more practically, to improving 
our everday-lives". 
It has been the failure of the psychometric approach to 
research in personality to have denied its origins in 
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everyday life and common-sense. It has failed to follow 
its 'data' back to its source - the stock of common-sense 
knowledge of persons available to members of a culture. 
In denying its grounds in this way, the psychometric 
approach forfeits its claim to be a scientific approach 
to knowledge. The extent of the psychometric denial of 
everyday life is explored in subsequent sections. 
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Psychometrics as an exercise in denial 
1) The denial of relationship. 
The style of bureaucracy is to create a special kind of 
relationship between officer and client. The client is 
objectified, is treated only as the bearer of certain 
types of messages to the officer, and this relation 
strictly limits the knowledge one can have of the other. 
Similarly, in psychometric testing the relationship 
between tester and testee is of importance. But, while 
the situational or relationship aspects of assessment 
have been acknowledged with respect to projective techniq: 
ues (see Masling, 1960; Schachtel, 1967; Dana and Leech, 
1974) it is less often admitted that they also play a part 
in psychometric test administration. 
For example, Jourard and Kormann (1968) gave the EPPS to 
a group of people who did not know the experimenter. Half 
of the group were left as a control while the other half' 
were given the chance of getting to know the experimenter 
through one of Jourard's mutual disclosure games. After 
two weeks there were more changes in the experimental EPPS 
profiles than in the control. Jourard suggests that in 
some way the 'authenticity' of the relationship between 
tester and testee can effect performance on a psychometric 
personality test. 
The study by Willems and Willems (1965), reported above, 
also offers some evidence on this point. It will be 
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remembered that of the three methods used by the Willems, 
the most valid proved to be the interview, then the card-
sort, with the check-list as the least valid. The Willems 
suggest that one factor in the relative validities of the 
three methods may have been the relationship between 
researcher and informant. They speculate that : 
"perhaps the face-to-face confrontation in a personal 
interview (coded interview and card-sort methods) 
provides constraints which make the subject more 
careful in responding. It may be that the face-to 
face presence of the investigator provides a constant 
reminder to the subject to respond as honestly and 
carefully as possible in terms of his own experience''· 
(pp 69-70). 
Another source of evidence for the proposition that the 
tester-testee relationship is important even in highly-
structured psychometric test settings is the research on 
the effect of race of the interviewer/tester. For example, 
firstly Canady(1936) and then Ledvinka(1971) have shown 
that Negro performance on intellectual or linguistic tasks 
is negatively influenced by the presence of a Caucasian 
rather than Negro tester. Much of the work in this area 
has been reviewed by Katz(l964), while Labov(l969) gives 
a fascinating descriptive account of the differences 
between Negro children's language performance when being 
interviewed by black and white adults. All this research 
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points to the conclusion that the psychometric tester is 
certainly not the 'neutral' scientist that psychometric 
theory requires him to be. 
It has been suggested that psychometric tests do not give 
us knowledge of the 'unconscious' level of personality. 
Psychoanalytic writers comment that unconscious material 
is only made available through symbolic, fantasy or dream 
expression, none of which are considered part of the world 
of psychometrics. However, it may be useful to draw a 
parallel between conscious-unconscious and public-private. 
The kind of material or 'facts about the self' defined 
as belonging to the 'unconscious' is also material which 
we choose to divulge only in the most private or intimate 
relationship. Unconscious or pre-conscious material may 
be information the individual wishes to keep privat6 -
"the set of facts about himself to which an individual 
expects to control access while in the presence of others" 
(Goffman,1959 p38). 
In this context, it is of interest that some people complain 
of 'invasion of privacy' with respect to certain items of 
the M!vlPI (Butcher and Tellegen, 1966) . Presumably this test 
demands that they disclose information to which they feel 
they should "control access", at least in the test situation. 
It is also of interest that most psychometric tests avoid 
the areas of life considered to be most private - topics 
such as sexual adequacy, feelings about the body, financial 
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status, guilt and disgust are seldom dealt with in 
psychometric devices. 
In various ways, then, the denial of the relationship 
between tester and testee seriously diminishes the 
quality of information which can be collected using this 
method. A truly scientific approach to research into 
human beings would be one which acknowledged and indeed 
exploited this basic feature of human nature, the power 
of people to be in relationship. 
2) The denial of meaning. 
Not only does psychometric dogma attempt to abolish the 
relationship between tester and testee, it also tries to 
deny that test items and the test situation in general 
have any meaning for the research participant. The most 
extreme advocate of this point of view is Berg(1959). Berg 
argues that it does not matter what a test item means. 
Concern with the meaning, or content of test items is old-
fashioned: 
"the content of ...... older tests sampled a wide range 
of what was regarded as significant behaviour and 
accordingly had a heavy interlarding of items that 
ciealt with symptoms of maladjustment. Then, it was 
usually assumed that the subject would give honest 
answers when taking the test'' (Berg,l959 p83). 
Berg goes on to explain that this kind of 'face validity' 
was probably a heritage from achievement testing procedures. 
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Face validity, or meaningfulness of items, is of no 
consequence, since : 
"it is not impor·tant whether the meaning (of the test 
items) is the same or different for all subjects, nor 
does it matter whether the subject is being truthful 
or even a good judge of his own behaviour ..... the 
important thing is that behavioural correlates can 
be empirically identified with such a respcnse" 
(Berg,1959 p85). 
It is difficult to know where to begin with these state: 
ments by Berg. For a start, however, it should be clear 
that, even if his views correctly express the official 
psychometric 'party line', they are given the lie by actual 
psychometric test procedures. It is very much an implicit 
rule of the testing situation that the testee should attempt 
to be accurate and honest, as discussed above. Could Berg 
be advocating that testees reply to test questions at random? 
Surely not. Further, the vast ma~ority of tests in use at 
this time have a degree of 'face validity'. That is, their 
items have some meaning, and this meaning has some relation: 
ship to the purpose of the test. Berg claims that behaviours 
such as swaying in response to suggestion, or having aversions 
to certain foods, are signs of underlying traits of suggest: 
ibility and neuroticism. Is it not also possible that 
swaying or having food fads are part of what we ~ by 
'suggestible' or 'neurotic'? 
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Finally, our knowledge of personality is not increased by 
information on the correlation between enigmatic samples 
of behaviour. At some point, the "indicator" must make 
contact with whatever it is that is being "indicated". 
It is extremely doubtful if mere knowledge of what 
behaviour goes with what would ever be usable in everyday 
life. However, this is to stray from the point. It should 
be apparent that the psychometric strategy of denying meaning 
just is not realistic - it does not even do justice to their 
own methods, never mind our everyday experience of life. 
Another aspect of the denial of meaning is the denial of 
the testee's intentions. That is, the test may often have 
a part to play in the life of the testee, in the projects 
he or she is pursuing at that time. The psychometric 
procedure denies that this is so. The test is only a 
meaningful, intentional act for the tester - the testee is 
expected to be passive. Or, at best, the informant's 
intentions are discounted through the inclusion of 'lie' 
or 'faking' scales. 
Nevertheless, test-takers are often capable of using tests 
for 'impression management'. For example, Cohen and Taylor 
(1972), writing about long-term prisoners, noted that 
"the standard tests were known to the men who frequently 
told stories about fiddling this or that test in order 
to achieve particular concessions in the prison. One 
of them described in detail how to fill in one person: 
ality test in such a way as to ensure that he was 
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given outside work during the summer"(p35). 
Two studies are also relevant here. In the first, Braginsky, 
Braginsky and Ring (1969) demonstrated how mental hospital 
patients can control information about themselves to gain 
access to desired wards. The second study, by Braginsky 
and Braginsky (1972) showed that mental retardates can 
manipulate their performance on intelligence tests to serve 
their own needs. 
It is impossible to abolish meaning from psychometrics. 
People taking tests work on the basis of what items mean 
to them; behind this is the background meaning of the test 
situation itself and the person's intentions in that situation. 
Thus the denial of meaning is another element in the failure 
of psychometrics to provide knowledge about people which is 
in any way adequate to the conditions under which people 
live - conditions which include the ability to act in terms 
of meaning. 
3) The denial of logical difficulties. 
There are certain logical difficulties inherent in the 
psychometric approach. Psychometric personality research 
gathers information from individuals, and its findings are 
supposed to refer to individuals. However, that information 
elicited from individuals is then treated as group data, 
and there are seve~logical difficulties involved in 
inferring statements about individuals from group data 
(see Hudson, 1975). 
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What appears to happen is that personality becomes 
confused with 'personality'. When we talk or report about 
our own or someone else's personality, we are making refer: 
ence to the common-sense constructs and typifications we use 
to make sense of everyday life. This is personality. 
The psychometric test process, however, takes this informat: 
ion and extracts 'factors' - second-order schemes or 
principles of organisation. This is 'personality'. Thus 
when someone claims to be an 'extravert', he is talking 
about personality. When Eysenck talks about the dimension 
of 'extraversion', he is referring to 'personality'. 
'Personality' statements, although derived from personality 
statements, are not used in the same way, and do not have 
the same meaning. It seems as though generalisations about 
'personality' are in fact statements about the culture as a 
whole, whereas personality, of course, refers to individuals. 
As we discovered earlier, 'personality' factors, the products 
of the peculiar filtering of everyday reality caused by 
replying to psychometric test demands, may be thought of as 
being "popular illusions"(Mirels, 1976), or cultural 
stereotypes. 'Personality' constructs such as "extraversion", 
"neuroticism", "psychoticism" or "intelligence" seem to tell 
us more about the way a particular culture is organised than 
they do about the behaviour of individual members of that 
culture. Perhaps 'personality' constructs are more a 
problem for the sociology of knowledge than for the psychology 
of personality. 
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Yet the psychometric approach to research ignores this 
distinction between individual and group. The prevalent 
attitude is to assume that the individual can be located 
somewhere in the network of group data produced by psycho: 
metric techniques with little trouble. This is to deny 
the logical difficulties involved in this kind of inference. 
As we have seen, there is good reason to suppose that 
'personality' is much different from personality. The 
failure of the psychometric programme to tackle this problem 
is part of its overall failure to recognise the complexity 
of its subject matter, a complexity which does not survive 
translation into the oversimplified language of the test. 
4) The denial of experience. 
There is no way to avoid the fact that psychometric test 
procedures and research results are saturated with everyday 
life theorising about personality. The answers people give 
to test questions are based on their experience of life. 
But the test attempts to deny the reality of that experience, 
it says to people that life is not as they see it. Here are 
some examples. 
The psychometric approach denies the "emergent character" 
of everyday life. Cicourel(1964) puts it thus : 
"questionnaire items ..... tend to ignore the emergent, 
innovational and problematic character of everyday 
life by imposing a deterministic 'grid' on it .... " 
(p 113). 
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rt does not seem too far-fetched to suppose that many, if 
not most, people experience life in terms of possibilities, 
of "becoming", to use Allport's word. The idea of change, 
of progress, is certainly part of the way many people 
experience the world. All this is ignored by the psycho: 
metric method. 
Secondly, people experience themselves as effective causes 
of action - as agents. The whole epistemology of the psycho: 
metric approach is, however, that people are passive 
"respondents". Traits appear in the minds of people as a 
result of frequent observation of the co-occurence of 
sequences of behaviour. This doctrine has been thoroughly 
demolished by Popper (1963). 
Popper begins with Hume's belief that knowledge is based on 
repetition. For Hume, "our habit of believing in laws is 
the product of frequent repetition - of the repeated 
observation that things of a certain kind are constantly 
conjoined with things of another kind" (Popper, 1963 p43). 
But as Popper (1963 p44) points out: "the kind of repetit: 
ion envisaged by Hume can never be perfect; the cases he 
has in mind can never be cases of perfect sameness". The 
similarity of events, then, must be similarity-for-us, and 
the repetition must be repetition-for-us. That is, repetit: 
ions must be from a certain point of view. And this implies 
that there must be a point of view before there can be any 
repetitions. 
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In the context of trait theory, therefore, it does not 
make sense to argue that somehow regularities in 
behaviour impress themselves on our construct systems. 
As Popper and an increasing number of philosophers and 
psychologists now admit, knowledge is the product of 
action. Our minds are not buckets waiting to be filled 
with knowledge; weearn our knowledge through testing 
hypotheses, experimenting with alternatives and so forth. 
But the psychometric approach denies all this. In the 
world of psychometrics people are passive recipients of 
knowledge and passive respondents to test stimuli. 
A third denial of experience comes in the denial of 
language. The psychometric use of language is at odds with 
everyday usage. Garfinkel (1967) has commented on the 
"indexical" nature of language - the extent to which meanings 
of words are dependent on context. It is clear that in 
everyday life the meaning of words depends to a large 
degree on the situation, on who is speaking, to whom and 
for what purpose. The psychometric strategy is to ignore 
all this. The language of the psychometric personality 
test assumes that meaningful statements can be made without 
any but the most minimal of contexts. So this is a third 
way in which psychometrics denies everyday-life experience -
it takes language out of life. 
Of course the psychometrician might protest that it is no 
bad thing to have a scientific theory which goes against 
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people's everyday ass.1.mptions, which is "counter-intuitive" 
to use a phrase coined by philosophers of science. He 
might suggest that the notions that the earth is round, 
or that it revolves around the sun were in their time 
equally counter-intuitive. This is correct. But these 
examples of counter-intuitive theorising were in their time 
accompanied by cogent explanations of why everyday 
experience was in error. Science characteristically 
replaces a discredited theory with another which offers 
a more adequate account of the same phenomena (Kuhn,l962). 
The psychometric programme fails to do this. It has no 
alternative way of explaining our experience of relationship, 
of meaning, of the "emergent" quality of life, agency or 
language - it can do no more than deny or ignore these 
problems. They are defined out of existence. And this 
is the failure of-psychometrics. It has created what 
appears to be an island of reason and fact concerning a 
topic of great importance - human nature and personality. 
Yet this island has been created at the cost of banishing 
any aspects of everyday experience which to not fit the 
psychometric pattern. And these are just the problems 
that are most important. If any issues to do with 
personality have claim to be central to a science of 
personality, these are the ones - relationship, meaning, 
language and agency. 
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conclusion: the psychometric approach to research 
in personality as an exercise in 
systematic denial. 
This has been a hard look at the psychometric approach 
to research in personality. We have examined the 
experience of doing a test, some of the research on what 
it is tests measure, the history of the psychometric movement 
and some of the ideas implicit in psychometric theory and 
practice. Through all of this has emerged the theme of the 
everyday-life basis of psychometrics. When we are doing 
psychometric research, we are really finding out about the 
common-sense routines and implicit theories of personality 
that people use in making sense of their everyday-life 
social interactions. But this is denied. The fundamental 
tenet of the psychometric approach is that it has succeeded 
in identifying "patterns of behaviour" - regularities in the 
world, not in our way of making sense of the world. 
And there lies the great appeal of psychometrics. By 
claiming to seek 'objective' knowledge, truth which can be 
traced back to biological and physiological systems, it 
appeals to our hope for certainty. By constructing what 
appears to be a growing island of knowledge in a sea of 
uncertainty, it is able to attract new converts and defy 
critics. That is why it is necessary to take a hard look 
at the psychometric programme - it is an attractive illusion 
and we would all be happier if it were true, no doubt. 
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The hard look reveals its transparency. The fine illusion 
is maintained at the expense of systematic denial of the 
most crucial elements of a true science of personality. 
The psychometric approach is not an easy one to argue 
against. There is no simple counter-argument to the 
psychometric doctrine. It has been necessary, therefore, 
to work relentlessly through at least some of its claifis and 
show them to be false. Having done that, no matter now 
imperfectly, it is now necessary to describe the alter~ative 
to the psychometric approach, a research strategy which will 
pick up the problems discarded by psychometrics and weave 
. 
them into a science of personality that is more human, more 




TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF THE PERSON 
-
Introduction -
Shotter (1975) has described in some detail how the 
'image of man' developed by Descartes has been adopted 
by the human sciences. Partly this has come about 
through the efforts of the human sciences to imitate 
what they understood as being the methods of the 
physical sciencees (see Mackenzie, 1974 ; Heather, 1976) 
and thereby achieve the success and acclaim accorded to 
Newton, Pasteur and Boyle. The methods they adopted placed 
a premium on the detachment of the experimenter, 'operation: 
al' definition of constructs, and the use of mathematics. 
But partly the espousal of Descartes' image of man by the 
human sciences was also a consequence of the degree to 
which the mind-body, subject-object split has pervaded 
all of Western thought. Yet, we must ask, is this 'image 
of man' an appropriate metaphor for our ultimate purpose 
- the construction of a science of persons rather than a 
science of objects. 
Descartes' great contribution was to make science possible 
by constructing a philosophical system within which scientific 
thought and research could be pursued free from the dead 
hand of religious dogma. The results of this liberation 
of thought are apparent in the enormous advances in 
technology over the last three hundred years. Nevertheless, 
no matter how successful Descartes' system of thought might 
be in the area of natural science, it contains basic 
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assumptions which prevent it from ever becoming an 
adequate philospphy of the person. 
some of these assumptions are explored in a paper by 
Dreyfus(1967) which bears the unlikely-sounding title 
"Why computers must have bodies in order to be 
intelligent". In this paper, Dreyfus examines the 
philosophical basis of work in artificial intelligence, 
the programme of research which has, over the last two 
decades, attempted to exploit advances in computer 
capabilities in the quest to develop a machine which will 
be "capable of doing any work man can do". This research 
is of interest to the philosopher because of the fact that 
the assumptions of reductionism and dualism implicit in 
this work are the same as those first stated by Hume and 
Descartes as providing the necessary conditions for all 
rational thought. Dreyfus(1967 p14) argues that the 
artificial intelligence research programme can be seen 
as 'testing' the following assumptions : 
"1. An epistemological assumption that all intelligent 
behaviour can be simulated by a device whose only mode 
of information processing is that of a detached, 
disembodied, objective observer. 
2. The ontological assumption, related to logical 
atomism, that everything essential to intelligent 
behaviour can in principle be understood in terms of 




oreyfus claims that ''we are now witnessing the last act 
wherein the conception of man as essentially rational, 
and rationality as essentially calculation, will either 
triumph or else reveal its inherent inadequacies'' (p15). 
And it is Dreyfus' contention that the failure of the 
artificial intelligence programme to solve basic problems 
in areas such as pattern recognition strongly suggests 
that the philosophical assumptions underlying the research 
must be inappropriate to its task. As an aside, it should 
be noted that Mackenzie (1974) argues that the failure of 
the behaviourist research programme to offer an adequate 
account of complex human behaviour is due to its espousal 
of the same conceptual model. The failure of the psycho: 
metric approach to research in personality has also been 
discussed above. 
The common failure of these research programmes appears 
to lie in their inability to recognise that it is impossible 
to reconstruct human performance and human abilities using 
an image, or model, of man as a detached, passive observer 
who builds his picture of the world from discrete bits of 
information. That is, the image of man proposed by 
Descartes and Hume is not appropriate for a truly human 
science. We can begin to make some progress towards an 
adequate conceptualisation when we examine Dreyfus' analysis 
of what is missing from the AI manifesto, what needs to be 
added to it in order that it might have some hope of 




Dreyfus identifies the primary difficulty facing 
artificial intelligence workers as that of reproducing 
the human ability of functioning in a wholistic manner. 
Machines designed to recognise patterns must use the 
strategy of searching for discrete features. Problem-
solving programmes must work through all the various 
alternative solutions. For machines and programmes such 
as these, the only 'short-cuts' or heuristic strategies 
available to them are those that have been programmed 
in by their makers. Their behaviour is not, then, what 
we understand by 'intelligent', but is more properly thought 
of as being stupid, if very fast. 
However, as Dreyfus points out, people go about recognising 
patterns or solving problems in a very different manner. 
People recognise patterns by projecting an indeterminate 
whole (in the case of word recognition, the meaning of a 
word) which is filled in later if necessary, if it is found 
to be a poor match with the input pattern. People solve 
problems by using their needs and interests as a guide 
through the infinitude of possible solutions. We talk 
about testing out 'hunches', 'guesses' or 'intuitions', 
which are already partially-formed solutions. We do not, 
unless we are unintelligent or in difficulty, proceed in 
the step-by-step manner of the machine. 
It is through action that we respond wholistically to 
the demands of the environment, and through our sense of 
bodily gratification, or 'feel', that we can organise 
tasks in terms of relevance and significance. Thus 
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nreyfus suggests that the kind of peculiarly organismic 
abilities which cannot be reproduced by machines, for example 
pattern recognition and problem solving, can only be made 
intelligible if we introduce the concept of an embodied agent. 
This is to propose that pattern recognition and problem 
solving should be seen as skills, which can only be reduced 
to component operations and rules after the event. As 
Dreyfus (1967 p29) puts it : "although science requires that 
the skilled performance be described according to rules, 
these rules need in no way be involved in producing the 
performance". The only principle involved in the repeat 
performance of skills is the willingness to "do that again". 
Dreyfus is saying, then, that the artificial intelligence 
research programme has failed in its attempt to mimic human 
powers because these powers are skills, they are pieces of 
"personal knowledge" and thus not translatable into the 
discrete formalised operations of an isolated, disembodied 
observer. He concludes that "the human world with its 
recognisable objects is organised by human beings using 
their embodied capacities, to satisfy their embodied needs" 
( p32) . Thus computers must have bodies in order to be 
intelligent. This is a curious thought. The great 
project to create a machine which could think fails 
because"··· .. it is the sort of intelligence we share with 
animals, such as pattern recognition, that has resisted 
machine simulation". (p15). 
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Dreyfus is making a very important point - that 
traditional philosophical systems, upon which we have built 
our entire science of behaviour, are just not capable of 
accounting for even the most basic human activities. It 
is not that they deny us the outer reaches of the spirit, 
although they may do that as well, but that they deny us 
the ability to read and write. Yet, what would a philosophy 
which took as its task the aim of clarifying what we are 
saying when we talk about human beings as persons rather than 
machines or organisms look like? Is it possible to 
construct such a philosophy? In the following sections 
are examined some of the ideas and problems intrinsic to a 
philosophy which attempts to;~hi1osophy of the person. 
However, what follows is not offered as a complete exposit: 
ion of such a philosophy, an undertaking which would both 
be beyond the scope of the present work and the competence 
of its author. It is intended instead as an introduction 
to and justification of certain concepts whose familiarity 




one basic assumption of any true philosophy of the 
person is summed up in the phrase "being-in-the-world". 
To admit that a person is a being in a world is to 
acknowledge that a person without a world is unthinkable. 
It does not make any sense to talk about a person without 
acknowledging the existence of a world in which he 
participates. As we saw earlier, the denial of context, 
of the person's world, by the psychometric approach, was 
a source of many of its difficulties. Similarly, Dreyfus 
has argued that problem-sol"\··ing, for example, is only 
possible given the wholistic involvement in a world, the 
being-in-the-world at many levels simultaneously, that is 
characteristic of a person·and absent from the machine. 
To talk about being-in-the~world is also to talk about 
relationship. Our world is a world of other people 
May(1959 p59) writes that "world is the structure of 
meaningful relationships in which a person exists and in 
the design of which he participates". And Macmurray 
(1961 p24) adds that "the idea of an isolated agent is 
self-contradictory. Any agent is necessarily in relation 
to the Other ....... Persons are constituted by their 
mutual relation to one another". These writers are 
making the point that we become persons only through 
participation in a culture. Human nature is an achievement, 
formed through thousands of years of social life and now re-





Another dimension of being-in-the-world and relationship 
is the aspect of intersubjectivity, the primitive ability 
to be aware of the other. Martin Buber has called this 
experience the "I and Thou". There now seems good reason 
to believe that this intersubjectivity, or basic awareness 
of the other, constitutes our first awareness of the world. 
The infant, Macmurray suggests, begins by being in a 
personal relationship with all the objects he encounters. 
In practical terms, this is the mother or caretaker. 
Only in the phase of withdrawing from the mother, by not 
being satisfied by the mother, does the infant begin to 
discover that ther~ is another realm. Some evidence on 
this question has been presented by Newson and Newson 
(1975) and by Trevarthen (1977) who, in observational 
studies of mother-infant interaction, discovered that 
during the first three months of life the infant is 
primarily interested in other people, and spends whatever 
non-feeding waking time there is available being in relation: 
ship. However, at about five months the infant seems to 
start on a new pattern of behaviour - now catching the 
mother's eye and looking away at the environment. It is 
as if the infant, having established a satisfactory 
relationship, can now move on to other things, and is 
inviting the mother to begin exploring the material world. 
The primacy of relationship in psychological development 
has been noted by other workers. For example, Winnicott 
(1971) talks about the child using "transition objects", 
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toys, or objects which are endowed with human qualities, 
to facilitate the switch from a personal to an objective 
world. Erikson (1950) places the learning of basic inter: 
personal attitudes such as trust and autonomy in the first 
years of life, seeing later life crises as centring around 
problems of initiative or identity. Finally, White (1959) 
depicts the later years of childhood as being the time 
when the young person masters cognitive and physical skills 
and acquires "competence". 
Even in adult life, however, intersubjectivity remains a 
backdrop for our conscious activities. For example, recent 
work in kinesics - the analysis of human movements - has 
shown that the ability to participate in relationship is 
apparently innate. Condon and Sander (1974 p99) write that: 
"as early as the first day of life, the human neonate moves 
in precise and sustained segments of movement that are 
synchronous with the articulate structure of adult speech". 
Further,when this "interactional synchrony" is absent in 
early life (Trevarthen, 1977) or later (Birdwhistel,1970); 
Condon and Ogston, 1966) we become distressed and liable 
to feel 'depersonalised' and think of the other person in 
the relationship as strange or crazy. This programme of 
research has exploited technical advances in the ability to 
take fast films of social interactions. By playing these 
films back at slow speed, it is possible to analyse in 
great detail sequence of movements, and 
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demonstrate very clearly that we are in constant exchange 
or communication with each other. As Birdwhistel(1970) 
puts it, we do not so much communicate as "participate 
in communication". 
A further source of evidence concerning the importance 
of relationship lies in the research undertaken by Rogers 
and his colleagues (Rogers and Dymond, 1954; Rogers, 1971) 
into the conditions for successful counselling and psychoth: 
erapy. They found that the most powerful predictors of 
therapeutic success were relationship variables - the degree 
of empathy exhibited by the therapist, the congruence of 
the therapist as perceived by the client, and the warm 
positive feelings, or "unconditional positive regard" 
transmitted from therapist to client. 
It seems, then, that Descartes' bid to separate the 
person from the world and set him, as thinker, against 
the world leads to great difficultieswhen our interest is 
in persons rather than in material objects and laws of 
nature. It would seem more fruitful to have a philosophy 
of the person which is more in harmony with our experience 
and observation, cne which admits that "existence is 
fundamentally communal in character, and without the others 
I cannot exist" (Macquarrie, 1972 p102). That is, it seems 
to be necessary to accept the idea of being-in-the-world 
as a fundamental tenet of such a philosophy. 
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~aning, intentionality and agency 
Moreover, the person is engaged in an active search 
to make sense of this world into which he is thrown. 
This 'search for meaning' points towards an important 
aspect of the relationship between person and world. 
That is, the world has meaning for the person, while, 
at the same time, the person attributes meaning to that 
world. Both person and world contribute to meaning. 
The contribution of the person is through his or her 
sense of agency. The person's sense of intentionality, 
the possible range of actions which might be undertaken 
with an object, are one side of that object's meaning. 
As for the object, it has its own contribution to make 
in resisting or evading our intentions. 
other side of meaning. 
This is the 
Thus meaning is between person and object. This can 
be seen most clearly in the case of talk. When one 
person talks to another, there is the meaning he or she 
'intended', and there is also the way the statement is 
'taken' by the other. The full meaning of the statement 
is not in either of these 'readings', but is somehow 
between them - it is the interaction which is meaningful. 
This example may also help to make clearer the use of 
the concept of intentionality. Intentionality is the 
reaching out towards an object. May (1969 p223) defines 
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intentionality as "the structure which gives meaning to 
experience. It is not to be identified with intentions, 
but is the dimension which underlies them; it is man's 
capacity to have intentions". May equates this'·. dimension 
of intentionality with the nature of consciousness 
" .... consciousness is defined by the fact that it 
intends something, points towards something outside 
itself - specifically that it intends the object. 
Thus, intentionality gives meaningful contents to 
consciousness" (p226) 
He adds that "each act of consciousness tends towards 
something, is a turning of the person toward something, 
and has within it, no matter how latent, some push toward 
a direction for action" (p230). Or : "every meaning has 
within it a commitment". 
By intentionality, then, is meant the experience of 
connectedness with the world, the feeling of "imaginative 
participation", the possibility of action. And this brings 
us towards the idea of agency. To consider the person as 
an agent is to affirm the primacy of action. Macmurray 
(1961 p15) states this position very powerfully when he 
writes that "the Self has its being only in its agency 
...... its reflective activities are but negative aspects 
of this agency." Macmurray argues that the traditional 
philosophical standpoint made action impossible. According 
to that analysis, self could only be equated with mind. 
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Macmurray seeks to remind us how unrealistic that position 
is : we are active, The doctrine of the "active organism" 
is now returning to psychology (see, for example, Gibson 
1966). 
To consider the person as an agent, as active, is to assert 
that events may happen because a person is willing to 
participate in them rather than happending as a result of 
a string of cause-and-effect relationships. In a 
philosophy of the person, the notion of cause and effect 
in physical systems is of little relevance. Instead, it 
is necessary to look at the interplay of meanings, or 
'symbolic interaction' which occurs as a person pursues 
his projects in the world. 
However, to talk of 'willingness to participate' is not 
to promote the idea of "free will". Being willing is 
part of being in the world, it is part of having intentions., 
All this is well stated by Matza 
"to recognise and appreciate the meaning of being 
willing is by no means to assert the existence of 
a free will. Indeed, it is the very opposite. 
The logic of one's past, the human agencies in one's 
situation are certainly real. They are the grounding 
for the conduct of will. Free will, as the phrase 
itself implies, takes will out of context, converting 
it inexorably into an abstraction of as little use 
as any other. Will is the conscious foreshadowing 
of specific intention capable of being acted on or 
not. 
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It is a sense of option that must be rendered in 
context. But to put will in its place is not to 
imprison it. Will need not be untrammeled, abstracted 
or 'free', nor need behaviour be determined, preordained 
or predictable. Thus viewed, being willing is the 
human leap that allows an open process to continue. 
Will exists in the world ....... "(Matza,1969, p 116) 
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Time --
Another way of approaching a philosophy of the person is 
to start with the idea of time. The traditional philoso: 
phical framework relied entirely on spatial metaphors. 
For Descartes all knowledge was ultimately reducible to the 
laws of extension, or geometry. Thus we tend to concept: 
ualise problems in the image of the billiard table - there 
is a certain force in this direction, a certain degree of 
resistance here, and so on. Throughout all this time 
continues as a steady progression a taken-for-granted 
background constant. Indeed, the most usual way of under: 
standing time in our culture is to use the image of the 
clock, wherein time is converted into spatial relationships. 
Nevertheless, the idea of time has a unique pa~to play 
in human existence. The centrality of time is discounted 
by the traditional philosophical attitude which ~educes 
time to a constant. Yet for people, as opposed to machines, 
the future, not the past, is the dominant dimension of time. 
As May (1958 p69) has put it - "the deterministic events of 
the past take their significance from the present and the 
future". Human beings continaally re-assess the past in 
terms of current and future possibilities 
" ..... instead of the past determining the character of 
the present, the present significantly reshapes~the 
past as we reconstruct our biographies in an effort 
to bring them into greater congruence with our current 
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identities, roles, situations and available 
vocabularies" (Gagnon and Simon, 1973 p13) 
we must recognise that action is often towards some end, 
some future state of affairs. Thus a philosophy or a science 
of the person is concerned with the ongoing process of 
being or becoming rather than with the description of 
static states or the discovery of one-and-for-all 
criteria. A philosophy of the person must allow the 
possibility that people are able, to some extent, to 
construct their lives, their identities. 
The importance of time and process is being acknowledged 
by certain areas of psychology (see Blatt and Buchwald,1974) 
A notable example is the recent interest in the life-span 
(see Baltes and Schaie, 1973; Datan and Ginsberg, 1975). 
There is a growing body of evidence concerning the c~rclical 
nature of psychological functioning (see Luce, 1972) 
However, perhaps the most compelling demonstration of the 
significance of time has come from certain technological 
advances which have begun to disclose a few of the secrets 
of time, just as the telescope and the microscope disclosed 
some of the secrets of space. 
In a sense, psychoanalysis made possible an examination 
of the meaning of time, of the current meaning of past 
events. More recent developments have attempted to reveal 
the psychological and interpersonal processes which are 
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hidden because they happen so quickly. A first example 
refers to a field which has been mentioned already -
kinesics, the study of human movements. The development of 
filming equipment has made it possible to witness some of 
the sequences of behaviour which in everyday life would 
occur too quickly to allow them to be consciously perceived. 
Important discoveries made possible by these techniques include 
Trevarthen's (1974) finding that in mother-infant 
interaction it is often the mother who imitates the child. 
A second avenue of research into psychological processes 
which are not usually available for inspection due to their 
brief duration has exploited the use of hypnosis. In a 
series of experiments, Cooper and Erickson (1952) induced 
time distortion through hypnotic techniques. Participants 
were put into a hypnotic state, and their experience of 
time was distorted in the following manner a metronome 
was started and the hypnotised subject was told that it was 
ticking at a rate of one stroke every second. The suggest: 
ion was made that the metronome was gradually being slowed 
down to one stroke per minute. At the end of this procedure, 
the person would be experiencing every second, every beat 
of the .. metronome, as lasting a minute. While in this state, 
he or she would be given a task to perform - typically an 
open-ended problem. After coming out of the trance state, 
the person would report on their solution and on how they 
had arrived at it. 
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The results of this series of experiments were to 
demonstrate that the experience of time can be drastic: 
ally distorted. Participants reported thought processes 
which could not possibly have been completed in the actual 
length of time at their disposal, but which corresponded 
to their subjective idea of how much time they had taken. 
The reader is referred to the original text for a fuller 
description of this intriguing work. Suffice to say that 
it implies that much of our psychological functioning 
may well happen far too quickly for us to be aware of it, 
and that it may be worth exploring further this means of 
uncovering otherwise hidden processes. 
The possibility that these methods.of doing research on 
short time periods, and perhaps other methods, such as 
life-span studies, which could look at long time periods, 
will prove to be as important for psychology as optical 
magnifying devices were for the natural sciences is an 
exciting thought. Nevertheless, it should not distract 
us from what is already certain - the dimension of time 
is of special interest to any adequate philosophy of the 
person. The concepts of being, of becoming, of process, 
must be central to any such system of thought. 
A person is a being who exists over time in relationship 
with other persons. To say this is to say very little. 
It sounds like common-sense. Of course, Kenneth Burke's 
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definition is grander 
"Man is the symbol using (symbol-making, 
symbol-misusing) animal 
inventor of the negative (or moralised by the 
negative) 
separated from his natural condition by 
instruments of his own making 
goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved 
by the sense of order) 
and rotten with perfection" (Burke, 1966 p16). 
Shotter(1975 p27) has argued that it is vital to construct 
a system of thought, a philosophical tradition, which will 
"clarify and help in the practical realisation of our 
already 'given' but admittedly rather vague notion of our: 
selves as persons". He believes that there is a crisis 
in our image of ourselves - our "admittedly vague" notion 
of ourselves as agents, as planners, as creators;,as "rotten 
with perfection", is being replaced with an allegedly 
'scientific' image of man the mechanism or man the organism. 
This section on the philosophy of the person has been an 
attempt to establish, in a condensed and somewhat summary 
form, the elements of such a system (for fuller treatments 
of the themes around which this chapter has been written, 
see Harre and Secord, 1972; Shatter, 1975; May, 1958, 1969; 
Heather, 1976; Giorgi, 1970; van Kaam, 1966; Armistead, 1974). 
So, this chapter is intended to provide a background for 
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later discussions concerning what a true science of 
persons would look like. Before moving on to that 
topic, however, it will be necessary to fill in the 
background a little by further introducing two more 
specifically psychological ideas which are nevertheless 
closely related to the philosophical matters pursued 




we have been suggesting that an adequate philosophy of 
the person must be in harmony with certain global features 
of our personal experience. One such aspect of experience 
is the sense of self, or personal identity. This problem 
has caused much difficulty for tradtional philosophical 
approaches. The separation of consciousness from its 
physical embodiment proposed by Descartes' dualism left 
the dilemma of what to do with an entity which appeared 
to be at the same time embodied and conscious. Similarly, 
Hume's empiricism was in trouble with any such wholistic 
concept as that of the sense of self. 
However, there were brave attempts to make personal identity 
intelligible within these frameworks. It was argued that 
personal identity could be derived from the existence over 
time of a particular body. But, if we have separated. mind 
and body, how can we be sure that this continuing body has 
been the vehicle for these continuing experiences? Perhaps, 
then, we can account for the experience of identity through 
an appeal to memory - I may construct my sense of self from 
the memories I have of experiences and the memories I have 
of this body. But to remember an experience as having been 
mine or to remember that it was~ body which had that 
experience is to assume an identity from the start. So the 
argument from memory appears to be circular. 
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Thus,while it may appear to be intuitively reasonable 
to argue that memory and bodily continuity are criteria 
for personal identity or self-hood, and, indeed, may 
well be the criteria we use in everyday life, we find 
that there are logical difficulties facing any such 
analysis within the traditional p~ilosophical perspective. 
For example, Hume's struggle with this problem lead 
him to reject the validity of the concept of self altogether. 
His search for the impression from which the idea of self 
might be derived resulted in his famous statement that "the 
Mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions 
successively make their appearance .... there is properly 
no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different". 
Therefore for Hume there were no adequate criteria for 
personal identity. He concluded that "the identity which 
we attribute to the mind of man is entirely fictitious". 
The idea of an enduring self was no more than a "fiction or 
imaginary principle of union" which provided a solace for 
those unwilling to confront the implications of thorough-
going skepticism. 
More recently, however, a solution to the problem of 
personal identity has been offered by the linguistic 
philosopher Strawson (1958,1959). Strawson reasons that 
the difficulties Hume and Descartes encountered with the 
idea of personal identity arose from their strategy of 
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analytic reduction, their wish to break down experience 
into elements. He suggests instead that we must recognise 
the concept of the person as being a primitive concept. In 
his analysis of the way people use language, Strawson 
discovered that there are a whole series of predicates (eg 
'depressed', 'tired') which refer at one and the same time 
to internal (subjective) and external (objective) events 
or states. What does this mean? Strawson (1959 p99) writes: 
"it is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states 
of consciousness, experience, to oneself, in the way 
one does, that one should also ascribe them or be 
prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself 
..... the ascribing phrases are used in just the same 
sense when the subject is another as when the subject 
is oneself ....... The dictionaries do not give two sets 
of meanings for every expression which describes a state 
of consciousness : a first person meaning and a second 
and third person meaning". 
By assigning the concept of the person this primitive status, 
Strawson makes it unnecessary to continue the attempt to 
reconstruct the idea of self which was lost in the empiricist 
and Cartesian programmes. What is now needed is an elaboration 
of the idea of self, an examination of what this idea means 
- in other words, a phenomenology of self. 
Within the framework of a philosophy of the person, we 
can begin our analysis of the concept of self from the 
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standpoint of self as agent. That is, we begin with the 
assumption that as a person one is being-in-the-world, one 
is engaged in physical and social exchange with the world, 
one invests oneself in projects and purposes. This is one 
sense of self-the self as agent, as existent, as 'I'. 
A second sense of self is that which George Herbert Mead 
has called the 'Me'. The 'Me' is created, Mead argues, 
from the infant's ability to take the role of the other, to 
take the point of view of the other, to accept that he is 
object for the other. Cooley uses the phrase "Looking-
Glass self" to convey the idea that the child sees his or 
her own actions reflected in the way others react to them. 
For example, he may begin to see himself as 'bad' if others 
treat him as if he were 'bad' or labels him as 'bad'. 
It is through this aspect of self - the 'Me' - that a 
person's sense of self, his personal identity or self-
concept, becomes moulded by society. It is through social 
interaction, the responses of others to his actions, that 
the child gradually comes to realise what his roles are to 
be, what kind of a person he is. As Becker (1971, p36) 
has put it: "we learn the full significance of our acts 
from those around us". 
The 'Me' part of the self, then, can be understood as 
our way of making sense of what we are. It consists of 
our selection from the stock of knowledge in our culture 
and in our language which is used for this purpose. Thus 
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Thus the 'Me', the self-concept or sense of identity 
that the person can refer to and talk about - his name 
his accomplishments, his goals, interests and so on -
is a reflection, either by the person himself or by 
others, upon the activities of the 'I'. This distinct: 
ion is found in the way we talk - 'I' is subject while 'Me' 
is object. Sartre sums up this relationship between the 
active and passive aspects of self in his slogan "existence 
precedes essence". That is, we act, we are, before we 
define or understand what it is we have done. 
However, although in this sense the 'I' is prior to the 
'Me', at another level the power of responsible action and 
agency emerges from the 'Me' 
"the child begins to establish himself as an object 
of others before he becomes an executive subject. 
He becomes a point of reference in relation to others 
before he becomes an agent of action for himself" 
(Becker, 1971 p33). 
This is the process Shotter (1973b,1974) has termed the 
"transformation of natural into personal powers". He writes 
that if the child "is ever to act responsibly he must learn 
to use different forms of behaviour in ways which make sense 
to other people" (Shotter, 1974 p141). The child must learn 
to monitor the meaning and significance of his actions -
they are no longer merely things that just happen to him, 
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they must become events that he takes responsibility for. 
This is part of what we mean by the idea of a person. In 
becoming a person, the child must learn to view his actions 
within the social context of meaning and significance. 
so what seems to happen is that there is a dialectical 
process through which our intentional, active self, the 
'I' continually refers back to the passive, social self, 
or 'Me' as the person undertakes social action. Through 
reference to the 'Me, he or she is able to monitor his or 
her activities in the light of the needs and intentions of 
others. And in reflecting on the results of action, the 
'me' may be either confirmed or denied. Through this 
confirmation or denial, a new area of personal control may 
be established, setting the stage for further action. And 
the process begins again. This, briefly, appears to 
characterise the way we move from action to reflection and 
back again - the process Macmurray has called the ''rhythm 
of withdrawal and return" - and the kind of effect this 
process has one our sense of self. We can say that the self 
exists in neither the 'I' nor the 'Me' alone, but in the 
dynamic interaction between them. 
To summarise what has been said so far, our analysis of the 
experience or sense of self which we possess has revealed 
that it may be useful to think of the self as constituted 
from an 'I' and a 'Me', 
relationship. The 'I' 
which are in dynamic, dialectical 
is defined as : 
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"the unique, active, idiosyncratic, subjective 
and essentially indeterminate aspect of an individual 
personality, the source of our sense of freedom, 
initiative and puzzlement as to the extent of ourselves" 
(Shotter, 1975 p120) 
"the force which moves action at any given time ..... the 
present moment which either may call some aspect of the 
past into question or ignore it·" ( Natanson, 1970 p17) 
"the 'I' is the impulsive tendency of the individual. 
It is the initial, spontaneous, unorganised aspect 
of human experience. Thus, it represents the 
indirected tendencies of the individual" (Meltzer,1967 
p11) 
"a being which is not what it is and is what it is not" 
(Sartre,1969 p79) 
The 'Me' is defined as 
"the passive, objective, relatively stable aspect of 
ourselves existing for others" (Shatter, 1975 p120) 
"continuous, memorially directed, and indexed with 
clues and keys to past action ...... the organised 
accumulation of what happened to the individual" 
(Natanson,1970 p17) 
"the incorporated other within the individual .... the 
organised set of attitudes andctefinitions, understand: 
ings and expectations - or simply meanings - common 
to the group" (Meltzer,1967 p11) 
The dynamic relationship between 'I' and 'Me' has been 
described as: 
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"a perpetual series of initiations of acts by the 
'I' and acting-back-upon the act (that is, guidance 
of the act) by the 'Me'. The act is a resultant of 
this interplay" (Meltzer,1967 p12). 
"a complex development in which each 'I' of a present 
becomes incorporated into the 'Me' of a later state 
of the self" (Natanson, 1970 p18) 
This is a description of the experience of self. It is the 
outcome of phenomenological 'suspension' of what we know 
about the practical manifestations of self in the world in 
order to uncover what it is that self means. The pheno: 
menological analysis offered here owes much to the pioneers 
in phenomenological description of the experience of self -
Husserl, Mead and Sartre. Their writings have provided the 
basis for the description of self as, on the one hand, 
constituting the knower, the agent, the ego, and on the other 
the 'Me', the being-for-others. But a complete analysis of 
the sense of self can go further. We now turn to an examin: 
ation of what might be called the domain of self. 
This domain of the self has been termed by William James the 
"empirical self". He tells us that 
"in its widest possible sense .... a man's Self is the 
sum total of all that he can call his, not only his 
body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his 
house, his wife and children, his ancestors and 
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friends, his reputation and works, his lands and 
horses, and yacht and bank account. All these 
things give him the same emotions. If they wax 
and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle 
and die away, he feels cast down - not necessarily 
in the same degree for each thing, but in much the 
same way for all" (James,1901, pp291-2). 
James goes on to discriminate between the material self 
-a person's body, clothes, home and possessions - the 
social self - his recognition by various individuals and 
groups - and the spiritual self - the inner life of the 
person, his thoughts, will, conscience and ability to 
argue. This scheme is similar to a more recent one 
proposed by Waterbor(1972) who suggests that our sense of 
self is derived from three sources of experience, which 
are the continuities we experience in our bodily awareness, 
our social roles, and our value systems. 
Are there degrees of salience or self-relevance in these 
sources of self or personal identity? James suggests that 
there are. He designates the "spiritual self" as the 
"self of selves" 
"We take a purer self-satisfaction when we think of 
our ability to argue and discriminate, of our moral 
sensibility and conscience, of our indomitable will, 
than when we survey any of our other possessions. 
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enly when these are altered is a man said to be 
alienatus a se" (James,1901 p296). 
Yet to assume that for all people in all cultures there 
is but one ordering of the sources of self is clearly 
mistaken. Individuals and groups differ in the degree of 
importance they attach to particular aspects of the self. 
Riesman's 'other-directed' person, for example, would 
identify himself most, one might think, with his social 
roles and others' perceptions of him. Similarly, when 
Fromm talks of the 'marketing personality' he implies 
that this type of person values the world of possessions 
and material wealth. In much of the writing of Rogers and 
Maslow there is an emphasis on 'organismic' or 'instinctoid' 
needs. Thus they nominate bodily feelings and awareness 
as the primary source of self. Finally, in many societies 
the concept of 'honour' is used to indicate the overwhelm: 
ing identification of the person with his values. So it 
appears as though the various sources of self-inner life, 
bodily awareness, social roles, possessions, values and so 
on - are not arranged on a dimension of self-relevance, but 
are more properly thought of as being simultaneously avail: 
able to the person. 
This is the point of view taken by existential writers. 
May(l958 p61) has written that there are : 
''three simultaneous aspects of world which characterise 
the existence of each one of us as being-in-the-world. 
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First, there is Umwelt, literally meaning ~world 
around'; this is the biological world, generally 
called the environment. There is, second, the 
Mitwelt, literally, the 'with-world', the world 
of beings of one's own kind, the world of one's 
fellow men. The third is Eigenwelt, the 'own-
world', the mode of relationship to one's self". 
May's system of analysis is clearly similar to that 
constructed by William James. The Umwelt stretches from 
the body to the furthest reases of the "world around" -
our possessions and personal spaces. The Mitwelt 
corresponds tto the "social self". The Eigenwelt, the 
world of personal meaning, is equivalent to the "spiritual 
self" of James. But, for the existentialist, "the human 
being lives in the Umwelt, Mitwelt and Eigenwelt simultan: 
eously. They are by no means three different worlds but 
three simultaneous modes of being-in-the-world". (May, 1958 
p63) • 
Our analysis of the experience of self has isolated these 
three broadly distinguishable areas of experience - the 
experience of physical embodiment, of social relationship, 
and of personal meaning and value. Having made this analysis 
however, it is necessary to emphasise the integration of 
these aspects in life as a whole, to avoid the temptation 
to reify these aspects by supposing that they can exist 
in isolation. 
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An example : the connection between the experience 
of having a body - body awareness, feeling and emotion-
and social relationship has been noted. Bakan (1968 pp6-8) 
writes: 
"somatic diseases resulting from traumatic disruption 
of social relations have been demonstrated to occur 
as quickly as within twenty-four hours. Separation 
and estrangement fromsignificant~ersons - actual, 
anticipated and symbolic - have been implicated as 
factors in numerous diseases : asthma, cancer, 
congestive heart failure, diabetes mellitus, 
disseminated lupus erythematosus, functional uterine 
bleeding, Raynaud's disease, rheumatoid arthritis, 
thyrotoxicosis, tuberculosis and ulcerative colitis". 
Schilder(1950) reports that sometimes people who lose their 
interest in the external world and social relationships may 
also display a loss of interest in their own bodies - "the 
individual does not dare to place his libido either in the 
outside world or in his own body" (Schilder,1950 p140). 
The resulting syndrome of 'depersonalisation' is described 
by Schilder in this way : 
''the patient sees his face in the mirror changed, rigid 
and distorted. His own voice seems strange and unfamil: 
iar to him and he shudders at the sound as if it were 
not himself speaking Gottfried feels that his move: 
ments are interrupted. His body feels as if it were 
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dead and he has the sensation that a dynamo is 
hissing in his head. The body feels too light, 
as if it could fly. A patient of Loewy 4 s says, 
'I feel the body not for me but for itself'. The 
patients look for their limbs in the bed. A 
patient of Pick's complains that his eyes are like 
two holes through which he looks. Patients complain 
that they do not feel the urge for urination and 
defecation. They feel as if they were dead, without 
life, like shadows. All the patients complain about 
hypochondriac sensations, noises in their ears, 
choking sensations, bubbles in the head, and sens: 
ations in the heart" (Schilder, 1950 p139). 
These excerpts from Bakan and Schilder are merely to 
demonstrate the inter-connectedness between social relation: 
ship and bodily experience, to demonstrate just how much 
our understanding of ourselves is diminished by regarding 
any single avenue of analysis as being complete in itself. 
Although we can analytically identify different modes of 
being-in-the-world, our ongoing experience of the world, 




we have already introduced the concepts of meaning, 
intentionality and time as core concepts in a philosophy 
of the person. These concepts have been justified by 
their congruence with everyday experience. They seem 
to be necessary elements in any scheme designed to help 
us understand and gain control over our everyday lives. 
Now another concept, that of structure, must be confronted. 
An adequate philosophy, or psychology, which attempts to 
do justice to experience must come to terms with the 
existence of levels, or a structure, of experience. 
To talk of experience being structured is to talk of 
meaning and to talk of time. It seems that the meaning 
that things have for us may become ceverlaidi through 
time as we learn new meanings for these same objects. 
For example, we made reference much earlier to some 
research into mother-infant interaction (Trevarthen,1977). 
In that research, it was shown that the mother often 
imitates the child. One of the experiments, however, 
involved the mother ceasing to imitate the child, while 
continuing to look at the child and continuing to make 
the right kind of facial movements. (The mother was in 
fact suddenly presented with another baby's face where 
her's had been). What happened was that the baby 
invariably became upset and withdrew from the social 
interaction. 
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Let us call this an experience of someone losing interest 
in what one is doing. And let us imagine that a child 
often has this experience - his mother often appears to 
lose interest in him, and he is often, as is natural for 
babies, upset by this. Now, let us imagine that person 
as an adult. He is talking to someone else. That other 
person loses interest, perhaps because they do not under: 
stand very well what is being said. Our protagonist 
understands this, that when someone does not follow what 
is being said, they may lose interest. But at another 
level, he is upset and withdraws. 
This kind of experience is common enough. At one level 
the situation or event has a certain meaning, often fairly 
well understood by all parties in the interaction. At 
another level, however, things are not so clear. The 
event is accompanied by echoes and resonances. It has 
been the genius of Freud to have discovered that these 
echoes and resonances are meaningful, and that, when their 
meaning has been brought to light, theysignify repressed 
or 'forgotten' events. 
This is to suggest that the meaning of events and objects 
may be structured or layered. That is, when we begin to 
reflect on what something means to us, we may begin to 
uncover layers of meaning. Berger and Luckmann (1966) 
use the term "sedimentation" to describe this kind of 
phenomenon. 
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Let us go further and look at the structure of language 
itself. It will be useful to start with this statement 
by Ricoeur (1970 p7): "language itself is from the outset 
and for the most part distorted: it means something other than 
what it says, it has a double meaning, it is equivocal." 
Ricoeur is here t9.Lking about the symbolic dimension of 
language - the possibility that a statement can signify 
more than is immediately apparent, the possibility that 
a text can have a meaning that is not immediately clear. 
And this metaphoric usage gives language much of its 
flexibility and expressiveness (see Billow,1977). 
It seems, then, that the very way we describe the world, 
through language, is structured in this sense, through 
symbolisation. The use of symbols appears to be a 
necessary component of the way we think.Piaget(1971), 
for example, claims to have traced the growth of symbolic 
thought from its biological origins. Langer(1951) 
talks of a "need of symbolisation". For her, "the symbol 
-making function is one of man's primary activities, like 
eating, looking, or moving about" (Langer,l951 p41). 
Cassirer talks about man no longer living in a 'physical' 
universe. The universe of man is now a 'symbolic' one, 
with the result that: 
"no longer can man confront reality immediately; 
he cannot see it, as it were, face to face. 
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Physical reality seems to recede in proportion 
as man's symbolic activity advances. Instead of 
dealing with the things themselves man is in a 
sense constantly conversing with himself. He 
has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, 
in artistic images, in mythical symbols and 
religious rites that he cannot see or know 
anything except by the interposition of this 
artificial medium ..... man does not live in a 
world of hard facts, or according to his immediate 
needs or desires. He lives rather in the midst 
of imaginary emotions, in hopes and fears, in 
illusions and disillusions, in his fantasies and 
dreams. 'What disturbs and alarms man,' said 
Epictetus, 'are not the things, but his opinions 
and fantasies about the things'' (Cassirer,l944 p25). 
But not only is language structured through symbol and 
metaphor, speech is structured by the multiplicity of 
gestures, speech inflections, postures and facial express: 
ions which accompany verbal communication. Such commun: 
ication - face-to-face talk - is conducted at several 
levels. Key(1975 p9) has written that ''whatever language, 
or whatever the purpose in communication, informational 
or expressive, emotions and attitudes always project 
themselves in an overlay of superimposed patterns". 
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Furthermore, such talk is also characterised by the back: 
ground expectancies and taken-for-granted assumptions held 
by conversants. It is the existence of such rules which 
makes interaction possible, the shared sense of a 'moral 
order' which makes people members of a culture, and able 
to understand the meaning of each other's actions, As 
Garfinkel (1967 pp36) has put it: 
''the memb~r of the society uses background expect: 
ancies as a scheme of interpretation. With their 
use actual appearances are for him recognisable and 
intelligible as the appearances - of - familiar -
events. Demonstrably he is familiar to this back: 
ground, while at the same time he is at a loss to 
tell us specifically of what the expectancies consist". 
Here is another means through which experience can be seen 
to be structured - the degree of 'taken-for-grantedness' 
of knowledge : 
"one experiences that which is taken for granted as 
a kernel of determinate and straightforward content 
to which is cogiven a horizon which is indeterminate 
.... ''(Schutz and Luckmann,1973 p9). 
It seems, then, that our stock of social knowledge is 
structured or layered by its accessibility, its taken-
for-grantedness, its 'obviousness'. 
Another structuring of experience comes about through the 
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' i ' 
existence of 'provinces of reality'. By this phrase 
is meant the. various worlds which we live in - the every: 
day-life world, the world of science, the world of dreams, 
the world of art, of fantasy, of a novel we are reading, 
the world of childhood and so on. Each of these worlds 
constitutes, to use Schutz's phrase, a "finite province 
of meaning", each has its own consistent cognitive style 
or system of logic and we allow each of them its own 
brand of reality (while reserving the label of "paramount 
reality" for the everyday-life world). Lewin uses the 
term "irreality" to refer to these alternative realities. 
To review what has been said in this section: We have 
looked at such phenomena as the persistence of "the basic 
intolerances, fears and resulting arxieties which arise 
from the mere fact that hun.an life begins with a long, 
slow childhood ..... "(Erikson,1950 p401), the saturation 
of language and thought with symbol and metaphor, the 
existence of paralinguistic levels of face-to-face 
communication, the dimension of taken-for-grantedness in 
social knowledge, and the existence of provinces of mean: 
ing, or alternative realities. We have seen in all these 
phenomena a structuring or layering of experience. It 
seems necessary, therefore, to include this concept in 
any adequate philosophical or psychological approach to 
the person. 
The importance of this idea of structure cannot be 
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overeffiphasised. It would not be exaggerating to say that 
the credibility or possibility of a psychology of the 
person depends on it. Put very crudely, if it were not 
for the existence of such levels of meaning, if we 
could not talk about 'depth' or unconscious processes, 
there would be no need for a psychology. All the 
knowledge we might have, or ever wish to have, about 
persons could be provided by either sociological or 
philosophical analysis. That is, we would exist as 
members of a society and our biographies and personal 
projects could be known either through reference to our 
membership o~ through the philosophical techniques of 
reflection and conceptual analysis. It is only through 
the working of this aspect of structure, of symbolisation, 
that we exist as truly enigmatic creatures who need a 
psychology, whether common-sense or otherwise, in order 
to begin to understand ourselves. 
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~ummary 
This chapter has taken a few faltering steps towards a 
philosophy of the person. No doubt the ideas expressed 
here have been expressed much better elsewhere. Neverthe: 
less, the reason for exploring such ideas has been to 
prepare the ground for other work, in particular the 
following chapter on the methodology of a science of 
persons, and then later some substantive research. 
Therefore it has been necessary to take this diversion 
into philosophy, so that later writing will not be 
overburdened with the task of justifying and legitimating 
from first principles the use of certain concepts 
introduced here. 
The concepts introduced were thoseof : being-in-the-
world, agency, intentionality, meaning, time, self and 
structure. It has been argued that these ideas are 
central to any system of thought which attempts to do 
justice to personal experience. Some of the ways in 
which traditional philosophical approaches do violence 
to experience were also examined. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A SCIENCE OF PERSONS 
part 1 Issues and problems 
Up to this point we have discussed some of the issues 
involved in the philosophy of the person. We have con: 
structed a framework within which we can think about man 
as an active, purposeful being in relation with others. 
Is this as far as we can go? Are we limited to philos: 
ophising about persons, or is there some way we can conduct 
systematic scientific research into the actual use that 
individuals find for these personal powers we have describ: 
ed? Or, on the other hand, is it an essential feature of 
what we know as scientific research that it should necessarily 
reduce the person to his or her mechanical or organic 
aspects? One philosopher who has written widely about 
the philosophy of the person - Macmurray - would agree with 
this pessimistic conclusion. Macmurray(1961 p27) states: 
"the theory of the personal is philosophical and not 
scientific. In other words, when we consider the 
self in its actuality as a personal being we do 
not initiate an anthropological enquiry. Anthro: 
pology is a science, and a scientific enquiry is 
merely objective; and an objective account is 
necessarily impersonal. From the traditional 
standpoint, with its polar oppositionof subject and 
object, we look to science for an account of man, but 
to philosophy for a theory of the self. When we 
substitute for this the standpoint of the Agent, we 
still look to science for an objective account of 
man. But it is to philosophy we must look for a 
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theory of the personal. The change of standpoint 
makes no difference to science .......... ". 
In this passage Macmurray states his belief that there is 
a fundamental opposition between the relationship of a 
scientist with his object of enquiry and the relationship 
between individuals engaged in a personal relationship -
"I can know another person as a person only by entering 
into a personal relationship with him." (p28) 
Further, not only does the kind of relationship between 
individuals ensure that the scientific relationship cannot 
be at the same a personal one, it also changes the type of 
knowledge we have of each other. If we meet as persons, 
we are both engaged in action, in fulfilling intentions. 
A personal relation is an inter-action, an acting together. 
To reflect upon this action is to withdraw from the personal 
relation and substitute an impersonal one instead: ''action 
cannot be object for a subject; for a purely objective 
attitude reduces action to behaviour and represents it as 
matter of fact, not as matter of intention". (p28) 
It should be clear that Macmurray's objection to a science 
of persons lies in his assumption that the 'scientific 
attitude' is essentially one of objective, detached observ: 
ation - the exact antithesis of the personal relationship. 
Yet Macmurray does not mean that we have no knowledge of 
people as people, for he writes that we possess a "personal 
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understanding of others which is the result of reflection 
upon our personal dealings with men and women of various 
sorts under varied conditions, and which we sometimes call 
'a knowledge of the world'." (p30) But he insists that 
this differs from scientific knowledge: 
"The one assumes, and implies, that men are free 
agents, responsible for their behaviour, choosing 
their mode of action in the light of a distinction 
between right and wrong; the other that all human 
behaviour follows determined patterns, and that the 
laws that they obey are, like those which govern all 
natural objects, discoverable by objective scientific 
methods of investigation. This duality of knowledge, 
personal and impersonal, is the concrete statement of 
the antimony of freedom and determinism". (pp30-31). 
Is Macmurray correct in his assertion that the scientific 
attitude must be accompanied by an impersonal relationship 
with the 'object' of study? If he is in fact correct then 
there is no hope that we will, in Shatter's terms, 'regain 
ourselves'. For surely the best rejoinder to the multipl: 
icity of reductionist theories of man with which we mislead 
ourselves is a humanistic science of man with which we can 
come to terms with the many real problems that confront us all. 
But to say this is to do no more than state an article of 
faith. What are the prospects that such a science might be 
possible? 
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To begin with, Macmurray's pessimism would appear to be 
unjustified. By 'science', Macmurray refers to the 
positivist, verificationist approach, which insists on 
strict operational definition of constructs and the anon: 
ymity of the researcher. And when he talks about anthro: 
pology, he is referring to the attempts of the human 
sciences to modify this approach and rationale in their 
own areas. Yet it now seems as though this model does 
not provide an adequate description of what we know as 
'science'. :.Kuhn (1962), for example, has established 
that science is a product of social processes as much as 
of individual genius, a particular method, or a particular 
philosophy. There could be no science without a scientif: 
ic community, is Kuhn's message. Polanyi(1958) argues 
that the knowledge scientists possess, or which science 
creates, is not an impersonal, objective knowledge, a 
set of theories or propositions which exists in a book or 
a library, but is instead a personal knowledge, a set of 
skills and abilities which enable the scientist to make 
statements about the world with confidence. 
Kuhn and Polanyi are making the point that the personal 
aspect of science is a necessary part of the whole scientif: 
ic process. Habermas goes further when he argues that the 
denial of the personal in the kind of positivist science 
envisaged by Macmurray will in itself lead to error. 
Habermas(1970) notes that the attempt by positivist science 
to deny the existence of personal interests or choice on 
the part of the scientist had its own effect: 
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"the purpose of freeing knowledge from interest was 
not to rid theory of the blurrings of subjectivity, 
as it were, but on the contrary, to submit the 
subject himself to an ecstatic expurgation from the 
passions". 
perhaps Habermas does not intend us to take this remark too 
seriously. He goes on to describe what happens when science 
denies its origins in personal interest "it is precisely 
pure theory, with its claim to be self-contained, that 
surrenders itself to the interests it suppresses and becomes 
ideological". Habermas is emphasising that, if :indeed the 
scientific pursuit of knowledge is bound up in personal 
interest, then to deny that interest or motivation is to 
be trapped by it. It is to be fundamentally unscientific 
in so far as the very basis of the science remains a set 
of unexamined beliefs. For Habermas, then, true science 
not only sets out to explore the external world, but also 
and at the same time engages in analysis and discussion of 
its own assumptions. Such a science cannot be value free, 
since the choice of basic assumptions must remain a free 
one, and, as Habermas himself puts it - "the truth of 
statements is ultimately bound up with the intention to 
live the true life". 
Now we arrive at a conception of science very different 
from that envisaged by Macmurray. It is a conception of 
science as a collective, systematic search for true 
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knowledge. As such, it need make no concessions to a priori 
notions concerning the desirability of an 'object attitude' 
or a metaphysics of determinism. This idea of a science 
makes a modest claim - it is the way we organise knowledge 
in our culture, within our world view. Horton(1967) has 
examined the similarities and differences between traditional 
African religious thought and Western science. Mainly, there 
are similarities - both attempt to place events in a causal. 
context wider than that provided by common sense, both use 
analogy, both postulate a unity underlying apparent diversity 
and so on. The main difference between these systems of 
thought, in Horton's view, lies in the fact that in tradition: 
al cultures there is no developed awareness of alternatives 
to the established body of traditional tenets. And even in 
this respect, it is of interest to note that Polanyi(1958 
ch9 sections 9 and 10) discusses at some length the identical 
procedures used by the Azande and by Western science to deal 
with alternative hypotheses and unwelcome facts. So, within 
this more permissive conception of science, how can we 
construct a science of persons? 
If there is to be such a thing as2 science of persons, it 
must be a science which at all levels reflects the aims and 
concepts of the philosophy of the person. For example, it is 
no use claiming to be doing research into man's sense of 
agency and then conduct this research using laboratory methods 





Nor is it appropriate to undertake research on a personal 
basis which is then exploited at an impersonal level. 
Thus, a science of persons must be conducted with~people 
and!££ these same people. 
we can get closer to what a science of persons might look 
like when we discover·that such a science must be concerned 
with everyday life. Traditional forms of science, as we 
have seen, attempt to stand back from everyday life by 
denying the personal involvement of the scientist. Another 
aspect of this objectification of, or abstraction from the 
everyday world, is the method of 'operational definition' 
of constructs. That is, the constructs, or concepts with 
which the scientist hopes to explain the events he is 
observing are identified with the outcomes of measuring 
operations - they become 'variables'. But as Douglas 
(1970 p6) has put it - "once we follow these 'disembodied 
numbers' back to their sources and see how they were 
arrived at, and what, therefore, they actually represent, 
we find that they are based on the most subjective of all 
possible forms of activity". All measurement in social 
science research must ultimately rely on the meaning that 
some social act or piece of behaviour has for some person. 
This may seem obvious when the measuring operation is a 
person answering a questionnaire - clearly he or she will 
respond according to what the item means to him or her. 
Douglas shows, however, that even objective-seeming social 
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rfacts' as coroners' statistics, police figures or 
divorce rates are the outcome of many people's interpret: 
ations of the events in question. 
For Douglas, then, any denial of the everyday life basis 
of scientific knowledge is mistaken: 
"Any scientific understanding of human action, at 
whatever level of ordering or generality, must 
begin with and be built upon an understanding of 
the everyday lives of the members performing those 
actions". (Douglas, 1970 p11) 
Not only would a science of persons "begin with and be 
built upon" the understandings that people engaged in 
everyday purposive activity have of their actions, it 
would also aim to increase our understanding of everyday 
life as well a::.:., more practically, improving everyday life. 
By 'everyday life' is meant the world of shared understand: 
ings which enable people to communicate and work together. 
This body of shared understandings is often referred to as 
'common sense' and is typically 'taken-for-granted' or 
self-evident. It is a shared knowledge implicit in social 
action or personal interaction. This is the area of life 
which a science of persons is to investigate. As Schutz and 
Luckmann(1973 p3) put it- "the world of everyday life is .. 
man's fundamental and paramount reality". 
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How can this world of everyday life be brought under 
investigation? Surely, the critic would argue, any 
scientific attempt to 'capture' the spontaneous action 
which we understand as being central to the 'naive attitude' 
within which we take for granted so much, would necessarily 
destroy what we are trying to study? This is another way 
of stating Macmurray's objection that "a purely objective 
attitude reduces action to behaviour" and thus science must 
reduce the personal to the organic or mechanical. But the 
answer to this objection also comes from Macmurray. He 
states that we possess "a personal understanding of others 
which is the result of reflection upon our personal dealings 
with men and women of various sorts under various conditions." 
"It is this "personal understanding" that forms the source 
material of a science of persons. 
It is part of what we mean when we talk about persons that 
a person is capable of conscious reflection on his or her 
ongoing action. It is this reflection Macmurray calls 
"personal understanding" and it consists of the meani~ 
of the action for the actor. The world of everyday life, 
we have said, is made up of these shared meanings. When 
someone winks at us, we know what it means. We have a 
"personal understanding" of the wink, an understanding which 
is at the same time largely a shared understanding - a wink 
has a certain meaning in our culture, in certain contexts. 
But how to gain access to these meanings and shared 
understandings for scientific purposes? 
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First of all, we can ask people what their actio~mean 
"At the heart of the explanation of social behaviour 
is the identification of the meanings that underlie 
it. Part of the approach to discovering them 
involves the obtaining of accounts - the actor's 
own statements about why he performed the acts in 
question, what social meanings he gave to the actions 
of himself and others". (Harre and Secord(1972 p9). 
However the account does not exhaust the meaning implicit 
in an action. In the first place, if we are in relation, 
at least part of the meaning of an act will lie in how the 
other person understands it, and this may not always be 
clear to the actor. This is to say that in a true relation: 
ship, the meaning of an act, a statemen~ .a gesture, is in 
some sense between the two persons. But also, as Macmurray 
puts it, the self-as-knower is a fiction of the 'egocentric', 
'purely theoretical' standpoint of traditional philosophy; 
persons are agents, the self is a self in action, engaged 
in projects not in reflection. Thus not all of the shared 
meaning which makes interaction possible is recoverable by 
conscious reflection, not least of all because it is just 
the taken-for-grantedness or obviousness of this kind of 
knowledge that makes it so basic. 
a knowing that. 
It is a knowing how, not 
So, while we must certainly use the person's account as a 
way of gaining access to meanings, we must also use observation. 
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For example, through detailed observation of 
interaction we may well decide that his account - the 
reasons he gives for that action sequence - may be 
incomplete or implausible. In passing, it should be said 
that the actor himself might well be unconvinced of the 
plausibility of his account if he were able to see himself 
'from the outside' - see for example the research on 
behaviour change following videotape playback of performance 
see (Ne1..Lsen, 1962. ; ) . Some of the comple~ issues involved in 
comparing and evaluating the various methods of self-report 
and observation are discussed below. Suffice to say that 
both observation and account gathering are necessary if we 
are to reconstruct the self-in-action of the personal 
relation. Often these two modes of research converge in the 
technique known as participant observation, in which the 
observer endeavours to share in the activities and meanings 
of his informants. 
The end-product of observation, account-gathering and 
whatever other methods we might devise to gain access to 
meanings is a description of an episode, or series of 
episodes of social life. This description, according to 
circumstances, may be in terms of who did what and who said 
what (the observer strategy) or in terms of the actors' own 
reasons and explanations (the account-gathering strategy), or, 
preferably, both. This description constitutes a text. It 
to 
is the work of the investigator first of all~make sure that 
the text is complete, and then to interpret the text. Thus, 
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a science of persons is a science of interpretation. It 
is suggested that the only way of constructing a science 
of persons which does not violate the existence of the 
phenomena it sets out to study, which neither objectifies 
persons nor denies the everyday life basis of personal 
knowledge, is to proceed by the method of description and 
interpretation. 
The basic aim of interpretation is the elucidation of 
meaning. When we interpret, we ask the question - 'what 
did he mean by that act or statement?'. When we interpret, 
we assume that the text before us is a product of purposive 
activity. The task is to uncover the purposes, intentions 
and meanings embedded in it. As Jones (1975) puts it -
"interpretation is the business of making sense of the text, 
rendering it coherent." (p182). Or Taylor(1971 p5) -"a 
successful interpretation is one which makes clear the meaning 
originally present in a confused, fragmentary, cloudy form". 
Yet it might be argued that a science of interpretation can 
make at best only a hollow claim to the title 'science'. 
For what assurance have we than an interpretation is in any 
sense 'correct' or 'valid'? If our only method is that of 
interpretation, surely there is the danger that we will 
engage in endless re-working of the same material. How do 
we know when to stop? Further, how~are we to decide between 
rival interpretations? The answers to these questions direct 
us towards important features of the science of persons. 
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In the first place, as Jones (1975) has noted, all inter: 
pretation is "aspectival" - it is taken from a certain point 
of view. This is to confirm Habermas' recommendation that 
the scientist should not deny his interest. This is to 
answer the first question - 'how do we know when to stop' -
with the rejoinder - 'it depends on what we want'. As Polanyi 
(1958 p265) has written - "we must accredit our own judgement 
as the paramount arbiter of all our intellectual performances'. 
The second question - 'how do we decide between rival inter: 
pretations?'is more difficult. 
The difficulty which arises is that there will always be 
rival interpretations. In part, this comment is a direct 
implication of what has been said above - interpretations 
are always from some point of view. Yet what is implicit in all 
this is the suggestion that there will never be a single 
point of view from which everyone will want to construct 
interpretations. To make this suggestion is to make 
assumptions about the desirability of democracy and the 
existence of conflicting world-views within one society. 
It is to accept the primacy of an 'open society', to use 
Popper's term. For, as Taylor (1974 p48) states - "a study 
of the science of man is inseparable from an examination of 
the options between which men must choose". If we insist 
on a plurality of fundamental options, it seems as though 
we must put up with a plurality of interpretive schemes. 
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This leads tc another question - 'can interpretations 
be wrong?'. Even if we accept that there will always be 
competing interpretations, do we have any way of making 
sure that an interpretation within one particular scheme 
is correct? There are three answers to this question. 
First of all there are factual criteria by which we can 
judge an interpretation. Does it ignore important parts 
of the text? Is the text an accurate description of the 
events as they happened? Is the critic's line of argument 
a logical one? So the first answer is yes, there are matters 
of fact which can lead us to reject an interpretation. 
However, if these criteria are met, it becomes difficult 
to decide on the correctness of an interpretation. As Jones 
(1975 p191) puts it: 
"because there are no formal limits to the ways in 
which texts may be taken, or the uses to which they 
may be put, it is reference to convention or tradition 
and practical inefficacy in the context which lead to 
the properly reasoned dismissal of some interpretations 
as 'implausible', 'pointless' or 'far-fetched'." 
Jones adds, "in this domain there is no timeless truth, and 
public accord determines what is accepted". We find, then, 
that just as in physical science, the acceptability of an 
interpretation, or theory, is contingent upon its acceptability 
to the scientific community (see Kuhn,1962). 
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The third and last, criterion for the accuracy of an 
interpretation is through usage. Geertz(1975) has this 
to say: 
"Theoretical ideas are not created wholly anew in 
each study; as I have said, they are adapted from 
other, related studies, and refined in the process, 
applied to new interpretive problems. If they cease 
being useful with respect to such problems, they tend 
to stop being used and are more or less abandoned. 
If they continue being useful, throwing up new under: 
standings, they are further elaborated and go on being 
used". ( p27) . 
An example might be given of the psychoanalyst Bettelheim, 
who found that what he observed in a concentration camp could 
not be assimilated into the interpretive scheme of psycho: 
analysis - "my efforts to understand the ccncentration camp 
experience through:classical psychoanalysis had broken down, 
and only then was I willing to accept the need for revising 
that frame of reference". (Bettelheim, 1960 p31). 
So, even though there may not exist statistical or predictive 
criteria with which to evaluate interpretation, there certainly 
seems to be sufficient reason for us to agree that it fulfils 
most of the conditions necessary for it to be accepted as a 
systematic, verifiable approach to knowledge - a science. 
Moreover, it is a phenomenological approach. The procedures 
we have been discussing - detailed description of everyday-
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life experience, treatment of this description as a text 
with interpretation as its key, and testing of the usefulness 
or validity of interpretation through further experience -
these are the procedures of phenomenology. 
As Spiegelberg (1960 p656) has put it, "the first objective 
of the phenomenological approach is the enlarging and deepening 
of the range of our immediate experience". This is to say 
that phenomenology attempts to go beyond the 'natural attitude', 
the pre-scientific life-world, the world of everyday-life, 
in order to examine that world: 
"as phenomenologists we should become disinterested 
bystanders watching our own conscious life. It is 
only in this manner that it can become a pure theme 
in our experience. Instead of living in the world, 
instead of investing it with our wordly interests, 
we must actually observe our life ..... as somehow 
being interested in itself" (Kockelmans, 1967 p243) 
Through such 'suspension of belief', or 'bracketing of 
existence' it becomes possible to examine the meaning of 
phenomena 
"when we 'bracket the existence' of the content of 
any immediate experience we forego all factual questions 
about the experience and focus attention exclusively 
on what it means, what is required for any immediate 
experience to have the content which our description 
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ascribes to it. When we ask this question we 
encounter 'phenomena'. The 'phenomena' to be 
described are meanings". (Schmitt,1961 p463). 
so,the methods of a science of interpretation are 
phenomenological, their aim is to make explicit meanings 
which are implicit or 'anonymous' in our experiencing of 
phenomena. But is such a science useful? Can we do 
anything ,with1 such post hoc interpretive knowledge of 
persons? Or, like the peasant in the old story, are we 
merely shooting holes in a fence and then painting the 
bullseyes around them? 
Traditionally, usefulness in the human sciences has been 
equated with the twin aims of prediction and control. It 
should be clear that a science of interpretation has as its 
goal neither of these two aims. Given the political 
implications of effective control, and the impossibility 
of significant prediction (could one predict something 
like, for example, the Theory of Relativity~), maybe there 
are more appropriate aims. In the first place, there is the 
more modest and more personal goal of anticipation. Bakan 
(1967) stresses the usefulness of being able to speculate, 
from a theoretical scheme, the possible dynamics of behaviour 
"In the matter of prediction and control of human 
behaviour, a knowledge of what an individual might 
possibly do, or possibly feel, or possibly think, 
places us well on the way towards the achievement of 
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our objective. Given a detailed knowledge concerning 
possibles, we can discourage some from becoming 
actualities. The pragmatic usefulness of knowledge 
of possibles extends from the clinical situation to 
world affairs". (Bakan, 1967 p112) 
However, as has been discussed at some length above, a 
science of persons is only possible within the 'form of the 
personal' to use Macmurray's phrase. That is, the 'scientist' 
and the 'object' of his science must be engaged in a eo-/ 
operative enterprise, one in which neither denies the agency 
of the other. And this realisation makes possible a new 
role for the scientist. No longer is he a detached 'expert' 
- he must become a eo-participant. As George Miller has said 
"I can imagine nothing more relevant to human welfare, 
and nothing that could pose a greater challenge to the 
next generation of psychologists, than to discover how 
to give psychology away". (Miller, 1969 p1074) 
Shatter (1975) argues that the human ~.ciences have always 
worked to refine or transform our 'images of man', our ideas 
of what sort of a being we are. These sciences provide 
metaphors which can extend such images and ideas (see Turbayne, 
1970) . So, one way of 'giving away' a science of persons is 
to make available for general use whatever metaphors or 
images of man we can invent. Moore and Anderson(1961) have 
put it thus 
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"one of the principal activities of social scientists 
will be, or should be, to continue the work done (for 
our civilisation) by Homer and Hesiod; ie to continue 
the job of constructing folk-models for the instruction 
and diversion of our fellow-creatures". (p431). 
To the skeptic this programme for a science of persons may 
appear impractical and idealistic when compared to the 
concerns of traditional social science. Yet the image of 
positivist social science as practical and 'tough-minded' 
is a dangerous illusion. Is it practical to conduct 
research in the laboratory and expect one's results to 
generalise to the outside world? Is it 'tough-minded' 
to ignore important human abilities - the ability to choose, 
to decide, to find meaning - because these do not fit easily 
into the experimental paradigm? Surely nothing could be 
more practical than everyday life, and nothing more 'tough-
minded' than looking at the whole problem, attempting to 
take into account the person's 
"awesome capacity to transcend himself and his immediate 
situation, to bring a vast realm of previous experience 
to bear in constructing meanings and actions for his 
immediate situation, to co-ordinate (order) his 
immediate situations with those of many others beyond 
his immediate grasp, and to project himself into an 
as yet unrealised future''· (Douglas, 1970 p42). 
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This has been an examination of some of tr.e issues involved 
in the idea of a science of persons. £ome of the methods 
which might be exploited by such a science, and some 
examples of work done using these methods, are discussed 
below. Finally, in the spirit of such a science, some 
mention should be made of, to use Habermas' term, the 
'interests' which lie behind such an endeavour. Briefly, 
for a full treatment of this topic would take us into a 
new set of problems, the sentiment which motivates a science 
of persons can be taken to be 'conviviality'. A true science 
of persons might be a 'tool for conviviality'. To say this 
is merely to affirm Illich's marvellous slogan, but at a 
deeper level it is a demand for us to examine the uses to 
which we put scientific knowledge and to examine the means 
by which we gain this knowledge. Ultimately, a science of 
persons makes this claim: 
knowing them. 
we cannot understand men without 
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part 2 Methods of a science of persons 
Introduction 
some of the issues and problems which have to be faced 
by a science of persons have been discussed. We are now 
ready to take up the question of how such a scientific 
programme could be carried out. How might a psychology 
of the person, a truly humanistic psychology, be possible? 
What would be its aims and methods? 
It is necessary to clarify the use of the term 'humanistic 
psychology'. This is the correct term to describe a 
psychology which takes as its goal the elucidation of human 
experience. Yet it is unfortunate that it should have become 
identified with the activities of a particular group - the 
'human potential' or 'growth' movement. This movement has 
been widely misrepresented and misunderstood, and it would 
be a pity to associate all of humanistic psychology with this 
relatively minor part of it. Moreover, this group has 
devoted itself to therapeutic endeavours, and a complete 
humanistic psychology must be more than a therapeutic tool. 
Giorgi (1970 p287) sums up this point of view when he states 
that : 
"many objections to psychology as a natural science 
come from clinical psychologists and therapists who 
find the natural scientific model of man irrelevant 
for their concerns and problems. We can agree to their 
objections but we feel that to substitute 'therapy 
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models' for 'mechanical models' is another opposite, 
but equal, error" 
Humanistic psychology is, then, much more than therapy. 
rt is also, at least, a programme of research and a 
c.ontinuing examination of its assumptions and biases -
a programme of 'conceptual analysis' (see Shotter, 1975 
pp35-39) . Its task is to study the ways that people use 
and misuse, invent and deny what Peter Berger has called 
the 'symbolic canopy', the system of personal constructs, 
typifications, beliefs, attitudes, meanings, emblems, myths, 
and theories through which we define ourselves, guide our 
actions and in terms of which we receive our satisfactions. 
Humanistic psychology thus takes as its goal the clarific: 
ation of meaning. 
The fundamental question it puts to the world is - what does 
it mean to be a person, a member of a group, to perform some 
action? This is to say that to understand human action we 
need to know about what has been called the 'phenomenal field' 
- the protagonist's plans, expectations, theories and s.o on, 
and also how he or she makes sense of the setting and the 
particular situational rules which prevail within it. 
The problem for the humanistic psychologist, then, is to 
get access to the meanings that a person, or group, is using. 
The most obvious method of doing this is often also the most 
appropriate - just ask them. But sometimes there are occasions 
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when people are unable to account for their actions -
for example infants are clearly unable to do this -
or are unwilling to do so. In these cases the researcher 
can employ other techniques, such as observation, role 
playing, special situations and so on, which are described 
below. As Winthrop (1963 p136) has put it : 
"the phenomenological outlook must be bolstered by 
the painstaking work characteristic of other schools 
of thought~ namely a willingness to undertake tedious 
experiments, gather case histories and employ various 
methods of free association". 
As will be seen, the fact that the humanistic researcher 
has different methods at his disposal also makes it possible 
to check the authenticity of material being gathered, by 
comparing what is gleaned from different sources. 
The aim with all humanistic research methods is to obtain 
a description of some experience or performance in terms of 
the meanings, reasons, theories and so on of those involved. 
It is essential, then, that research procedures are designed 
so that they do not import, suggest or impose meaning on 
whatever activities are being investigated. At the level 
of description, the humanistic researcher is engaged in 
'naturalistic research' (Barker,1963; Willems,1969). This 
is to say that he or she is attempting,ideally, to observe 
and record the experiences and activites of people without 
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either manipulating antecedent conditions or imposing units 
of measurement or categorisation. (Willems,1969). The goal 
is to discover what happens in the world independently of the 
operations of the researcher. Again, it will be seen that 
this is not always possible. While all research methods, 
all methods of gaining information about the world, impose 
their own limitations and systematic distortions on that 
world, some methods clearly do so more than others, and some 
phenomena of interest may need more digging out than others. 
The description obtained through naturalistic research can 
be of interest for its own sake, as a piece of reporting, 
or it can be used as the basis for interpretation and 
theorising. The value of the former function of research -
reporting - is often belittled by experimental scientists. 
Yet it goes hand-in-hand with an interest in everyday life 
and actual lived experience. Lofland(1971) talks about the 
difference between 'knowing about' and 'knowing'! 
"it happens that humans in complex, urban, industrial 
societies need to understand more people than they 
personally can encounter face-to-face. It is in large 
scale societies that people know about more people than 
they have met face-to-face. But the desire and need to 
understand and know persist, and, indeed, perhaps become 
more acute. People known about but not known may still 
be encountered at some future time. Public decisions 
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, I 
must be made about, and stances taken toward, people 
known about but not known"(p2). 
It is in the gap between knowing about and knowing that 
social science can make a contribution in constructing full, 
accurate, portraits of social settings, groups or individual 
ways of life. 
The diagram on tr.e next page displays in simplified form the 
stages involved in doing humanistic research. The first stage 
is the discovery of some problematic aspect of everyday life 
by the researcher. It is necessary to acknowledge this as 
part of the research process in the light of Habermas' 
arguments concerning the importance of the researcher's 
interests. Secondly, an effort must be made to clear the 
ground for empirical research by looking at just what the 
concepts being used in the research actually mean. Shotter 
(1975 p37) has written that, "as a preliminary to any 
scientific inquiry, we must try to state clearly and agree 
upon what it is that we are investigating, such that we may 
co-ordinate our inquiries into it in a disciplined manner". 
The necessity for this kind of 'conceptual analysis' has 
been emphasised by Winch(1958), who argues that many issues 
in the social sciences are problems in philosophy,to be 
solved by looking at use to which we put concepts, rather 
than being problems resolvable by empirical research. 
As Heather (1976 pp20-21) has put it - "the conceptual 
scheme of ordinary language is not without ambiguities and 
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:; 
contradictions but it is precisely the task of conceptual 
~alysis ........ to analyse ordinary language and make it 
fit for scientific purposes". 
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The next stage in research, the selection or enlistment 
of informants, is not without problems. The researcher 
must make contact with appropriate individuals and groups, 
and build and maintain a relationship of trust and mutual 
co-operation with them. The difficulties of this kind 
of work have been well documented in the sociological 
literature (see, for example, Adams and Preiss, 1960; 
Hammond, 1964; and Lofland, 1971). A pro~uctive relation: 
ship with research participants and informants is best 
viewed as a skill, a type of 'personal knowledge', to use 
Polanyi's phrase, and although the texts mentioned above 
are full of suggestions concerning the best way to app~oach 
informants, what to tell them, and so on, there seems little 
substitute for experience. The criteria which might be used 
in selecting informants are discussed in a later section. 
The general principles of gaining an account of a description 
of some experience or activity have already been touched upon. 
It was suggested that the aim should be to discover the mean: 
ing of such events. We now turn to an enumeration of the 
various methods available for this kind of research. After 
these methods have been identified, the strategies for 
checking the authenticity or accuracy of information gathered 
using them will be examined. Both these sections owe much 




observation The use of observation as a research method 
in psychology has become more readily accepted following the 
achievements of ethologists such as Tinbergen and Lorenz. 
However, many observational studies now use recording 
techniques such as video (see Birdwhistell, 1971) or tape 
recording (for example the work of Rogers and his colleagues 
with tapes of therapy sessions) so that the t transience~ of 
observed episodes is no great disadvantage. Much of the 
recent progress in research on mother-infant interaction 
(Trevarthen 1974, 1977~ is surely due to the ready availab: 
ility of unobtrusive video equipment. Moreover, such 
equipment is now portable and simple enough to permit true 
field rather than laboratory studies. 
Participant observation is a research technique which has 
been widely used in sociology. We might point to the work 
of Erving Goffman on the role of the mental patient, or on 
the management of stigma, as examples of research which 
demonetrates the significant contribution participant observ: 
ation techniques can make in social psychology. Becker and 
Greer (1960) note some of the advantages of participant 
observation methods - they maximise the possibility of making 
discoveries or discovering unexpected data and give direct 
knowledge of matters otherwise known about only through 
hearsay. Lofland (1971 p93) asserts that participant 
observation is "the most close and telling mode of gathering 
information". 
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~count gathering/Interviewing As has already been 
suggested, account gathering - asking people to describe 
hoW and why some event happened as it did, and what it 
meant - is the basic methodological tool in humanistic 
research. Account gathering normally takes place through 
interview, which can range from the structured 'conversation' 
of the repertory grid technique (Mair, 1970), through semi-
structured interviews which allow the informant to answer 
freely in reply to specified questions (see Lofland, 1971 
ch4; Cicourel, 1964 ch3), to the almost totally unstructured 
question-and-answer sessions which may take place in 
participant observation field studies. The purpose of all 
these kinds of interviews is the same - to uncover the ways 
the informant makes sense of some event or state of affairs, 
to gain an entry into their 'phenomenal world'. 
Many of the finest examples of interviewing and account 
gathering in recent times are to be found in the work of 
journalists such as Tony Parker (1969,1970) and Studs Terkel 
(1968). However, there are also many social scientists who 
combine sensitive interviewing with the theoretical and 
methodological sophistication necessary for scientific work 
- for example the People and Places Research Group at the 
University of Surrey (see Canter,1977; Brown and Sime, 1977). 
Their various projects in environmental psychology involve 
recording informants' reports of their experiences in domestic 
fires, in buying a house, in being a patient in a hospital. 
Other examples of research which has used account gathering 
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and interviewing are : Laing and Esterson's (1964) research 
on the families of scizophrenics, Lemert's (1962) study of 
the process of becoming paranoid, Toch's (1969~ investigation 
of the circumstances of violent crime, Cohen and Taylor's (1972) 
study of the effects of long-term imprisonment, and Stevenson's 
(1961) description of the various types of 'spontaneous 
recovery' from mental illness. 
Problem and conflict situations This category of research 
method refers to the strategy of putting the person in a 
special situation or setting a problem whose solution or 
resolution yields valuable information about that person's 
way of coping with problems and general 'working assumptions' 
or 'taken-for-granted background expectancies'. This approach 
has recently been advocated by DeWaele and Harre(1976), although 
it is similar in many ways to the 'situational testing' used by 
Henry Murray and later by the War Office Selection Boards 
(see Semeonoff,1970, ch6), and also resembles some of the 
experimental situations created by Kurt Lewin and his 
associates. In a different area of psychology, we can see 
the same principle being used by Eleanor Gibson in her famous 
'visual cliff' demonstration and by Tom Bower with his 'virtual 
object' study. In both these demonstrations the infant's 
solution of the puzzle he is set informs us about otherwise 
unknowable aspects of his competence. The situation is one 
which makes explicit an otherwise hidden or taken-for-granted 
ability. 
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such problem and conflict situations are, however, not 
to be seen as experiments in the usual sense. Experiments 
typically require measurement and control of variables. 
These puzzles, on the other hand, while giving the researcher 
control of the 'antecendents of behaviour', allow the person 
participating in the research to react in whatever way they 
like. As Garfinkel (1967 p38 , in a phrase borrowed from 
Herbert Spiegelberg) puts it, these demonstrations are best 
thought of as being, not experiments proper, but "ai.d.s eo 
a sluggish imagination". 
Some of the most intriguing and imaginative examples of 
this technique are in fact due to Garfinkel (1967). His 
"preference is to start with familiar scenes and ask what 
can be done to make trouble~·· { p37) . In a now famous series 
of demonstrations, Garfinkel had his·studentsdisrupt 
conversations or imagine they were boarders in their homes, 
in order to display the 'seen but unnoticed' background of 
common-sense understandings which make everyday social 
interaction possible. This technique is now known as 
'Garfinkelling' . 
Personal documents: Allport (1942) has suggested that 
personal documents - autobiographies, diaries, open-ended 
questionnaires, letters and literary productions - are an 
important resource in psychological research. While there 
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haS been some use made of this approach in psychiatry, 
in the sense of having patients write autobiographies 
(see Farber,1953) or create artistic productions, little 
has been done on the research front in recent years. The 
interest shown in personal documents in the pre-war years, 
with valuable appraisals of the technique from Dollard (1935) 
and Blumer (1939) as well as from Allport himself, seems to 
have waned. 
A model of the kind of research which can be done with this 
method is the study by Allport, Bruner and Jandorf (1941) 
into the effects on personality of the Nazi revolution of 
1933. These researchers conducted a prize competition for 
essays on the topic "My Life in Germany Before and After 
January 30, 1933". They received over 200 entries, of which 
90 were considered suitable for psychological and sociclogical 
analysis. These personal documents were written by fugitives 
of the Nazi regime. The reader is referred to the original 
source for demonstration of the fertility of this approach. 
The researchers themselves noted that "these documents have 
...... yielded insights that no other method of investigation 
could have yielded" (Allport et al, 1964 p21). 
More recent research with personal documents includes the 
study by Freedman(1974) of the experience of schizophrenia. 
This researcher examined more than 50 autobiographical books 
or articles written by schizophrenics during or after their 
psychotic episodes, and found a wide measure of agreement 
concerning subjectively experienced perceptual and cognitive 
disturbances. 
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personal documents have also been valuable in the study 
of suicide (see, for example, Farberow and Shneidman, 
1~61; Alvarez, 1971). Yet, as this passage from Shneidman 
(1973) testifies, such research is not simple 
''·· .... on the face of it, suicide notes would seem to 
offer a special window, unparalleled among socio-
psychological phenomena, into the thinking and feeling 
of the deed itself .... And yet, as one reads dozens 
and hundreds of suicide notes, one finds that many of 
them tell pretty much the same story. What is most 
disappointing is that most suicide notes, written at 
perhaps the most dramatic moment of a person's life, 
are surprisingly commonplace, banal, even sometimes 
poignantly pedestrian and dull. It is obviously 
difficult to write an original suicide note; it is 
almost impossible to write a note which is really 
informative or explanatory" (Shneidman, 1973 p380). 
Shneidman's pessimism indicates the difficulties involved 
in using personal documents. They are often only one piece 
in a whole mosaic which must be decoded, especially, of course, 
in studies of suicide. And they call on the researcher 
to somehow struggle through the problems of style and 
convention in order to arrive at some approximation of the 
meaning intended by the writer - a meaning which may well 
be contingent upon the intended audience or other unknown 
factors. Some of these problems are discussed in Allport 
(1942). But for an example of the kind of work which can 
emerge from this source, the reader is advised to consult 
what remains the most impressive study to have used personal .. -132-
documents - The Varieties of Religious Experience 
by William James (1902). 
public documents: Public documents such as newpapers 
and magazines, court records and hospital case notes also 
embody assumptions about motivation, cognition and social 
life which can be invaluable to the social scientist trying 
to analyse these settings. Examples of this kind of work 
are Scheff's (1966) and Nunnally's(1961) studies of the 
image of mental patients presented by the media and 
Garfinkel's (1967) exploration of hospital record keeping 
as a form of social ordering of the reality of the hospital 1 
The whole of Goffman's (1975) recent theoretical work 
Frame Analysis - has relied on this kind of material. 
A thoughtful guide to the exploitation of public documents 
and library facilities for research purposes is given by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967 ch7). 
Metaphor : Metaphor is similar to the other research 
techniques touched on so far in that it affords a vehicle 
through which the research informant can communicate. his 
or her understanding of the world to the researcher. It 
is with this meaning that the techniques known as 
'projective' (see Semeonoff,1976) can be used in hUIT-anistic 
research. Colour, texture and shape in the Rorschach, 
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the story in the TAT and the figures in the Lowenfeld 
world offer the person a metaphor he or she can use to tell 
us about the world they have constructed for themselves. 
The proverbs test devised by Bailey and Edwards (1973) is 
a good example of the deliberate use of metaphor in 
projective work. Yet this is perhaps still an unorthodox 
perspective on projective tests. Nevertheless it has been 
anticipated to some extent by Arnold's (1962) phenomena: 
logical approach to the TAT, and by Schachtel's (1967) 
experiential treatment of the Rorschach. Both Arnold and 
Schactel were concerned with the question - what is the person 
trying to tell us in what they say about the test stimuli? 
In a very different context, Cohen and Taylor (1972) asked 
long-term prisoners for their comments on various fictional: 
ised accounts of prison life. This gave the prisoners an 
opportunity to express their thoughts and feelings about 
prison through the words and images provided by perhaps more 
articulate writers. 
However, metaphor as a research tool is not limited to such 
situations as these, in which the researcher is consciously 
supplying or attempting to elicit metaphors. People use 
metaphors in everyday conversation, and therefore the images 
and analogies used by individuals and groups can be collected 
just as readily in field or media research as in laboratory 
settings. It often turDs out that a metaphor will crystallise 
the meaning of an event - as Cassirer (1946) has put it, in 
metaphor the range of concepts or experience to which we 
refer is "distilled into a single point". 
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experiments Problem and conflict situations 
such as those mentioned earlier suffer from being conducted 
in the special setting of the laboratory. Thus, however 
realistic they may appear to be, the participant is neverthe: 
less aware that, ultimately, they are only games or tests. 
Nature, howeveP, provides her own problem and conflict 
situations from time to time, and these may, within the 
bounds of ethics and taste, be of interest to the humanistic 
researcher. Out-of-the-ordinary circumstances such as 
disaster, war, illness and so on my bring to the surface 
meanings and assumptions which are submerged in everyday 
routine. While novelists and dramatists have always known 
that important issues are often thrown up by extraordinary 
happenings, social scientists are or·ly beginning to recognise 
that these events can be useful sources. Examples of work 
which has been done with this approach are Lifton's 
studies of victims of 'thought reform' (Lifton 1961), 
natural disaster (Lifton and Olson, 1976), and work with 
Vietnam War veterans (Lifton,1973), Cohen and Taylor's(1972) 
look at long-term imprisonment as an experiment in 'psycho: 
logical survival', Stoller's (1968) research into trans: 
sexuals and sexual identity and the work on naturally 
occuring instances of 'sensory deprivation' (see Lilly,1956; 
Miller,1962). It should be clear that the 'natural experiment' 
only provides a setting in which useful information can be 
gathered - other techniques, such as participant observation 
and interviewing, must be used as well. 
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A9tive role playing The rules for social interaction 
which prevail within a particular setting are of interest 
(see Harre and Secord, 1972, especially ch9). It is 
through his or her perception of and understanding of these 
rules that a person can act in a way which seems approp: 
riate to the situation and to the needs of others. One 
means of discovering the structure of such rules is through 
role playing. That is, it may be difficult,or hazardous, 
to directly enquire into the rule-structure of a particular 
setting, or the expectations which accompany a particular 
role. In these instances it may be useful to attempt to 
reconstruct the situation or role through active role 
playing. Even when the setting can be directly studied, 
this technique may prove to be a valuable source of 
supplementary information, or a means of checking models 
discovered through field research. 
Mixon (1972), for example, has used role-play techniques 
to discover the situational cues which set the scene for~·a 
particular type of performance. Mixon's research involved 
reconstructing the Milgram obedience experiments in a non-
realistic (ie, obviously role-playing - the shock machine 
was a drawing on a piece of paper) manner. In this setting, 
the cues and instructions given by the 'experimenter' were 
varied, and it was shown that the levels of 'shock' 
admin~tered varied accordingly. 
~ 
In a rather different kind of study, although one similarly 
using role playing, Garfinkel (1967) analysed the strategies 
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of a transsexual presenting himself as female. He writes 
Thus 
"the experiences of ..... intersexed persons permits 
an appreciation of ..... background relevanciE:s that 
are otherwise overlooked or difficult to grasp because 
of their routinesed character and because they are so 
embedded in a background of relevances that are simply 
'there' and taken for granted" (Garfinkel,1967 p 118). 
role playing, the attempt to play the part of, or 
'pass' as, someone else, can reveal much about what it is 
like to be that kind of a person. This has long been known 
by practitioners of 'psychodrama' and other therapies. 
And, indeed, Mead has stressed the importance of taking the 
role of other in the development of the self-concept. A 
final example of the potency of active. role playing as a 
research technique is the journalistic account of John Howarct 
Griffin (1962) who, in his well-known book Black Like Me, 
describes how he travelled through the Deep South as a Negro 
Introspection Introspection is a research technique 
the very mention of which is enough to arouse experimental 
psychologists' hosilities and suspicions. Boring (1953 p174) 
expresses these feelings in a mild enough form when he states 
that- "introspection went out of style .... because it had 
demonstrated no functional use and therefore seemed dull, and 
also because it was unreliable". 
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The reinstatement of introspection has been advocated, 
however, by Bakan (1954,1967). Bakan notes that the demise 
was 
of introspection;said to have come about at a time when it 
was in difficulties - the controversy over 'imageless thoughts' 
_ and Watson appeared with an a.l terno.ti ve research programme 
which might produce less equivocal results. That, at least, 
is the 'official' version (Boring, 1953). However, Bakan 
(1954 p106) suggests that 
"in the light of what we have learned from psychoan: 
alysis, a rather simple explanation suggests itself. 
These investigators were using themselves and each 
other as subjects. They had struck the unconscious, 
and particularly unconscious motivation, and had to 
probe it if they were to make any headway. However, 
as we know today, probing the unconscious tends to 
anxiety and resistance; and these investigators 
simply were not prepared to undergo the necessary 
personal trials involved". 
Bakan is proposing that the methods of psychoanalysis might 
be allied with the objectives of classical introspection -
the discovery of knowledge rather than therapy - to constitute 
a useful research tool. He argues that we can be aware of 
such error tendencies as repressing material or supplying 
socially acceptable material, and taJ..:e sui table precautions 
against them. A truly scientific introspection wowd 
ttf\d 
oscillate "between a free expressive moodf\an analytic mood, 
with the free expression being the subject of the analysis". 
Bakan,1954 p110). He gives examples of how this might be 
accomplished. 
Introspection appears to have two main uses. The first is 
in making it possible to do research into experiences which 
might be difficult to investigate in any other way : 
"introspection has its maximum value on those very 
experiences for which there may be no conspicuous 
physical stimuli, such as grief, joy, anxiety, 
depression, exhiliration, etc" (Bakan, 1954 p107). 
we might also add that introspection offers a way of looking 
at the meaning of such experiences. Secondly, introspection 
can at least yield hypotheses concerning the possible dynamics 
of such experiences - "the knowledge that a certain dynamic 
is possible enhances the sensitivity of the psychological 
observer" ( Bakan, 1954 p116) . 
Action research Finally, action research must be 
acknowledged as a useful approach in any science of persons. 
Many of the methods discussed above require the active co-
operation of informants and research participants - they 
"treat the subject as expert and colleague" to use Mischel's 
(1977) phrase. Action research (see Clark, 1976) has 
traditionally attempted tc combine research with a commitment 
to change or improve social conditions in line with the needs 
and wishes of those directly concerned. This perspective 
can be profitably assimilated into a wider variety of types 
of research so increasing the levels of co-operation and 
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sense of shared purpose between those involved and thereby 
indirectly increasing the effectiveness of whatever research 
methods are being used. 
These are some of the research methods which might be used 
by a science of persons, a truly humanistic psychology. 
The aim of these methods is to construct a description of 
relevant portion of people's experierce. Their acceptability 
as tools for a humanistic psychology lies in their congruence 
with the deeper philosophical asumptions of such a science. 
That is, these methods respect the agency of persons, their 
being-in-the-world, and attempt to record, not behaviour -
which could be anything, the behaviour.of organisms, the 
behaviour of molecules, the behaviour of sand in t.the wind 
but the distinctly human attribute of meaning. Such methods 
are no guarantee of truth. Unlike the logical positivist, 
the humanist does not believe that true knowledge results 
from the blind application of the methods of science. So 
these methods are best seen as techniques whereby a search 
for knowledge can be facilitated. Ultimately, the results 
of research depend on the imagination and good faith of the 
researcher. The next section describes some of the ways these 




one of the most important principles in humanistic research 
is that of attempting to capture as fully and as sensitively 
as possible the actual lived experience or actually~held values 
and opinions of informants. This stance is of course very 
different from the one take~ by experimental psychology, 
where the participant's freedom of action and ability to 
express his version of what is happen~ng are severely 
curtailed in the hope of gaining experimental control, 
certainty·and objectively verifiable, 'true' results. And 
this leads to the question - does humanistic psychology make 
the mistake of trading off certainty for sensitivity? To 
what extent can we say that our version of a science of 
persons will enable the accumulation of knowledge about the 
world which will be useful for decision making and social 
policy? Or is humanistic psychology inevitably subjective 
and unverifiable? To answer these questions we must 
consider the problem of checks and criteria in this type of 
research. 
The first set of checks occurs at the stage of selection 
of research participants or informants. The credibility 
and competence of informants is clearly an important factor 
in determining the usefulness of accounts. A good informant 
must be knowledgeable, must have access to the information 
being sought after, and must be motivated to co-operate 
(Back, 1956). In humanistic research, these issues are 
of more concern than matters of sample size, control groups 
and matching; one full account of an event is worth more 
than a hundred partial versions. 
The methodology of humanistic research, as outlined here, which 
ir.cludes description followed by inter·pretation, is ideally 
suited to studying both individual cases and large samples. 
Today the vast bulk of research work in the social sciences 
uses large samples. Presumably the use of large samples 
and the implicit assumption that experiments be repeatable 
is an attempt to mimic the physical sciences. This passage 
from a researcher who has studied ooe of the most characterist: 
ically unrepeatable and individual areas of human experience -
mysticism - should serve to put some of these assumptions 
into perspective 
"it is sometimes argued that a further obstacle to the 
study of mystical experience is that it is not only 
irrational and unique but also rare, not easily 
repeatable, and perhaps not within reach of everybody; 
hence, so the suggestion goes, such experience should 
be excluded from the realm of objective knowledge ..... 
(but) In physics experiments like the Michelson-
Mor}~y were highly trained men and their experiment 
is not easily repeatable. True in principle many people 
could be trained that way, and some might succeed in 
doing the experiment again. But exactly the same -
might be said with regard to mystical experiences. 
Most people are able to learn certain techniques of 
concentration and in due course submit at least some 
of the claims of mystics to a test. Not everyone's 
effort would have the guarantee of a beautific vision 
and not everyone would obtain Moksa or Nirvana - but 
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' i . . 
not everyone would be successful in the Michelson-
Morley experiment, or be invited to join the Princeton 
Institue for Advanced Studies" (Staal, 1975 pp57-8). 
part of the process of selecting informants is the act of 
creating a relationship within which research can be carried 
out. At one time this would have been called 'establishing 
rapport', but in fact the relationship between researcher 
and informant or research participant in humanistic research 
goes far beyond mere questions of rapport. A contract must 
be entered into in which it is clear to both parties what 
it is they are contributing to, and getting from the research 
effort. Certainly an agreement about confidentiality must 
be part of any such contract, but it also seems necessary to 
clarify matters such as who the research is for. As Sanford 
(1970 p10) has put it 
" ...... we have contributed to the dehumanisation of our 
research subjects by reducing them to 'respondents' for 
the sake of enterprises that never yield any benefit to 
them". 
But it is not only for reasons of ethics and dignity (see 
Cottle,1975) that we should avoid "enterprises that never 
yield any benefit" to research informants. 
is 
It/also the 
case that people are not disposed to reveal uncomfortable 
facts about themselves, or make observations with thoroughness 
and accuracy, for a project they feel they have no stake in. 
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DeWaele and Harre (1976) discuss the difference it makes 
to research participants when the researcher is not an 
anonymous, high-status 'expert' but is instead someone 
with whom they are engaged in a shared enterprise. Toch(1968), 
for example, has pioneered the 'eo-researcher' study, and 
his book contains the most complete description of this 
technique, which involves employing and paying, as eo-
researchers, members of the community or social group to 
be studied. The advantages of eo-research include the 
following the participant is highly motivatec to 
contribute, he or she is in a position to correct the 
researcher's gross errors, the researcher is in a good 
position to judge whether the informant is being honest. 
These three features are absent from most traditional 
experimental or psychometric research, and it is cf 
interest to recall the statement made by Willems and 
Willems (1965 p69-70) in relation to the research described 
in Chapter 1 "it may be that the face-to-face presence 
of the investigator provides a continual reminder to the 
subject to respond as honestly and carefully as possible''· 
Of course the existence of a good relationship between 
researcher and informant is no guarantee of honesty and 
accuracy. For example, Wax (1952), in an essay which is 
essential reading for anyone interested in the problem of 
researcher-informant relationships, writes 
"While it is true that some information will be given 




' ' . f 
a great deal of communication between human beings, 
whether in field situations or in ordinary life, takes 
place on a neutral or even hostile level. Inexperienced 
field workers sometimes err in regarding the statements 
of friendly informants whom they like as more truthful 
or more valuable than those of offensive or less 
engaging individuals. In point of fact, the latter 
may give more significant information, since informants, 
like other humans, tend to conceal unpleasantness from 
those they like, and, conversely, delight in telling 
the bitter truth to those they dislike" (Wax, 1952 p35). 
What the relationship between researcher and informant does 
make possible, however, is the opportunity for each to test 
out the other's integrity. As Wax has commented, an 
inexperienced researcher can be fooled;· so can an informant. 
Humanistic methods at least make it possible for each to 
use their powers of judgement to settle this matter to their 
own satisfaction. 
What has been said so far is, in a sense, preliminary. We 
have discussed the selection of informants and the establish: 
ing of a contract between them. Both these issues have their 
contribution to make to the accuracy and authenticity of a 
study. But the essential part of a study is its description 
of some part of life. How can we be sure that this descript: 
ion is accurate and authentic? To answer this question we 
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examine some of the checks used to monitor the content 
of accounts. 
Internal consistency it is unlikely that an informant 
will be able to maintain a deception throughout a lengthy 
report. Thus the internal consistency of an account is 
evidence for its authenticity. 
External corroboration the content of accounts may be 
checked against external sources. For example, the 
research on behaviour in fires carried out by the People 
and Places Research Group was able to call on forensic 
and Fire Officers' reports regarding the likely spread 
and intensity of fires. 
Concordance of accounts: the degree of agreement between 
different reports of the same incident may be evidence for 
the authenticity of these reports. For example, Lemert's 
study of the process of becoming paranoid involved reconstruct: 
int the story of how a patient had come to be so labelled 
by using the accounts of others on the scene - family, friends, 
colleagues - to check and augment the patient's own version. 
Concordance between different methods many of the studies 
mentioned in this chapter have used more than one method. 
For example, Cohen and Taylor (1972) used accounts, personal 
and public documents, participant observation and metaphor. 
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Agreement across methods is strong evidence that the 
information being gathered is, in some sense, valid. 
Negotiation of accounts it is the task of the 
researcher to construct an adequate description of the 
informant's experience or performance. The informant 
remains at least one criterion of the accuracy of the 
description. The adequacy of description, therefore, 
can be checked through negotiation - in two ways. 
Firstly, while the account is being gathered, perhaps 
during an interview, the researcher may inquire whether 
such is the case, or whether the informant is actually 
saying that ....... In this way the researcher can 
continually check out or negotiate his idea of what the 
other's experience might be. Secondly, once accounts 
have been gathered, the researcher can present informants 
with his overall description, and ask them to comment on 
it. It is of course necessary to include these comments 
in the final account or negotiate them further -
negotiation is an ongoing process. This is to subscribe 
to Mair's (1970 p167) proposal to use a "model for enquiry 
patterned on some of the important features of the sort of 
activities which constitute conversations''· 
Recognising an authentic world: of course the actual 
informants need not be the only judges of the accuracy or 
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authenticity of a description. We are all capable to 
some extent of judging whether a description of some 
area of life is at least credible. Further, we can 
test the portrayal by using it as a guide to that area -
will it serve to help us better understand some group or 
setting we have never encountered before? 
psathas (1973 p12) describes this criterion of adequacy 
as being a matter of whether -
"the descriptions and accounts of the activities 
would allow others - not directly knowledgeable as 
to their occurences but sharing the same cultural 
stock of knowledge - to recognise the activities if 
confronted with them in the life-world after having 
only read or seen the account presented by the social 
scientist analyst ...... That is, armed with 'only' 
the knowledge gained by reading the account presented 
by the observer-scientist, would someone else be able 
to understand what he was seeing when confronted with 
the actual life-world reality of the events described?" 
There are a further two important checks which should be 
employedin humanistic research. The first is the 'adversary 
method' proposed by Levine (1974). Levine suggests that 
social scientists might learn from the rules of cross-examin: 
ation and evidence which have been developed in legal systems. 
This is really a plea to take seriously competing interpretat: 
ions, versions or theories. Indeed, in research which depends 
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on accounts from informants, some way must be found to 
reconcile conflicting accounts. While concordance of 
accounts may be a criterion for accunacy, it is a rarely 
attained ideal - witnesses or informants have their own 
versions of reality, and their own languages for expressing 
them in. 
Further, Taylor (1971) notes that in a science based on 
interpretation, the only rejoinder to a different inter: 
pretation of an incident is an interpretation of that 
interpretation. This is known as the 'hermeneutical circle'. 
Levine's 'adversary method' is a practical means by which 
humanistic researchers can incorporate counter-arguments and 
objections into their work. 
Another crucial feature of humanistic research is the 
researcher's account of how the research was carried out. 
It is only through comprehensive knowledge of how a piece 
of research was carried out that we can decide on important 
aspects of its authenticity. The researcher must make 
explicit the controls and operations involved in each stage 
of the research. 
This completes the list of checks and controls available 
to the humanistic social scientist. It should be clear 
that a true science of persons is a real possibility -
adequate methods and a growing corpus of completed work 
suggest that there is an emergent alternative paradigm 
for research in social science. At the same time, however, 
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much work remains to be done. For example, few studies 
have made use of the range of checks available. Of 
course, there is a lack of specialised journals, teaching, 
or grant-aided projects in this area. But, these matters 
aside, the value of such methods remains unproven - only 
the future will tell if this hope of a science of persons 
will come to fruition. 
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M§tking sense of qualitative materials 
There remains a stage of the research process about which 
little has been said - the stage of interpretation, analysis 
or theorising. As has already been discussed, much useful 
research can be done with minimal analysis - for example 
description can be valuable in its own right, and the 
'naturalistic research' programme has concentrated on 
"atheoretical, phenomena centered data" (Barker, 1969, p39). 
However, it seems that even for many practical purposes 
analysis and interpretation are desirable. A good 
description is one which selects the relevant features of 
a situation -a complete description of most events would 
swamp the reader in tedious detail. As Lofland has put 
it, description is usually analytic anyway 
"even if one explicitly intends not to analyse, in so 
far as one does not present 'everything' one is 
engaging in analysis by default. To select some things 
from a larger body of materials is to make analytic 
judgements. If that is the case, it is certainly more 
useful to go on to a conscious process of decision 
making about what one is doing than to obscure it under 
the mantle of inarticulate intuition" (Lofland, 1971 p6). 
Further, the 'naturalists' notwithstanding, it seems to be 
the hallmark of science to develop conceptualisations and 
theories concerning its subject matter. Science typically 
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goes beyond the information immediately given, it 
postulates the existence of laws, rules or essences. 
After all, people do this anyway. Part of the subject 
matter of a science of persons must be their common-sense 
theories and conceptualisations. It is the job of the 
social scientist to provide ''an explicit rendering of the 
structure, order and patterns" of life (Lofland, 1971 p7). 
While the people being studied may have an implicit or 
inarticulate understanding of this "structure, order and 
pattern", they are living it more than analysing it, and 
there is plenty of scope for the social scientist to 
clarify and make explicit the meanings involved in everyday 
action. 
But, how is this to be done? How can the tangled mass 
of field notes, accounts, personal documents and so on that 
are the materials of qualitative research be moulded into a 
systematic treatment of a particular topic or problem? It 
is unnecessary to answer this question in great detail -
full descriptions of this process are available in Glaser 
and Strauss (1967), Lofland (1971) and elsewhere. We will 
address, instead, some of the issues and general principles 
involved in this work, bearing in mind that the earlier 
discussion of interpretation is also relevant here. 
One of the first tasks in constructing a description of a 
piece of social life, one that will be suitable for further 
analysis, is to discover the division of episodes within the 
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ongoing pattern of interaction (see Harre and Secord, 1972 
p154) • It seems to be quite simple for people to agree 
on what constitutes a particular episode. For example: 
a study by Dickman (1963) in which people were asked to 
identify episodes in a film of some social interaction. 
Not only did Dickman find a large measure of agreement 
among observers regarding beginning and end poin~s of 
episodes, but it also seemed that the episodes identified 
were meaningful - the themes people attributed to episodes 
always implied a piece of goal-directed activity on the 
part of the actor. 
so, this is the first task in analysis of qualitative 
information - the identification of meaningful episodes, 
which leads to a description of events in terms of sequences 
of acts, and allows initial discovery of any processes at 
work. 
The next stage is categorisation or coding of this informat: 
ion. Some of the practical short-cuts applicable to this 
stage, for example writing instances on cards and shuffling 
them into some likely ordering, are described by Lofland(1971) 
and Glaser and Strauss (B67). What the researcher is 
basically trying to do is to categorise episodes either in 
terms abstracted from the language of informants or in 
terms constructed by the researcher himself. Episodes or 
incidents are coded in terms of $many categories as possible. 
By comparing episodes coded similarly, general theoretical 
properties may emerge. Glaser and Strauss (1967 eh 5) call 
this the "constant comparative method". 
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Finally, the researcher must tidy up all these categories 
into a theoretical model. Deviant categories or episodes 
must be accounted for, and higher order concepts may be 
called into play. The analyst must then write the theory 
_ present descriptive material and theoretical analysis in 
a manner which will make it intelligible to those interested 
in it - including significant laymen~. 
Two comments need to be made with respect to this scheme 
of analysis. Firstly, it represents a use of qualitative 
material in which theoretical analysis is 'grounded' (Glaser 
and Strauss) in descriptions of everyday-life. As Glaser 
and Strauss (1967 p5) put it - "grounded theory is derived 
from data and then illustrated by characteristic examples 
of data". Thus it is a way of generating theory which 
has relevance in terms of actual experience, and which can 
be translated back into that experience or that situation. 
This compares with the kind of usage which has often been 
made of qualitative material - illustration or verification 
of theories which have been generated Qr thought up far from 
the real-life situation. Thus this kind of 'grounded' 
approach is truly phenomenological, it is a recipe for pheno: 
menological science of persons as opposed to the verification: 
ist treatment of qualitative information, which has all too 
often been merely a preliminary or supplement to traditional 
quantitative 'scientific' approaches. 
A second comment is that this type of work makes call 
upon personal qualities of the researcher. Clearly, the 
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discovery of coding categories is no automatic process, 
but involves the creative imagination of the analyst. 
A sensitivity to the nuances of meaning in accounts is 
required. The researcher must attempt to enter the 
phenomenal world of informants, to figure out whatever 
it was they meant when they said or wrote something. 
And all the time he or she must be aware of his or her 
own biases and possible areas of blindness. Finally, 
this approach requires painstaking work. Typically 
accounts, field notes or films must be read or seen 




A science of persons, a truly humanistic psychology, 
which is in harmony with the basic tenets of a philosophy 
of the person, has been described in this chapter. 
While even a chapter is too short a space to devote to 
such an important topic, it is hoped that the reader 
will have some idea of what such a science would look 
like, and what it could achieve. Not the least of its 
achievements might be to give psychological research 
a measure of dignity and an impetus to find out about 
things that really matter to people. 
To reach back to the end of the first part of this 
chapter, where it was said that we cannot understand men 
without knowing them, the conclusion which again presents 
itself is that the essential feature of a humanistic 
science, and this is what makes it distinct from a 
mechanistic or an organismic science, is its insistence 
on the centrality of the relationship between researcher 
and person being researched. For example, this passage 
from Cottle (1975 p25): 
"it is a contract essentially of friendship, of mutuality, 
and not merely one of questioning and answering. It 
is a contract predicated on a request that persons share 
moments of their lives ..... ! go to people, and they 
give me real as well as symbolic moments of their time. 
I go, moreover, to speak to them, not strictly to 
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research a problem or gather material that might 
elucidate some greater issue of which the other 
person is merely a convenient example". 
This sounds very idealistic. And it is - few researchers 
will ever achieve the level of sensitivity attained by 
cattle. But, even if this is an ideal, it is the way a 
science of persons must be conducted. As Macmurray 
(1961 p28) said - "I can know another person as ~ person 
only by entering into a personal relation with him". I 
can know other people as people only by talking to them. 
The humanistic researcher, then must remain balanced between 
the necessity of being in an authentic relationship and the 
desire to gather knowledge. It is this skill, not the lists 
of methods, checks and principles set out above, which makes 
humanistic research possible. The humanistic researcher's 
most important tool is himself or herself. It is here that 




THE PERSONAL MEANING OF TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION 
Introduction 
-------
Although meditation is a term that covers a wide variety 
of practices, from violent physical exercise to silent 
contemplation, there is some agreement that there exist 
fundamental processes common to them all (Naranjo,1972; 
Naranjo and Ornstein, 1973). Also, it has been claimed 
that there are similarities between forms of meditation 
recently introduced from other cultures and religious or 
even everyday activities found in Western society (Weil, 
1972; Berger, 1969; Benson, Beary and Caro, 1974). Thus, 
while this study is restricted to the experience of 
practitioners of one school of meditation, Transcendental 
Meditation, it is hoped that its conclusions and the 
material presented will be of value to those interested 
in other forms of meditation and religious experience. 
But, more than this, Transcendental Meditation (TM) is a 
social-psychological phenomenon deserving of attention in 
its own right. At the social level, the TM movement has 
grown from nothing in 1958 to its present position, nearly 
twenty years later, of having perhaps a million supporters 
in the Western industrial nations, considerable financial 
holdings, and, not least, some kind of impact on the culture 
as a whole. At the individual level, many of the people who 
have become involved with the TM movement report that they 
are happier and more satisfied with life - they claim to 
have 'changed', 'developed' or 'grown' as a result of using 
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thiS meditation technique. So, the TM phenomenon might 
well repay study for what it can reveal about social 
movements or 'personal growth' in general. 
TM? 
But, what is 
Briefly, TM is a meditation practice originally developed 
in the Vedic tradition of India and brought to the West 
by an Indian Guru, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. The practice 
basically consists of sitting with eyes closed in a 
comfortable upright posture for twenty minutes each morning 
and evening and allowing one's attention to favour a mantra, 
a Sanskrit word or sound. Initiates into TM undergo a 
standardised teaching procedure, beginning with an introduct: 
ory talk, then a ceremony at which the technique is taught, 
and three follow-up meetings with the teacher. A fee 
approximately equivalent to three quarters of one week's 
income is charged. No alterations of life-style, dress 
or diet are demanded. Teachers of TM themselves undergo 
a lengthy training programme, and all are personally examined 
by the leader of the movement, Maharishi, himself. TM 
is certainly one of the most convenient forms of meditation 
to study, since it is taught under strictly controlled 
conditions and its adherents are enthusiastic about 'scient: 
ific validation' of their claims concerning its efficacy. 
At present there are something in the region of 50,000 TM 
initiates in Britain, while the number in the USA approaches 
the million mark. 
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It is of interest that a meditation technique, and indeed 
whole system of thought, which evolved in one culture could 
become so central to the lives of members of a very different 
culture. At least some of the success of TM in bridging 
this cultural gap must be due to the background of its 
leader. For not only does Maharishi embody the 'continuity 
of divine awareness' characteristic of the enlightened man, 
the guru (see Brent, 1972), but also claims for his own the 
rationality and objectivity of science. 
has written: 
As one follower 
"the meditation has been made available in our time by 
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, who in turn attributes his 
inspiration to his own master. For Maharishi was 
the closest disciple of a renowned Indian teacher, 
Swami Brahmananda Sarasvati (1869) - (1953). For 
most of his life Swami Brahmananda was a strict recluse, 
but for the last thirteen years or so he was prevailed 
upon to become Shankaracharya of Jyotir Math, in the 
Himalayas ......... After his master's death Maharishi 
remained for two years in solitude and then began to 
teach. He inaugurated the Spiritual Regeneration 
Movement on a world-wide basis on 31st December 1957 
• • • • • • • • • • 
1 1 
( Camp be 11 , 1 9 7 3 p 1 0 ) . 
Before this, however, Maharishi is alleged to have graduated 
from Allahabad University in 1942 with a degree in physics 
(see Robbins and Fisher, 1975), for details of Maharishi's 
early life). Legend has it that Maharishi was on the verge 
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of settling into conventional Hindu married life when he met 
his master and realised he would have to follow the path 
of devotion. So in Maharishi we have a man who seems to 
have assimilated both the ancient traditional knowledge 
of Eastern mysticism and the modern, 'scientific' world-
view of Western society. Certainly, in recent years the 
TM movement has made great efforts to secure 'scientific 
validation' of its claims. The philosophical side of the 
TM system is now taught under the name 'Science of Creative 
Intelligence'. These are two of the ways in which TM 
attempts to present Vedic ideas in Western terms, and this 
whole development is made possible by Maharishi's unique 
personal history. 
But at the same time it can be seen that there has beeR 
a readiness in Western society to learn from the religious 
traditions of other cultures. Several commentators have 
noted that science, bureaucracy, technology, the mass media 
and all the other trappings of modern industrial society 
have altered man's sense of who he is and what his place 
is in the world. Whereas we can imagine that primitive or 
pre-industrial man lived in a moral world of unquestioning 
religious belief and a social world in which his identity 
and status were fixed and stable, modern man is faced with 
the dilemma of relativism - he must choose his beliefs, he 
must construct his own identity. So for modern man, the 
sources of right action and conduct - his beliefs and his 
concept of self - are problematic as they have never been 
before. 
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Moreover, it appears that modern man's 'existential crisis' 
has come about primarily through the secularisation of 
society, the diminishing in importance of organised religion. 
For example, Berger and Kellner (1974 p75) write: 
"through most of empirically available human history, 
religion has played a vital role in providing the 
overarching canopy of symbols for the meaningful 
integration of society. The various meanings, 
values and beliefs operative in a society were 
ultimately 'held together' in a comprehensive 
interpretation of reality that related human life 
to the cosmos as a whole". 
This "comprehensive interpretation of reality" once provided 
by religion has been largely replaced in modern society by 
the essentially impersonal, ever-changing world-view provided 
by science. No doubt Berger speaks for many when, comment: 
ing on the consequences of the scientific world-view, he 
writes that "there is nothing very funny about finding oneself 
stranded, alone, in a remote corner of a universe devoid of 
human meaning" ....... . 
The popular appeal of the TM movement must be seen in this 
context. The context is one of generalised feelings of 
alienation, dissatisfaction with present-day ways of life, 
a sense of insecurity, lack of direction, and even, from time 
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to time, an awareness of impending disaster. The act of 
meditating can be seen as an individual bid to escape from 
this chaos, to find a space to be oneself, outside the 
demands and routines of everyday life. Yet at the same 
time TM also helps the person to make sense of this every-
day world its philosophical basis offers a "comprehensive 
interpretation of reality", an alternative to a baffling 
"pluralisation of social life-worlds" (Berger, Berger and 
Kellner, 1974). Finally, it offers the opportunity of 
doing something positive about the world. 
The TM meditator is part of a world-wide network of like-
minded people working together to create a better society. 
The international aspect and sense of growing achievement 
and impact are expressed in this expert from a TM Newsletter: 
"Maharishi appeared twice on the nation-wide Merv 
Griffin show, accompanied by world famous meditators. 
Two of the books on TM have been best sellers for many 
successive weeks. The movement now operates a full-
scale university campus at Fairfield, Iowa and a 
television station in California reaching 20,000,000 
people. There are 4 residential academies, 2 in New 
York State and 2 in California. Among the very many 
items regarding TM in social and rehabilitation 
programmes is the news that 120 prisoners of the top 
security wing of Folsom jail are learning at their 
own request, and along with dozens of famous people in 
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sport it is estimated that 8% of top league baseball 
players now meditate" (Scottish Newsletter, Spring 1976). 
The meditator's sense of participating in a movement which 
will bring benefit to the world as a whole are reinforced· 
by the success of, for example, TM-inspired treatment 
programmes for drug users (see Brautigam,1971); Benson,1969). 
Also, however, it is believed that if there are enough 
meditators in a community, the personal benefits experienced 
by actual practitioners will rub off on other members of the 
community -
"Now that there is a large number of meditators in the 
world ..... the influence of TM will spread far beyond the 
immediate effects on individual meditators. There is 
evidence to suggest that if a proportion as low as 1% 
of a population is meditating, there is a significant 
effect on the quality of life of the whole community" 
(Scottish Newsletter, Autumn, 1975). 
Hence we can see that part of the personal meaning of TM 
for individual meditators is its contribution to their well-
being by providing a "comprehensive interpretation of reality" 
and a means through which the world may be made a better place 
as a by-product of their own development. However, it is 
important to recognise that meditators themselves do not see 
things this way. Mention has already been made of "scientific 
validation' of the effects of TM. This scientific work is 
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used to reinforce the belief that personal development or 
growth occurs simply through the technique of meditation 
and is a result of the altered state of consciousness 
brought about by regular practice. That is, meditators 
are told, and many of them believe, that whatever happens 
to them as a result of meditation is a product of physical 
change in their physiological make-up caused by the technique. 
They discount as incidental the effects of belonging to a 
social group, learning a belief system, and so on. 
All this is summed up in a passage from Kanellakos and 
Bellin (1972 p106) 
''TM .... does not require any change in life-style, dress 
or diet; and if such changes do take place, they are 
the natural and spontaneous result of the growth of the 
individual through meditation. Changes of this kind 
frequently do occur, because the mental process during 
TM brings about a psychophysiologic shift (ie a new 
style of functioning of the nervous system), which can 
be empirically verified and scientifically studied". 
Indeed, much of the existing research on Transcendental 
Meditation has concentrated on the 'physiological correlates' 
of the meditation state. It is clear that physiological 
changes do occur when people meditate. Woolfolk (1974) has 
differentiated between four categories of physiological event 
in meditation - the electrocortical, electrodermal, respiratory 
and cardiovascular. 
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To begin with electrocortical effects of TM, Wallace (1970) 
and Wallace, Benson and Wilson (1971) report increases in 
alpha wave trains in the central and frontal regions of the 
brain. Banquet (1972;1973) similarly analysed EEG records 
of meditators and found a predominant tendency for wave 
patterns to shift to slower frequencies. 
The effects of meditation of skin resistance have bean 
examined by Wallace (1970) and Wallace, Benson and Wilson (1971), 
who found an increase of approximately 60% in skin resistance 
during meditation. Also, Orme-Johnson (1973) showed that 
GSR habituated more rapidly for meditators than for a control 
group. 
Turning to studies which examined the carciovascular 
correlates of the meditation state, Wallace (1970) found a 
decrease in oxygen consumption of 20% during meditation, 
Wallace, Benson and Wilson (1971) discovered similar decreases 
in oxygen consumption and a decrease in respiration rate, and 
Allison (1970) noted decreases in respiration by approximately 
SO% compared to a base rate obtained while watching television 
Wallace (1970) and Wallace, Benson and Wilson (1971) found 
a decrease in heart rate during meditation. 
These are all the published studies on the physiology of TM. 
This work has been reviewed by Kanellakos and Lukas (1974) 
and by Woolfolk (1974). Woolfolk (1974 p1331) concludes that: 
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"research indicates meditation to be associated with 
a slowing and increased synchronisation of electro: 
cortical rhythms, an increased or more stable skin 
resistance, and slower rate of respiration. These 
changes are all in the direction of lowered arousal 
and suggest a diminishing of energy metabolism". 
This formulation is congruent with the description given by 
wallace, Benson and Wilson (1971) of TM as a "wakeful hypo: 
metabolic state" - ie a state of consciousness which combines 
the levels of relaxation associated with sleep or hibernation 
with an awareness of the world normally absent from these 
conditions. Indeed, Benson, Beary and Carol (1974) 
have coined the term "relaxation response" to describe this 
state. 
This interpretation of the physiological correlates of TM 
is, however, not without difficulties, Watanabe, Shapiro 
and Schwartz (1972), for example, argue that the research 
results demand the interpretation that the meditation state 
is an anoxic state brought about by reauction in oxygen 
consumption. They note that effects similar to those caused 
by meditation can be brought about by other situations that 
reduce the consumption of oxygen - for example high altitutes. 
Also, Glueck and Stroebel (1975 p35) put forward a theory that 
meditation effects are due to the quieting of the limbic system. 
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However, these alternative interpretations do not take 
issue with the validity of the experimental data per se. 
on the other hand, a study by Treichel, Clinch and Cran 
(1973) failed to replicate Wallace, Benson and Wilson's 
(1971) report that oxygen consumption decreased during 
meditation. These researchers compared meditators with 
non-meditating controls who sat in a relaxed manner with 
eyes closed, and found no difference in oxygen consumption. 
An as yet unpublished report by Otis, Kannelakos, Lukas and 
vassiliadis (1974) similarly failed to replicate the findings 
of Wallace and colleagues concerning heart rate and EEG 
rhythms. However, participants in the Otis et al study 
were considerably less experienced in meditation than those 
in other experiments. Two further recent studies have 
failed to replicate earlier claims. Caut~en and Prymak (1977), 
with a small group of meditators, did not find any significant 
alterations in skin conductance or respiration. Rogers.and 
Livingstone (1977) similarly detected no changes in base-line 
(ie resting rather than meditating) levels of physiological 
indices of relaxation in 17 meditators. 
More serious, perhaps, is the accumulating corpus of research 
which has found no difference between the EEG records of 
meditators and those of people who are asleep. For example, 
Younger, Adriance and Berger (1975) took EEG records of 8 
experienced meditators and scored them according to "standard 
sleep-arousal criteria". They founu that meditators spent 
between O% and 71% of meditation time in stage I or II sleep. 
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pagano, Rose, Stivers and Warrenburg (1976) looked at 
five experienced meditators who either meditated or took 
naps in different sessions. They were also asked to give 
their subjective impressions of what happened during 
meditation sessions or naps. These research participants 
both reported drowsiness during meditation sessions and 
produced EEO suggestive of stages II, III or IV sleep. 
Further, "in several meditations described as typical and 
relatively deep, considerable amounts of sleep occured" 
(Pagano et al, 1976, p309). Finally, Williams and West 
(1975) offer evidence for the view that the meditation state 
is one of prolonged drowsiness rather than sleep proper or, 
for that matter, any separate state of consciousness. 
At the moment these results need to be in~erpreted cautiously. 
Quite apart from problems in comparing studies using different 
electrophysiological equipment in different laboratories, 
with different experimental procedures, there were big 
variations both between individual meditators and with the 
same meditators on separate occasions. For example, in the 
Pagano et al study, one meditator spent no time asleep in 
one session and 90% of the time asleep in the next. Another 
difficulty is that meditators report that often they may 
fall asleep for a short time during meditation if they are 
particularly tired, so it is to be expected that at least 
some of the EEG records of meditation should reflect this 
fact. Also, meditators find it di~icult to report on the 
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'depth' of meditation achieved - the process of meditating 
is one which militates against this kind of self-observation. 
Finally, the effects of meditating in the laboratory, and 
meditating at an unaccustomed time are confounding factors. 
It has been suggested that the close personal contact 
wallace had with his research participants was an aid to 
overcoming such problems (Kanellakos and Lukas, 1974). 
In passing, some mention should be made of the recent 'negative' 
findings regarding the physiological correlates of TM. 
While much of the original research was carried out by 
individuals who were themselves enthusiastic about TM, 
the recent research has been conducted by those who seem 
to be more interested in refuting, or at least testing 
more thoroughly, the early claims made (~g Wallace, 1970). 
Also, some of these pioneer researchers, in particular 
Wallace and Orme-Johnson, have become members of the 
Maharishi International University, and have failed to 
publish any papers since that time, although MIU is said 
to have well-equipped laboratories. It is not known whether 
the absence of reports from these researchers is due to 
reluctance of journals to publish their work, difficulty in 
setting up a new institution, or some other reason. 
Nevertheless, the studies reviewed above must make us 
question just how unique the meditation state is - might 
it not be just as useful to consider it as a particular 
kind of sleep? This point of view is appealing, especially 
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in the light of the finding by Taub, Tanguay and Clarkson 
(1976) that college students who take naps during the day 
appear to reap the same kind of benefits that are claimed 
by meditators - increased alertness and calmness. In the 
end, though, firm conclusions cannot be arrived at on the 
basis of physiological or behavioural evidence alone. 
Meditators assert that, most of the time, they are not 
asleep when they are meditating. The experience of 
meditating, they say, is distinct from the experience of 
sleeping or napping. This kind of phenomenological evidence 
must be respected. After all, we know what we mean by 
sleep, we do not need EEG machines to tell us when we are 
asleep. In fact, these machines are in the first place 
calibrated against subjective reports of sleep state. 
And this observation takes us on to another perspective 
on the physiological changes which occur during meditation. 
Even if significant physiological events take place, they 
must still be made sense of by the people undergoing them. 
At the simplest level, this may consist of a belief in the 
benefit to be gained from such physiological happenings. 
As Benson, Beary and Carol (1974 p45) put it : "belief in 
the technique in question may well be a very important 
factor in the elicitation of the relaxation response". 
This is to say people do not respond automatically and 
mechanically to physiological changes in their hormone levels, 
blood lactate levels, or even brain wave patterns. They must 
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interpret these bodily events, they must learn how to make 
sense of them, must become sensitive to what is happening. 
And then the actual physiological event affects the person's 
actions through his or her conceptualisation of it. For 
example, the physiology of pregnancy and labour is presumably 
the same for all women in all cultures, yet there are vast 
differences in how these factors - pain, immobility, hormonal 
changes and so on - are interpreted. While women in some 
cultures may be back at work within hours, in our culture 
new mothers are typically taken care of for some time after 
labour. So we can see that the same physiological event 
can produce very different behavioural outcomes when the 
people involved possess contrasting frames of reference or 
systems of interpretation. 
It seems as though all basic physiological needs or motives 
are expressed only through socially sanctioned patterns of 
action. Nuttin, for example, talks of the 'canalization' 
of needs; Allport of the 'functional autonomy of motives'. 
Two further examplesrnn be offered of the importance of 
social factors in the fulfilment of biological needs. The 
first is sleep. In his comprehensive examination of the 
social meanings of sleep, Aubert(1965) demonSrates that 
"human sleep is an important social event" (pl69). He writes: 
"sometimes an individual may fall asleep as an automatic 
reaction to great exhaustion. Usually, however, falling 
asleep is not the fulfilling of an immediate biological 
need, but a result of activities bearing many overt 
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symptoms of role playing ...... Going to sleep 
usually means going through a number of culturally 
defined motions, such as dressing in a certain way, 
modifying light and sound conditions, assuming one 
of a limited number of postures, closing one's eyes 
even in darkness, expressing certain emotions and 
attitudes towards others, and so on. These motions, 
together with the perceptions of the actual state 
of sleep, and motions associated with awakening 
constitute the role of the sleeper. Since 
childhood most people have been trained to take 
this role, often with great difficulty. The training 
of children shows beyond any doubt that sleep at the 
proper place and time is not a process which is being 
left to be determined by biological,needs alone" 
(Aubert, 1965 p!70). 
A second very basic biological function which is chanelled 
through its social meanings is sexuality. Gagnon and Simon 
(1974 pp1-3) note that 
"at no point is the belief in the natural and universal 
human more entrenched than in the study of sexuality. 
The critical significance of reproduction in species 
survival is made central to a model of man and woman 
in which biological arrangements are translated into 
sociocultural imperatives. In consequence, it is not 
surprising that it is in the study of sexuality that 
there exists a prepotent concern with the power of 
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biology and nature as opposed to an understanding 
of the capacities of social life ..... 
...... Rarely do we turn from a consideration of 
the organs themselves to the sources of the meanings 
that are attached to them, the ways in which the 
physical activities of sex are learned, and the ways 
in which these activities are integrated into larger 
social scripts and social arrangements where meaning 
and sexual behaviour come together to create sexual 
conduct". 
If such basic human functions as sleep and sexuality are 
shaped by social factors, what chance is there that an acquired 
or learned set of physiological events - those associated 
with meditation- will lead to "natural,and spontaneous' 
behavioural outcomes? Another source of evidence here is 
the work on the cognitive alteration of feeling states 
stemming from Schachter and Singer's (1962) classic experiment. 
This research work strongly suggests that internal cues arouse 
evaluative needs which are met by a process of explanation in 
terms of an external cue (London and Nisbett, 1974). As 
Schachter (1964 p78) puts it :"given a state of physiological 
arousal for which an individual has no immediate explanation, 
he will label this state and describe his feelings in terms 
of the cognitions available to him". 
And of course meditators have no shortage of cognitions, 
meanings and beliefs in terms of which to make sense of the 
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internal cues brought about by meditating. It will be 
the task of this study to describe some of the ways in 
which the expectations, reasons and stock of knowledge 
that meditators possess interacts with the physiological 
event of the meditation act itself to produce the 
experiences meditators have and the benefits they· :claim. 
This is to say that the meaning of bodily events in 
meditation is not neutral. These bodily events do not 
lead in any straightforward or "natural" way to the 
changes in their lives that meditators talk about. The 
meaning of these events is interpreted and negotiated. 
It is worth remembering, in this context, that the 
physiological event of meditating is caused, in the first 
place, by the will, or intention, to med~.tate. It seems 
that the person begins with the wish or intention to live 
a better life, and in various ways uses the practice of 




The aim of this study, then, has been to uncover the 
personal meaning of TM for people actively involved in 
using this technique. It has been assumed that the 
meaning, or significance, of elements of TM practice may 
be explicitly stated by meditators or may be implicit in 
their actions and attitudes. Thus, while account gathering 
methods have been predominant, observational approaches 
have also been used (see Chapter 3). The basic strategy 
has been to find out what meditators have to say about 
meditation - their reports on its effects, their ideas, 
theories and expectations have been recorded. These 
reports have been brought together to form a description 
of what happens when people meditate, an~ this description 
has been used as a base for further analysis and interpret: 
ation. 
The information used in this research has been gathered 
in the following manner the author was a meditator for 
more than six years - his observations and experiences have 
been called upon. This six year period cannot however be 
regarded as constituting a continuous spell of participant 
observation. Only in the last two years of this period was 
the author engaged in formal research on TM; during this 
spell alone were his interactions with meditators used 
systematically as research material. At the commencement 
-176-
of this research work, the author made it clear to all 
concerned that his role had changed in this way. No 
hindrance of any kind was put in the way of his inquiries. 
In fact, those in positions of authority were actively 
helpful. 
The research was based on a TM centre in a Scottish city. 
The local organisers made address lists and records available. 
some interviews were held on TM premises. The local news; 
letter was used to announce to meditators in the area the 
existence of the research (it was said to be research into 
"personality development in meditators") and to encourage 
co-operation. At one time, for about a year, the author 
was a member of the organising committee of the centre, and 
was active in setting up a series of mee_tings for student 
meditators. The author also attended residential courses. 
Further, open-ended questionnaires were sent to 185 long-
term (more than one year since initiation) meditators. 
This group was composed of all such meditators in the centre's 
catchment area who were still in communication with the TM 
movement (ie those for whom quarterly Newsletters were not 
returned by the Post Office). Of these, 72 questionnaires 
were returned, along with one letter and a postcard. These 
documents provide most of the quotations used below. The 
author also talked with 20 people beginning meditation, some 




There were also informal, unstructured interviews with 
more than 30 meditators, of whom 12 were close friends 
or family and whose testimony is therefore, one might 
hope, of particular reliability. In addition, a small 
group of six people who have given up TM were also 
interviewed informally. Public documents such as 
newspaper articles, Newsletters, movement handouts and 
books have also been consulted. 
Finally, a paper on this research was prepared for 
meditators and widely distributed among them. Resulting 
from this, five lengthy communications have been received, 
·and these comments have been assimilated into this version 
of the work. This research, however, is a dialogue which 
continues, and much more in the way of feedback is expected 
from this source. 
Copies of all letters and questionnaires sent to meditators, 
and the paper prepared for them, are available in Appendix B. 
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M..edi tators' accounts 
What do meditators have to say about meditation? 
Before presenting a more detailed analysis of meditators' 
accounts it might be useful to give an example of the kind 
of material being worked with. Here are the replies of 
four experienced meditators to the question - "what effect 
do you think TM has had on the way you are and the way you 
live your life?" 
"From the very moment I started the effect was most 
marked - for myself I felt as if I had been travelling 
down a very unpleasant road and suddenLy , I had been 
completely turned round and was walking confidently 
toward the light. I had just returned to part-time 
teaching and found it shattering - I came home grey 
with fatigue and could only lie down and rest even 
after ~ day session and TM was my last hope to keep 
on my job/avoid another breakdown. My husband observed 
'I don't know what on earth you do in there but it 
certainly has done wonders'. My 15 year old daughter 
was so impressed that she became a meditator herself". 
"My emotional characteristics have become much more 
positive and stabilised. ie less depression, inertia 
etc although it still happens sometimes in a qualified 
way. TM has also helped me to purify my system to a 
great extent ie stopping smoking and narcotics - although 
not immediately on learning TM, only when a certain stage 
was reached the necessity went. Also have stopped 
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almost completely eating meat. My life is lived 
on a much more spontaneous level, my head being less 
crammed with thoughts. Things are less hard to 
accomplish in general - ie work etc. Things that are 
not particularly interesting are not 'boring' in 
the same way ...... . 
The way I live my life has altered subtly in that ! 
am also ie I perceive myself as part of the environment, 
both being as real as the other and both affecting each 
other. My life is therefore lived at a greater level 
of enjoyment of the unique experience of change and 
subtle variations. I feel that I am living while 
others are surviving although I still feel that I 
waste too much time in non-productive actions". 
"1. SELF CONFIDENCE; am generally more assured. 
Hands shake less, breathing less disturbed in tense 
situations. Better in public situations, although, 
still nervous when called on to speak publicly etc. 
2. ENERGY; probably more stamina or merely distribute 
energy better instead of having 'bursts'. Excess 
energy, rather disturbing eg after rounding, because 
not dissimilar to experiences when hypermanic. 
3. ORDER; approach to study, paperwork, etc much more 
ordered. First degree, before learnt to meditate, 
more taxing and stressful than present postgrad. course. 
4. VALUES; some values changed, eg no longer eat meat, 
but probably going in these directions anyway. 
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5. SENSITIVITY; I think I am more sensitive to nature 
and all senses are finer. 
less subjective. 
Reactions more consistent, 
6. EMOTIONS; much more independent emotionally and 
take misfortunes with no pain. Find this disturbing 
as I feel very isolated, but am rarely upset or 
depressed". 
"It has made me able to cope with a long hard day of 
study - I feel TM stops me from getting 'screwed-up' 
as I used to get with the worries of being able to 
cope with only 2 4 hours a day and the seeming need 
for 30 hours. I seem to be able to organise myself 
more and apply logic more often and more determinedly. 
The feeling of being more able to apply myself and 
feeling relaxed and able to cope with anything applies 
across the board and not only to studying. 
There was a time before I started meditating where the 
endlessness of work and the increase of burdens of 
responsibility, ie money matters, house management, 
being able to cope with the emotionalism of fellow 
students who were finding their studies overpowering, 
began to wear me down to the extent that I was physically 
tired almost permanently. I feel that I am still 
pressurised in the same manner, but since starting TM 
the tiredness and apathy have left me". 
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These testimonies are typical of meditators' accounts. 
A salient feature of the accounts gathered was the enthus: 
iasm displayed for TM. For example, one woman who had in 
fact given up doing meditation, wrote at the end of her 
account - "I think I'll go off and meditate now that I 
remember all the benefits of TM." However, there was 
also a large measure of agreement in the accounts regarding 
what were seen as being the main effects attributable to 
practice of TM. These 'main effects', as perceived by 
meditators, were 
Less anxiety 
"Don't worry so much .... Not so scared and worried" 
"I have become a calmer person. 
take everything as it comes" 
I do not worry and 
"Less anxious and strung up. This·is very noticeable" 
"No I never get angry or worry, never visit my doctor 
or take any drugs" 
"It has probably made me calmer and less tense" 
Greater energy 
Meditators typically report that they are less fatigued 
and have more energy after meditating. As one said : 
"sometimes in the day when feeling tense five or ten minutes 
(meditating) will have an effect of lessening nervous tension 
and giving more energy for a short time". Or "I did 
find that TM released great energy ....... through the day I 
noticed that my physical energy tremendously increased eg 
I trotted up to tutorials on the 8th floor .... whereas before 
I had always taken the lift". 
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problem solving became easier -
"I'd say that I was more able to adapt immediately 
to a change of circumstances or some new demands 
put in the way" 
" ...... can stand on the outside of situations" 
"······.things are less hard to accomplish in general" 
Feeling of being relaxed 
"It made me relax" 
"I do feel more relaxed" 
"·····.helps me to relax when feeling tense and gives 
a feeling of well-being afterwards" 
Better organised life 
"I'd say that I live a more regulated life, or, at 
least, that TM makes it easier to live a regulated 
life autonomously" 
"I feel calmer, hence better able to decide and discriminate 
between how to divide my time" 
"I seem to be able to organise myself more and apply 
logic more often and more determinedly". 
These are just a few of the statements made by meditators. 
The five 'main effects' mentioned here - less anxiety, greater 
energy, easier problem-solving, feeling of relaxation and a 
better organised life - are found again and again in meditators' 
reports. Other effects are also reported - these will be 
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described later. Two comments must be made in relation 
to the 'main effects', however, The first is that these 
effects can only be understood in terms of benefit. There 
is no hint of misgiving or doubt in such claims. Hardly 
surprising, then, that one widely used TM poster is headed 
"How to Enjoy the Rest of your Life". 
The second point is that these claims are universal. While 
it is sometimes not so easy to decide whether an informant 
is talking about anxiety, for example, or problem-solving, 
it is nevertheless clear from inspection of accounts that 
the theme of these 'main effects' is present in all of them 
in some form. But, more than that, this theme dominates the 
results of research conducted on the effects of TM on 
personality. 
All studies of the effects of TM on various personality 
variables are agreed on one point - all find positive changes. 
On all personality dimensions measured, meditators change in 
socially-desirable directions. Taking only published studies 
which have tested people before and after learning TM, and 
which have used control groups, the following personality 
changes have been reported over periods of approximately three 
months; increased self-actualisation (Seeman, Nidich and Banta 
1969), more internal locus of control (Stek and Bass, 1973), 
less field dependence (Pelletier, 1974), less anxiety and more 
internal locus of control and self-actualisation (Hjelle, 1974), 
greater self-actualisation (Ferguson and Gowan~ 1975), 
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decrease in neuroticism (Williams, in press), less physical 
and social inadequacy, neuroticism, depression and rigidity 
and more self-esteem, ego-strength and self-actualisation 
(van den Berg and Mulder, 1976), increased intelligence and 
lowered levels of neuroticism (Tjoa, 1975). In addition, 
Glueck and Stroebel (1975) reported positive personality 
changes in psychiatric patients treated with TM. 
The significance of these research findings is highly 
problematic. One problem is that meditators are, as has 
already been suggested, eager to participate in research which 
will 'verify' the benefits they claim. This point is also 
made in the two reviews of this literature by Smith, J(1975) 
and by Kanellakos and Lukas (1974). Another problem lies 
with the paper-and-pencil psychometric tests used in these 
studies. As we saw in Chapter 1, these tests call heavily 
upon the testee's common-sense notions or implicit theories. 
Finally, the relationship between research and the 
beliefs or behaviour of the people being studied is an 
P• 
unusual one with TM. Much use 
is made of research results in selling and advertising 
TM. Posters display charts of research results. People 
who come to introductory talks are given pamphlets contain: 
ing reviews of research work. All this has some impact, as 
we shall see. The extent to which research results influence 
the behaviour being investigated is, then, a factor to be 
taken into consideration when evaluating this work. 
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Yet these research findings do back up the accounts of 
local meditators to the extent that it seems as though 
meditators all over the world report the same sort of 
effects - reduction in anxiety or neuroticism, '.self-
actualisation', less tension and so on. And also, the 
fact that the themes identified in meditators' accounts 
have emerged in the work of researchers using different 
methods is certainly evidence that these ideas are at least 
very central constructs in the TM system. They are ways 
of looking at the world or making sense of behaviour that 
are used by many meditators. This interpretation is also 
reinforced by the recognition that constructs such as 'less 
anxious' or 'relaxed' are general, higher-order constructs. 
They are constructs used by all meditators in a vague fashion. 
This aspect of these ideas becomes more ~pparent when we 
look at some of the comments made by sub-groups of meditators 
concerning more specific effects. 
One observation which is made by many meditators is that 
soon after they take up TM their tolerance for alcohol becomes 
reduced. A similar kind of effect is the also quite frequent 
report that meditators tend towards vegetarianism. 
Another claim that was made several times in meditators' 
accounts was the assertion that physical health improved 
dramatically as a result of meditating. For example, one 
woman reported that "I seldom have migraine headaches now. 
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Before becoming a meditator I suffered very badly from this". 
or : "I would also say that my general health has improved". 
An experience which was not very frequently reported spontan: 
eously by meditators, but which many recognised and admitted 
to when asked, is the experience of recovering 'repressed' 
or archaic material during meditation. That is, meditators will 
remember scenes from childhood which they say they had not 
thought about for years. They also state that these were 
scenes of some emotional content. Sometimes such memories 
are experienced as divorced from the feelings which would 
normally be associated with them. This aspect of meditation 
will be dealt with later. Perhaps linked in some way to 
such events are the numerous reports of muscle twitching 
during meditation and the less frequent reports of full body 
tremors, bursing into tears, or breathing difficulties. 
A last category of meditation effects are reported feelings 
of detachment and emotional isolation (see Kennedy 1976). 
One woman reported that she "got feelings of 'detachment' 
from everyday affairs", and another wrote that "once I was 
meditating and felt as if I was outside myself and could see 
myself quite clearly - as 'other'"· Other meditators said 
that on occasion they have felt that they were observing 
themselves doing something, that they were not involved in 
the part they were playing at that moment. 
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These additional effects of meditation - in terms of diet, 
health and anomalous experiences - are not reported by all 
meditators or reflected in the results of psychometric 
research. However, they are of interest in that they allow 
a more complete description of what happens to meditators. 
Those who had turned their backs on TM were also interviewed 
in case they might be able to add to the completeness of the 
description being pieced together. However, little useful 
information was gained from this source. Most of the people 
who had given up did so merely because nothing much seemed 
to be happening to them rather than because of any special 
kind of negative experience. However, some people do give 
up as a result of the kind of experiences described .. above-
recovery of repressed material, sobbing and the like. 
Nevertheless, many who continue with med~tation also have 
such experiences. As we shall see, the important factor 
seems to be how these experiences are understood and put 
into context. 
This section has attempted to bring together a wide range 
of meditators' accounts, to discover what it is they have 
to say about meditation. These reports must now be taken 
as a basis for analysis and interpretation. To begin with, 
we shall see that an examination of the process of becoming 
a meditator and doing TM regularly will take us a long way 




~coming a meditator 
The process by which people become meditators can tell 
us a lot about what it means to meditate. The initial 
contact with the TM movement, the person's reasons for 
following up this contact, and the means by which he or 
she becomes a member of this new social group are all 
important factors in shaping the experience the person has 
when actually meditating. To bring to light some of these 
issues, the open-ended questionnaire sent to meditators 
contained the following questions 'how did you find out 
about TM?' and 'why do you think you decided to learn TM?' 
Analysis of the 72 replies received indicates that 57% 
of this group of experienced meditators ~ound out about 
TM through personal contact with someone else who meditated 
- either a friend or professional person who meditated such 
as a yoga teacher or doctor. The remaining 43% learned about 
TM by reading newspaper or magazine articles, watching a TV 
programme, spotting an advertisement or poster, or dropping 
in on an introductory talk. A detailed breakdown of sources 
of contact with TM is given below. 
Source of first contact 
Friend or family member who meditated so% 
Yoga teacher or doctor 7% 
Poster/advertisement/leaflet 21% 
Article/book/TV programme 16% 
Introductory talk 6% 
Total no. of informants: 72 ! . ; 
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It appears to be the case, then, that most people who 
become meditators already know quite a bit about TM -
from friends, advisors, or information media - even before 
they are exposed to the introductory talk which precedes 
initiation. It is also of interest that many of those who 
attend these introductory talks, and who decide to start 
TM, do not ask questions about it at the time. Some of them, 
it would appear, have made up their minds even at this stage 
that meditation is likely to be of benefit to them. But 
even those who have no such expectations may be impressed 
with the person giving the talk. For example, one meditator 
has written: 
"what decided me to learn the meditation was not so 
much what was said as the quality of the two speakers. 
One of them in particular gave such' an impression of 
vitality and happiness that I could not doubt that he 
was speaking the truth". (Campbell,1973 pp27-28). 
People who begin TM are well prepared for it. They often 
have high hopes for benefit, based either on their reading, 
contacts with friends or advisors, or the image presented 
by the meditation teacher giving the introductory talk. 
Of course, it is highly likely that only those who suppose 
it will benefit them are going to follow up their initial 
interest in the technique - the substantial cost of learning 
TM will discourage those with only a passing interest or 
curiosity. But, what are their reasons for taking up TM? 
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what is it that these people see in TM which attracts them, 
and what is it about them which leads to these, rather than 
thousands of others, becoming meditators? 
Both experienced meditators and those about to be initiated 
were asked to write about their reasons for taking up TM. 
The reports from experienced meditators, which provide the 
basis for the analysis presented below, may be biased in 
the sense that they could be re-interpreting their initial 
reasons for starting in the light of subsequent experience. 
However, the reasons they give are similar to those given by 
the smaller group of beginning meditators interviewed. 
The most frequently given reason for taking up TM was that 
it appeared to be a way of relaxing and :educin$. tension or 
stress. Informants mentioned "pressure of work", believed 
it "might help nerves" or admitted to be "going through a 
period of emotional instability". This reason was often 
accompanied by another - the person had seen the effect of 
TM on a friend. 
A third type of reason given was that of seeking personal 
growth or self-realisation. People in this category wrote 
that they thought TM would be "an avenue to unexplored parts 
of the self" or mentioned their "desire for self-improvement". 
Fourthly, some said they were curious. For another group of 
meditators, the scientific evidence was an important reason 
for their learning,TM. Some said that TM seemed a natural 
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follow-on from their reading and interest in Yoga and 
Eastern religion. Finally, a seventh group comprised 
those who claimed they started TM "in the hope of a 
transcendental experience", to fathom the enigma of 
creation" or because they "wanted to find God". There 
were also idiosyncratic reasons - for example, "intuit: 
ion". The relative frequency of each of these categories 
of reason is given below. 
Reasons for taking up TM 
To reduce stress; pressure at work 
Personal growth and self-realisation 
Curiosity 
Its effect on a friend 
Follow-on from Yoga or reading 









Total no. of informahts: 68 
Total no. of reasons given : 82 
It seems clear that the most frequently offered reason for 
learning TM parallels the reported main effects of actually 
meditating - these people see meditation primarily as a 
way of reducing stress and tension, relieving anxiety and 
helping them to relax. As we shall see later, there 
certainly appear to be processes that happen during 
meditation which reduce anxiety. However, the new 
meditator's expectations of and hope for personal benefit 
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of this kind also have a part to play in leading him or 
her to interpret what happens during meditation in this 
light. 
The initial contact, and the person's reasons for follow: 
ing up that initial contact, are important first steps on 
the road to becoming a meditator. These background factors 
have been briefly described above. Further analysis of 
this material will follow, but before moving to that task, 
some other features of the group of people who are drawn 
towards TM demand attention. 
Going back more deeply into the lives of people who begin 
meditating, we find that for many the decision to take up 
TM was taken at a time of personal crisi~. For example: 
"it was my last hope to keep my job/avoid another breakdown". 
Others talked about wanting to move away from the life-style 
they had adopted- "I wanted to give up drinking". One man 
wrote: "I took up meditation immediately before coming to 
............ from ........ ; it was a 'cusp' of greater signif: 
icance of any other event in my life, and it precipitated 
me into a better style of life than ever before, with the 
(more or less) constant hope of improvement 
in almost every respect, from 
the ability to genuinely care about other people to the 
ability to do jigsaws better". A few mentioned that they 
had been seeing a psychiatrist or were on "tranquillisers" 
before TM. There were some working through the effects 
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of recent divorce or separation. Finally, for many students 
who started, TM appeared to offer some hope and comfort in 
unfamiliar and lonely university environment. It is difficult 
to be sure of how many people came to meditation from a 
background of personal life crisis - not all of them would 
recognise the events as such, and inquiry concerning such 
matters would need to be extremely rigorous to cover all 
the possible areas of life which might be affected. Never: 
theless, the evidence from those meditators who were 
interviewed in greatest depth indicates that a life crisis 
appears to be an important background factor in many cases. 
The vast majority of meditators encountered in the course of 
this study might be categorised 'middle-class'. The open-
ended questionnaire asked meditators to ~ive occupation details, 
and the most frequent given occupations were student, 
lecturer, professional or para-professional, housewife or 
civil servant. All age groups were represented, the largest 
single group being students. 
Apart from these very general educational and social class 
variables, there were wide differences in the people who 
seemed to find TM beneficial. Introvert, extravert, disturbed 
and stable are all to be seen at TM meetings. What little 
psychometric research there is either shows no difference 
between those about to start TM and matched controls on 
various personality variables (Orme-Johnson,1973); Seeman, 
Nidich and Banta, 1973; Stek and Bass, 1973) or shows that 
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those starting meditation are slightly more neurotic 
(Williams et al, in press). The 'neuroticism' of 
meditators on psychometric tests is predictable enough in 
the light of their interest in Eastern religions, seeking 
help for tension at work, emerging from life crises and so 
on. The kind of generalisation which psychorr.etric research 
produces is seen to be inappropriate as a characterisation 
of 'the meditator' when we make actual observations of the 
people who go to meditation centres, and discover that every 
conceivable type of person turns up at introductory talks 
and may go on to learn, and claim benefits from, the technique 
itself. This is not to say that there may not be aspects 
of meditators' personalities which could tell us something 
about why they take it up and how it works for them. It 
is just that these have yet to be discov~red. There are, 
however, some tantalising clues - for example a large 
proportion of>tmedi tators are highly musical. 
But what does all this mea~? Is there any way we can 
bring together and make sense __ of these background factors? 
A framework within which this information can be put can be 
found in a model constructed by Lofland and Stark (1965) to 
account for the adoption by individuals of a "deviant 
perspective". They were interested to trace the process 
by which people came to give up one ordered view of the 
world for another. Their model is a useful one in the 
context of asking how it is that people come to take up 
TM. 
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The first stage in the process as hypothesised by Lofland 
and stark is the would-be initiate's experience of a tension 
or discrepancy between the actual circumstances of his or 
her life and what he or she would consider as the ideal. 
rt is clear that many meditators have felt such a tension. 
one wrote - "I wasn't very satisfied with myself and needed 
changing". As can be seen from the kind of reasons 
meditators gave for starting TM, the idea of moving closer 
towards some goal or ideal is very prevalent - reports of 
wanting to reduce stress, achieve personal growth, or find 
inner peace, suggest that the person is not satisfied with 
his or her present way of life, or at least is attempting 
to improve it. 
But, as Lofland and Stark point out, there are many ways of 
dealing with such tensions. Many people would take their 
problems to some psychiatric or medical agency, or perhaps 
locate their difficulties in society as a whole and therefore 
engage in political activity. For the person to turn from 
choice to an organisation such as the TM rr.ovement requires 
they have a pre-disposition to look for religious or similar 
kinds of solutions for their tensions, rather than psychiatric 
or political ones. So, Lofland and Stark suggest, people who 
become involved in 'deviant perspectives' such as TM, will 
often have a history of interest and involvement in similar 
types of organisation. For example, in their study, they 
found that the converts of a millenarian cult were often 
individuals who had grown up in religious homes and who had 
rejected conventional Christianity while still searching . i 
i 
for a more acceptable substitute. Lofland and Stark define 
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thiS personal pre-disposition as being in a state of 'seeker: 
ship' - the person perceives himself as being a religious 
seeker and interested in religious matters. 
Again, this model seems to fit the information we have 
about meditators. When we look at how meditators heard 
about TM in the first place, and why it was they began 
meditating, we see that many had been interested in Eastern 
religions, Yoga, and so on. Also, a significant number of 
meditators had a background of Christian belief. Many from 
both these religious traditions said that they saw TM as a 
way of experiencing mystical states they had read only about. 
Even after beginning TM, for many individuals the religious 
quest did not end. Some mentioned in the questionnaires 
that they had taken up Yoga since starting TM. It was clear 
from talking to others that their interest in the Occult 
continued, and perhaps even deepened, since TM is in a sense 
an introduction to non-Western systems of thought, it is 
a meditative practice that does not require the change of 
life-style and discipline which makes Westerners reluctant 
to investigate other, similar approaches. So TM was a 
channel for religious seekership, sometimes in new directions, 
sometimes familiar ones. 
However, there were also meditators who were seekers of 
a kind, but who had little previous contact with religious 
groups. These individuals, mainly belonging to younger 
age groups, had used drugs rather than religious practices 
to bring about self-transformation. Many of these people 
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were looking for a means to bring about 'altered states 
of consciousness' through TM. It is generally assumed 
in the TM movement as a whole that its massive growth has 
been due in part to the widespread exposure to halluc: 
inogenic drugs among young people. These drugs are said 
to not only open the 'gates of perception' but also implant 
the idea that states of mind are dependent on states of the 
body. As one experienced meditator put it: 
" ..... people who have used consciousness-expanding 
drugs are intimately aware of the link-up between 
physiology and states of consciousness and are 
therefore more inclined to respond to TM ..... . 
than 'religious mystics' who think of mystical 
experience as something ethereal and divorced from 
the state of the body". 
There is also evidence from other sources that many of those 
who take up TM enter this sub-culture from the drug one. 
For example, surveys of people learning TM show that many 
were users of marijuana but lost interest in drugs once 
they started meditating (Shafii, Lavely and Jaffe, 1974; 
Wallace, Benson, Gattozzi and Luce, 1971). Also, studies 
of drugtakers suggest that some leave this world for t~e 
world of meditation. 
Plant(1975) writes: 
In his study of English drugtakers, 
"some groups of individuals became attracted to religious 
cults, which sometimes involved a rejection of drugtaking 
..... I knew one group of students who were all frequent 
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users of hallucinogenic drugs and who claimed they 
derived profound mystical experiences through these 
drugs ..... within a short period of time the group, 
who all lived in the same building, became members 
of a religious sect which disapproved of the use of 
drugs. Overnight, virtually, all drugtaking ceased 
and several of the males had their hair cut short 
as an outward sign of their metamorphosis. All 
drug-oriented literature was discarded and was 
replaced by religious pamphlets and boqks on mysticism 
and meditation. In addition, posters of musical 
stars were taken down and a shrine to the newly 
espoused religious leaders was erected ..... "(Plant, 
1975, p118). 
The existence of tension between actual and ideal, and an 
interest in religious solutions, are background factors 
which set the scene for entry into the TM world. Entry 
proper is often precipitated by some crisis. As Lofland 
and Stark(1965) put it, there is a turning point in the 
person's life, in Esterson's (1970) phrase, a 'developmental 
moment', which makes change not only possible but necessary. 
Lofland and Stark(1965 p870) sum this up well when they 
write that : 
"the significance of these various turning points is 
that they increased the pre-convert's awareness of and 
desire to take some action about his problems, 
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~ the ~ time giving him~~ _£Eportunity to do so. 
Turning points were situations in which old obligations 
and lines of action were diminished and new involvements 
became desirable and possible". 
A further factor in the process of becoming a meditator 
appears to be the influence of what Lofland and Stark call 
'affective bonds' between the would-be meditator and people 
who have already become meditators. As we have seen, many 
meditators say they took up TM because of the advice or 
example given by friends, family members or other significant 
figures. Sometimes the recruit merely observes the effects 
of TM - for example the woman who wrote that she "witnessed 
the benefits to my brother over three years". Or more 
directly persuasive tactics may be tried- "my friend .... 
tried to tell me about it, but I refused to listen for years", 
t!a friend told me about it and gave me a book to read". 
In a sense, as Lofland and Stark (p871) put it, coming to 
believe a world-view such as the TM one is indeed "coming 
to accept the opinions of one's friends". 
The other side of this facet is the dimension of friendships 
with people who are not interested in TM. This may cause 
problems for the meditator, especially when those involved 
are spouses or sharing living accommodation, as we shall 
see later. However, for many meditators there were few 
intimate friends on the scene to hold them back. Many of 
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the university students who took up TM, for example, had 
recently come to college and had yet to build up any very 
intimate relationships. And, of course, for others learning 
TM was an opportunity to leave old friendships and patterns 
of life behind. The author of a research report on the 
effectiveness of TM in treating drug abuse, noted that 
"meditation opened up opportunities for social contacts 
without drugs ..... and break with previous role expectations" 
(Brautigam, 1971 p9). 
What is being said here, then, is that the decision to learn 
TM must be seen in the context of the personJs life as a 
whole. Learning TM is a means to fulfilling certain projects 
in which the person is involved. The individual who learns 
to meditate is in a state of intentionality characterised 
by a wish to change, or improve, or develop, his or her 
life. Meditation is seen as a way of achieving such a goal. 
It comes to be seen as such primarily through the example of 
other people, but also to some extent through reading and a 
background of interest in such matters. A turning point, 
or life crisis, dramatises or emphasises whatever it is that 
individual senses he or she is lacking, the person becomes 
aware of these tensions, and acts - learns to meditate. 
When we think about what it means to meditate, therefore, we 
must take these factors into consideration. Every time the 
person sits down to meditate, that activity is in part an 
outcome of all these needs and interests. When the meditator 
reflects on what meditation is to him, he sees it in this 
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context of making life better. And yet these matters are 
typically very much taken for granted, implicit, the 
meditator seeing first the immediate meaning of his meditation, 
what it brings him in day-to-day living. This deeper 
meaning of the meditation act is on the horizon, to use 
schutz's word. To retrieve this meaning from that horizon 
is, however, a necessary step in reconstructing the full 
significance of meditation. 
Another layer of the meaning of TM for those who practice 
it can be dug out of the description of being initiated. 
Given that the individual has found out about TM from friends, 
advertisements, books or television, and given that he or 
she wishes to learn this technique, what happens next? 
In brief, what happens is that the would-be meditator attends 
an introductory talk, often held in a TM Centre but possibly 
also conducted in a church hall, university lecture theatre, 
community centre, hotel etc. This talk is in two parts. 
In the first part the meditation teacher giving the talk 
describes the history of the TM movement, its aims, the 
mechanics of meditation and the benefits to be gained from 
it. There are questions. At the end of the question period 
the teacher asks those who intend to learn the technique to 
stay. After the others have left (some people attend several 
introductory talks before deciding to start) the teachers 
may go into more detail about the technique, if there are 
further questions but primarily uses this time to arrange 
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times for initiation. The would-be meditators fill in 
a form at this point in which they are asked such things 
as their psychiatric history and whether they use drugs. 
people who are receiving psychiatric help are told to 
discuss the matter of starting TM with their doctor 
before going any further. Those who use drugs are given 
instructions to stay free of them for a specified period 
before being initiated. These matters are discussed 
privately with the initiator during a brief interview. 
The meditators - to - be are also told what they will 
be charged (approximately three-quarters of one week's 
income) and what they must bring to the initiation ceremony. 
The initiation ceremony usually takes place within the fort: 
night following the introductory talk. It consists of a 
short ceremony conducted in Sanskrit by the initiator and 
using the symbolic gifts brought by the learner - fruit, 
flowers and a new white handkerchief. At the end of the 
ceremony the person is taught how to meditate - he or she 
is instructed in the use of a mantra, or sound and the 
correct posture, breathing and attitude of mind required 
for correct meditation. The person then meditates alone. 
After this meditation the initiate is asked by the teacher 
to describe the experience he or she has had. The teacher 
may at this point repeat the initial instructions and give 
recommendations on how the new meditator should proceed with 
the technique at home. 
The initiate has three further meetings with the teacher 
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on subsequent days. These meetings may be group meetings, 
if there are a group of people being taught at the same 
time. The purpose of the meetings is to check that 
initiates are meditating correctly and to impart more 
information about the technique and its philosophical 
background. 
This, then, is how people learn to do TM. It is a process 
in which the initiate is exposed to the great faith that the 
teacher has in this technique, and in the learner's ability 
to master it and benefit from it. The first meditation in 
particular, but also to some extent the following communal 
meditations at checking meetings, are often reported as 
being profoundly relaxing and liberating experiences 
new sides of their being may be revealed or it may simply 
be "the first time I've felt relaxed i'n ten years". 
However, for many meditators this is only the beginning. 
There is a whole career structure open to those interested 
in the particular kind of spiritual or personal growth 
offered by the TM movement. The first step in this career 
is to move from "new" to "experienced" meditator status. 
This distinction - between "new" and "experienced" meditators 
- is revealed in various forms throughout the TM movement. 
For example, special group meetings are arranged for the 
former and they are gently discouraged from attending meetings 
intended for their more experienced colleagues where more 
advanced ideas are discussed. The rationale appears to be 
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that new meditators are still learning how to use the 
technique properly, whereas 'old hands' are less likely 
to want to talk about basic problems such as finding 
privacy and peace for meditation, knowing when to stop 
meditating, and so on. So the "new" - "experienced" 
dichotomy seems to be a pragmatic one frcm the point of 
view of meditation teachers. Yet from the point of view 
of the initiate it appears as though he still has some 
way to go before he can truly see himself as a meditator. 
From his perspective there is a barrier which can only be 
overcome by meditating regularly, going on courses and the 
like. And when he has reached the other side of the barrier 
he knows he has "arrived" in the TM movement. The achieve: 
ment of "experienced meditators" status, however informally 
it may be bestowed, functions both to motivate the beginner 
and to provide him with a measure of his progress towards 
the final goal. 
This first task - that of learning to use meditation over 
a period of time - is only one stage in the career of the 
meditator. The experienced meditator is encouraged to take 
'rounding' and 'SCI' courses, learn advanced techniques and 
train to be a checker and eventually a teacher of meditation. 
These options are described below. 
'Rounding' courses: These are residential courses lasting 
for between three and seven days and usually conducted in 
some quiet rural setting such as a convent, monastery, country 
hotel or TM - owned centre. During these courses meditators 
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are expected to meditate four to six times a day rather than 
the usual twice, and are taught yoga and breathing exercises 
which are done between meditations. This programme is 
supervised by a meditation teacher. In addition, emphasis 
is placed on rest and relaxation - the course is designed 
to be a complete retreat from the worries or pleasures of 
everyday life. Finally, tape or video - recordings of 
talks given by Maharishi are played and discussed. 
1 SCI'Courses: Courses in the 'science of Creative 
Intelligence, the philosophical and theoretical system 
expounded by Maharishi. The basic teaching material used 
in these courses consists of a set of video-tapes of Maharishi. 
'Advanced techniques' Additional meditation techniques, 
taught after a short ceremony by certain senior meditation 
teachers during rounding courses. 
'Checking' training: Experienced meditators may learn to 
check the correctness of others' meditation. The would-be 
checker must pass a stiff examination before being permitted 
to carry out this function. 
'Teacher' training A lengthy course of instruction in 
the philosophy and techniques of TM. Those who aspire to 
become meditation teachers (initiators) must undergo at least 
one year of full-time traing ending in personal examination by 
the leader of the movement, Maharishi. 
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In addition, there are a variety of roles for meditators 
associated less with the spiritual than with the organisational 
side of the movement. For example, there is now in most 
areas a TM Centre - a flat or house used for introductory 
talks, initiations and so on. The administration of the 
centre is the responsibility of a committee formed of 
experienced meditators. Members will be elcted to 
secretarial, financial, publicity and other positions. 
What is the significance of this process of becoming a 
meditator and taking the first steps along the path of the 
meditator's career? The importance of these social factors 
becomes obvious whenwe remember that people do not merely 
learn to meditate - they also become meditators. This role 
of meditator becomes a part of their identity, it becomes 
part of the way they deal with the world, and perhaps even 
the way the world deals with them. Meditators gradually 
learn to internalise the values of the TM movement and the 
various stages in the process of becoming a meditator offer 
opportunities for this kind of learning. If the initiation 
ceremony itself marks a turning point or milestone in the 
meditator's life, then later aspects of the process of 
becoming a meditator provide challenges which can themselves 
serve to mark out the course towards a new self. 
:Glaser and Strauss (1967)) and Strauss (1969) use the term 
"status passage" to describe the kind of self-transformation 
that meditators undertake on moving through the various ... 
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stages on the road to enlightenment. The meditator gains 
in status within the TM movement as he meets and overcomes 
the challenges at each stage. One of the means by which 
is 
the novice is helped on his way/through coaching. Those 
who have already been through this process give advice and 
encouragement to their successors. As we have already seen, 
the first hurdle, that of deciding to learn TM, is often 
only cleared with the support of friends or family who are 
already meditators. But many of the subsequent difficulties 
that meditators encounter are also dealt with by coaching 
during group meetings and 'rounding' courses. 
There are three kinds of difficulty which the beginning 
meditator faces and which are resolved through coaching 
or negotiation. 
These are: 
1) Physical sensations such as twitching, tremors, 
breathing difficulties, feelings of detachedness, 
or depersonalisation, tiredness, mood swings, 
tears or unwelcome thought content. 
2) Problems in finding privacy and space within a 
household in order to meditate. 
3) Discovering what are the benefits that are being 
gained. 
By examining these three areas of difficulty reported by 
meditators we shall discover the importance of coaching 
and negotiation in the process of becoming a meditator. 
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The first category refers to a whole set of experiences 
which meditators have which may not appear on the face 
of it to be related. They are, however, within the TM 
world-view, all examples of 'unstressing'. The TM 
theory is that we all carry around in our nervous systems 
stresses which have accumulated as a result of living in 
a manner which is out of harmony with the way the world 
is. As people meditate, their nervous systems become 
'purified' ,and this stress is released. Stress-release 
may take many forms - twitching and the other activities 
listed above would all be considered as examples of stress 
being released. 
What are these phenomena? Whether or not the theory 
of 'unstressing' holds water is difficult to decide, although 
it appears to be consistent with the approach to psycho: 
somatic disorder pioneered by Selye (1974). However, we 
can start from the realisation that these phenomena all 
consist of alterations in the felt experiencing of the body. 
While some of these changes in body awareness may have deeper 
psychological significance (see Schilder,19!0), there may 
be sirr.pler explanations. For example, the similarities 
between the meditation state and sleep were outlined above. 
And certainly at an experiential level, twitching and dream-
like thought content are ~ccurences we associate with sleep. 
But,further, some of the other effects ,such as depersonal: 
isation, are similar to those reported by those who have 
undergone lengthy periods of sensory deprivation (see Note 1). 
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This analogy is strengthened by the observation that more 
of such effects are reported during long meditations on 
courses, and meditators are cautioned against meditating 
for longer than the prescribed time in order to avoid just 
such hazards. 
Whatever the reason, these bodily experiences occur as 
a result of meditation, and they demand interpretation. 
As Schachter(1964 p78) would put it, they constitute "a 
state of physiological arousal for which (the) individual 
has no immediate explanation". These incidents are 
enigmatic for novice meditators - their meaning must be 
negotiated. This negotiation and interpretation takes 
place during the first day of learning to meditate, when 
the initiate has meetings with his or her teacher, at later 
group meditation meetings, and on courses. On these occasions, 
the meditator is taught to accept such happenings, and, 
indeed, welcome them as signs of progress. 
meditator's account of such an episode 
Here is one 
" ..... was unlucky enough to have some kind of physical 
breathing difficulty which carried on to become a 
psychosomatic problem. Became very upset, couldn't 
meditate as the breathing becomes very shallow and 
this set off the feeling of not being able to breathe. 
Have gradually got over it - my friends and the people 
on the course helped me and am now not frightened by 
the symptom ...... the teacher explained about it releasing 
stress". 
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What happens, then, is that when these physical symptoms 
are reported, the manner in which they are dealt with by 
teachers or experienced meditators is likely to reinforce 
the initiate's belief in the efficacy of TM. The teacher 
is not surprised by anything the new meditator might report -
there are a complete set of instructions, which must be 
committed to memory, which the meditation teacher or the 
'checker' has fer dealing with all eve~tualities. So the 
initiate gains confidence from thinking he or she is in 
the hands of people who know what they are doing. Also, 
at these times the teacher's great faith in TM, and the 
optimistic, happy image he or she presents, will also have 
an effect. Finally, the values implicit in the TM approach 
to life - detachment, calm, creativity, tolerance and so on 
- are communicated in the way the teacher handles difficult 
queries. This is particularly noticeable in group meetings, 
where they may be individuals intent on demolishing the TM 
system, or who insist on asking idiosyncratic questions. 
These people are invariably treated with genuine personal 
respect. It comes across that while their questions may 
not make sense, they are accepted as people. In ways like 
this the essential passivity, acceptance and tolerance of 
the T~l world.- view is communicated. 
The second category of difficulty meditators report - that 
of claiming privacy - is also of interest. Here again, 
the way that such problems are handled by teachers and 
experienced meditators is a model of the TM approach to 
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life. But this kind of difficulty is significant in a 
different respect - it represents a testing-out of the 
meditator's new image of herself. Taking the role of 
a meditator does not necessarily involve performing 
successfully at the TM centre. Many of the hardest 
aspects of the new role are those in relation to others 
in one's life. Many of those who give up TM appear to 
do so becNAse of the impossibility of negotiating an 
adequate level of peace and quiet for meditating with the 
people they live with. One woman who was enthusiastic 
about the effects of TM wrote - "I stopped meditating 
because I could no longer find a quiet corner". The struggle 
to make this personal space can bring other issues in 
relationship to the surface 
"I am aware now, more than ever before, of the need 
for more personal privacy. I become resentful when 
I am needlessly interrupted during my own pursuits. 
I guess what I'm really saying is that I have been 
a bit of a push-over in the past and now feel in the 
need of a little more respect". 
There were many reports of families or flatmates not accept: 
ing the meditator's request for silence during meditation times. 
The meditator's announcement that he or she is going off to 
meditate can sometimes meet with a quizzical hostility which 
can either contribute to that individual giving up, or, on 
the other hand, identifying that little bit more strongly with 
TM. Similarly, the struggle to keep to the TM schedule -
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to meditate in the morning and the evening - is a test 
of the novice's commitment. These are problems which 
are often brought up by initiates in early group meetings. 
Their resolution is another sign of the person's increasing 
competence as a meditator. 
The third problem which meditators talk about is that of 
discovering what good it is doing them. 
few days after being initiated : 
One man wrote a 
" ..... incident which sticks out happened on the third 
day of TM. My car broke down at traffic lights and 
there were many other cars held up. The time was 
8.30 am and I was already late for work. In 'normal' 
circumstances this would have been an extremely stress: 
ful situation for me, but in fact I quite placidly 
accepted the predicament and resolved it". 
This incident is a highly typical example of the kinc of 
effect reported by newly initiated meditators. It describes 
exactly what a meditator would be expected to do in that 
situation- "placidly accept the predicament and resolve it". 
It represents a very rapid adoption of the role of meditator. 
Incidents like these are reported in the group meetings which 
initiates have, and are approved by the teacher as paradigm 
cases of the sort of effect TM should have. Reports that 
"orgasm is no longer such a mind-bending experience" are not 
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treated so seriously. There is, to some extent, a 
selective filtering of the events of the day, some episodes 
being taken as evidence of progress and other equally 
enigmatic ones being left unexplained. After all, the 
man who made the report reproduced above might have had 
the same experience the day before starting TM and put 
it down to just being in a good mood, it was a lovely 
morning, or whatever. But this is not to say that there 
no 
are real effects on people's conduct resulting from TM. 
1\. 
It is only to point out one of the ways new meditators 
piece together the story of what is happening to them 
by negotiating with others to produce a credible and, 
in this case, creditable account. As Goffman (1974) puts 
it, people attempt to make some sort of sense out of every-
day life experience by putting a frame round it, by organising 
all kinds of incidents in terms of certain themes. He 
writes 
"what is presented by an individual concerning himself 
and his world is so much an abstraction, a self-defensive 
argument, a careful selection from a multitude of facts, 
that the best that can be done with this sort of thing 
is to say that it is a lay dramatist's scenario employ: 
ing himself as a character and a somewhat support~ble 
reading of the past" (Goffman, 1974 p558). 
The meditator's 'reading' of the benefits TM is bringing him, 
then, is a "selection from a multitude of facts" which is 
guided and informed by more experienced meditators and teachers, 
by the things they talk about, what they expect him to say, 
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what he has read, and so on. 
coaching and negotiation of the meaning of meditation 
experiences take place at group meetings, which are held 
weekly at the centre, and on residential courses. At these 
times the meditator is exposed to a community which supports 
certain values and standar-ds of conduct. Moreover, he or 
she is exposed to a community which has its own language, 
and many sessions are spent clarifying the meaning of 
'transcending', 'unstressing', 'cosmic consciousness' and 
so on. One of the means by which the usage of these terms 
is learnt is through listening to tapes of Maharishi. Most 
group meetings are built around such tapes, and group 
meditation. 
The group meditation is said by many to be the reason they 
go to group meetings. It is claimed that group, as opposed 
to individual meditation, is deeper and more satisfying. 
Certainly, meditating with a group of people appears to 
provide a feeling of "experiential communality" (Bebout,1974), 
a basic sense of being with others which is highly valued 
by meditators. The meditation group is also a supportive 
grcup, particularly in relation to meditation-related 
difficulties, as has been discussed above, but in other ways 
as well. Thus the group meetings fulfil what has been 
called the basic requirement for "affectively positive 
interaction with others" (Henderson, 1977). 
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Finally, at meetings other meditators, especially teachers, 
may be taken as models. We construct our sense of self 
from models of all kinds, and many of the people involved 
with the TM centre were remarkable by any standards -
their artistic and personal achievements, style and knowledge 
surely had some effect on those who were seeking change and 
development in their lives. 
In this section we have identified some of the ways that 
people become meditators. It seems as though this process 
starts with the person deciding that he or she would like 
to change in certain ways. The TM movement provides a 
social setting in which he or she finds support for this 
attempt at self-transformation. Meditation provides 
certain experiences and ways of interpreting them. It 
offers confirmation of progress towards the final goal. 
The group of meditators is a place where the person is 
valued and an organisation through which his energies may 
be chanelled to good effect. These are some of the 
meanings associated with the role of meditator. 
It would be misleading to give the impression that meditators 
agree in full with this analysis. Some are, indeed, very 
skeptical. They say that the social aspect of TM is minimal, 
and that in fact, there are many people who seem to gain much 
benefit from TM who never go near a meditation centre. One 
man reported that for the first year after being initiated, 
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he lived in a town where there were no other meditators, 
and he had no contact whatsoever with the TM movement. 
some meditators would argue,then, that the whole organisation 
is merely a by-product of the necessity to teach TM in a 
controlled manner, and bears no relationship to the effects 
the technique is said to have on people. 
Now, there are clearly degrees of involvement which people 
have with the TM movement. This study, in using as its main 
group of informants people contacted through, or met at, a 
TM centrE:, might be in danger of missing those who meditate 
quite happily in isolation. On the other hand, those who 
were seen who had least contact with other meditators, because 
they lived in places where there was little TM presence, or 
because they did not have the time or inclination to come to 
group meetings, nevertheless appeared to have a great interest 
in what was going on in the movement, and what kind of experience 
other meditators were having - when they had the chance to do so. 
Indeed,some made long journeys from remote regions to attend 
meetings and courses. It seems that those who do not actively 
take part in movement events still like to know that there is 
a group of like-minded people somewhere, a resource they could 
call upon if they needed to. 
Also, the social organisation of the TM movement is extremely 
loosely-knit. There is no pressure on me~bers to take up 
courses or come to meetings, unlike, for example, the 
Scientology or other movements. There are no rules for diet, 
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life-style or dress. So, in one sense it can be said 
that the TM social group is not sharply defined. But 
this is not to say that it does not exist. As we have 
seen, the whole process of becoming a meditator is one 
which shapes the experiences the person has when he or she 
meditates. When the person meditates, he or she is 
affirming his or her membership in a social group, and his 
or her progress from a state of crisis to a happier future. 
These kinds of meanings are in the background of what TM 
means to people. So the meditator is certainly a member 
of a group with a certain world-view and set of values. 
But there are other processes at work too, and it is these 
we now turn. 
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The experience of meditating 
The meditation act itself is of great significance. 
when we examine the experience of meditating, we discover 
that much of what TM means to the people who practice 
this technique can be accounted for through careful 
description of what appears to happen during meditation. 
TM is a form of mantra meditation. That is, the meditator 
is taught how to use a mantra, a meaningless Sanskrit word 
or sound, in order to reach certain states of consciousness. 
The mantra, once given to the meditator, is never to be 
repeated aloud to another person, and it becomes, for 
the meditator, a powerful symbol of their inner life, 
as well as of their allegiance to a social movement and 
system of thought. (Note 2). 
If the mantra takes on great personal significance for the 
meditator through its participation in this personally 
important ritual of meditating, then the place where the 
meditation is done may also acquire such a meaning. While 
it is possible to meditate in all kinds of surroundings, 
on buses and trains, out of doors, and so on, many meditators 
like to define the more clearly the boundaries of this 
personal area. It is an area which becomes, in Goffman's 
(1971) words, one of the "territories of the self". It 
becomes -
"somehow central to the subjective sense that the 
individual has concerning his selfhood, his ega 
the parts of himself with which he identifies his 
positive feelings". ( Goffman, 1971 p60) . 
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Rooms in meditation centres and private homes which are 
often used for meditating are said to acquire an atmosphere 
of stillness which makes meditating in these places powerful 
and effective. One might say that these rooms take on the 
feel of churches and other places of worship. 
But what happens when someone meditates? What is the 
experience like? First of all, the person chooses as quiet 
a place as possible, where the chances of interruption are 
slight, and sits with a straight back, and eyes closed, for 
twenty minutes. At the end of this time, the eyes are 
slowly opened, the person sits still for a minute or two, 
and then carries on with his or her everyday business. The 
externally observable behaviour, then, is unremarkable. 
The inner experience is more complex. 
While meditating, the person may be aware of the following: 
thoughts, images, memories, feelings in the body and external 
stimulation. The individual may sometimes fall asleep and 
awaken with the realisation that he or she has been sleeping. 
The person will also from time to time be giving attention 
to the mantra. The mantra, this meaningless sound, is 
repeated or repeats itself during the meditation. The 
meditator has been instructed to return his attention to 
the mantra when he notices he is no longer thinking it. 
On the other hand, he has also been told not to force.the 
mantra, not to repeat it compulsively. So, the meditation 
takes place at a point of balance between voluntary and 
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involuntary mental activity, somewhere between thinking 
and listening, and consists of thoughts or images of 
various kinds, followed by the mantra, followed by more 
thoughts, and so on. 
Maharishi (1969 p470) has this to say about the experience 
of meditating: 
"the technique may be defined as turning the attention 
towards the subtlest levels of thought until the mind 
transcends the experience cf the subtlest state of the 
thought and arrives at the source of thought ..... 
A thought-impulse starts from the silent creative 
centre within, as a bubble starts from the bottom of 
the sea. As it rises, it becomes larger; arriving at 
the conscious level of the mind, it becomes large enough 
to be appreciated as a thought, and from there it turns 
into speech and action. Turning the attention inwards 
takes the mind from a thought at the conscious level 
to the finer states of the thought until the mind 
arrives at the source of thought. This inward march 
of the mind results in the expansicn of the conscious 
mind". 
Goleman (1972 p487) puts it this way: 
"with the inward turning of attention in meditation, 
the meditator becomes keenly aware of the random chaos 
characteristic of thoughts in the waking state. The 
train of thought is endless, stops nowhere, and has no 
destination. The meditator witnesses the flow of 
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which is essentially one of being outside the everyday 
world. And it is of interest that if prolonged for too 
long a period, meditation can produce feelings of deperson: 
alisation and detachment, feelings of being outside the 
world in an unpleasant, unwelcome, too extreme, fashion, 
But normally the feeling is merely one of temporary retreat. 
Meditators use words like 'restful', 'peaceful', 'relaxing', 
and 'tranquil' to describe the experience of peace which is 
often found in meditation. This feeling becomes something 
which meditators anticipate "when I have missed a session 
I feel annoyed and slightly at odds with the world because 
I have been 'thwarted'. I now look forward to my sessions 
each day .... " It is also a feeling which seems to be 
carried around during the day, an always available reminder 
of the possibilities of life. And one man, writing about 
the ways he thought TM was effective, commented that it 
might be 
" ..... simply the memory of a degree of inner peace, 
little though it be. You actually remember that you 
don't have to let the furious cataract of your internal 
dialogue run away with you". 
A woman suggested that : 
"the conscious effort of setting aside 20 minutes a day 
to experience 'stillness' underlines what we set out 
to do, ie bring more tranquility into our lives. 
Unconsciously, some of the stillness we experience 
during meditation spills over into our everyday lives". 
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often, however, the experience of meditation is one of 
witnessing a succession of images, thoughts and feelings 
of varying levels of intensity and meaningfulness. For 
example, there may be a primary awareness of an uncomforable 
posture, or memories of commonplace everyday events. At 
the other extreme~ memories of emotionally significant 
events which had been repressed or forgotten, or feelings 
associated with current circumstances, may also be experienced. 
sometimes these feelings may spill over into tears: 
'' ...... after meditating for approximately 10 minutes 
...... I burst into uncontrollable sobbing which lasted 
for about 2 minutes followed by very deep sighing and a 
great sense of relief ...... " 
The woman who made this statement does not mention any thought 
content associated with this expression of feeling. Such is 
often the case. On occasion, however, the feelings appear 
to accompany memories of specific events : 
"some of the old material which comes up ....... (goes) 
back several years, and even sometimes back to child: 
hood. This very old material generally carries a fairly 
high affective charge ..... it is sometimes strong enough 
to be depressing or to cause anxiety for a few minutes" 
(Tart, 1971 p137). 
When powerful feelings are experienced during meditation, 
the meditator is instructed to accept them and, .once they 
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have passed, attend to the mantra once more. What seems 
to happen, therefore, is that the emotions or feelings 
associated with an incident are discharged or expressed, 
leaving the person able to appraise or assimilate that 
memory. (Tart(1971 p137) uses the phrase "processing of 
unfinished psychic business" to describe these experiences. 
Glu~·k and Stroebel(1975 p316) write: 
"during meditation,thoughts and ideas may appear that 
are ordinarily repressed, such as intense hostile-
aggre:;si ve drives, murderous impulses, and, occasionally, 
libidinal ideation. An impressive aspect of this phenomenon 
is that, during the meditation the intense emotional 
affect that would ordinarily accompany this ideation, 
eg when obtained by free associaton, seems to be 
markedly reduced or almost absent". 
In passing, the reference above to free association may bring 
to mind the strong resemblance between Freud's instructions 
to his patients to free associate 'unc~itically' and the 
passive, witnessing attitude demanded for successful meditation. 
However, it would be more correct to say, Glueck and Stroebel, 
that emotional affect becomes markedly reduced. There appears 
to be a process cy which the individual achieves a state 
of emotional equilibrium, by 'sitting-out' or waiting for 
the emotional storm to pass. And often this is not easy -
some at least of the people who give up TM do so because 
it uncovers and brings to the surface feelings they are not 
ready to confront. 
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Two examples are given, both from women who turned to TM 
as an adjunct to psychiatric help. One wrote that she was 
being treated by a psychiatrist for an "acute depressive 
illness", and that 
"I tried meditating on a number of uccasions, but this 
seemed to intensify the depression. I have therefore 
not meditated since . 
...... sometimes waves of sensation come over one 
as if deep seated anxieties are rising to the surface 
leaving the self clean and pure". 
Another woman reported similar problems, but suggested that 
meditating, while unpleasant at times, did help her to 
work through such difficulties 
"TM helped me to get over a nervous breakdown, which 
was building up before : I began meditating and which 
was probably much less serious than it might have been 
because I meditated. It may also have brought the 
problems to the surface, and made me face them all at 
once, which wasn't so good, because I just couldn't 
cope then. However, I'm fine now, and meditation 
helped me recover ..... 
... ... if you have something bothering you, its much 
better that it comes up during meditation, and not 
while you're trying to deal with other things at the 
same time. That way you can think about it more clearly, 
and come to a soluticn more easily". 
But how is it that meditation can bring to awareness such 
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material? To begin with a simple reply to this question, 
the person is put in a situation - that of sitting silently 
for 20 minutes - which is, one might suppose, certain to make 
him or her feel frustrated or anxious sooner or later. The 
meditator, however, has been taught to acc.ept whatever 
happens during this period, whereas the non-meditator would 
react in ways designed to maintain his control of the world, 
he would attempt to repress, or deny the anxiety, therefore 
perpetuating it. This may be a simple model of how the 
meditator comes to feel emotions and work through them in 
meditation. 
Yet, the meditator does not merely have feelings which 
correspond to current exigencies. Sometimes these feelings 
appear to represent "deep seated anxieties". How is it that 
such content, which would not normally be available to 
consciousness,emerges during meditation? This phenomenon 
can be more readily understood with the help of the theory 
of 'experiencing' developed by Gendlin(1962; 
Gendlin's contribution has been to clarify the relationship 
between feeling, meaning and symbolisation. What follows is 
a summary of work published in several places (Gendlin,1962; 
1964,1966' 1974). 
Gendlin begins with the observation that "at any moment 
...... one can refer directly to an inwardly felt datum" 
(Gendlin,1964 plll). This inner sensing Gendlin calls the 
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''direct referent", and he suggests that this direct 
referent contains meaning 
"at first it may seem that experiencing is simply the 
inward sense of our body, its tensi0n or its well-being. 
Yet, upon further reflection, we can notice that only 
in this direct sensing do we have the meanings of what 
we say and think. For, without our 'feel' of the 
meaning, verbal symbols are only noises (or sound 
images of noises)" (Gendlin1964 p112). 
Gendlin is here suggesting that there is a relationship 
between feeling and meaning such that words or other symbols 
get their meaning from the feelings associated with them. 
Sometimes the word may be an accurate symbolisation of a 
feeling state. Gendlin says that when this happens, when 
feeling and symbol coincide, we are b~ing explicit, we are 
saying exactly what we mean. More often, however, there are 
many meanings implicit in a verbalisation, there are feelings 
which are not symbolised in the statement. When this happens, 
it seems to people that there is a lot left unsaid. Or, to 
put it another way, our experiencing is incomplete, we have 
not been able to express what we meant and so we are not 
able to move on from that feeling. We have a feeling which 
we cannot symbolise. Gendlin has attempted to explain how 
it is that in psychotherapy, the therapist helps the client 
symbolise and complete feelings which were not being 
expressed. Briefly, Gendlin suggests the therapist can 
do this by encouraging the client to stay with the feelings, 
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partly by building up a relationship of trust with the 
client, and then offering the person symbols which 
carry forward the client's experiencing. 
What Gendlin is saying is that the feelings which people 
take to the therapist - that they are depressed, that 
there is something missing in their life, and so on -
can be dealt with only by staying with them and exploring 
the meanings implicit in them. He suggests that a 
therapist is necessary for this kind of process because, 
when alone it is too easy for the person to run over 
and over the feeling without result, to deny it, repress 
it or to project it on to someone else. 
The kind of effect which Gendlin describes as coming 
from the symbolisation of a felt meaning which was 
conceptually vague but definite as a feeling is very 
similar to the kind of release reported by meditators. 
He has observed great feelings of relief, a realisation 
that something has ~hanged, an acceptance of previously 
repressed attitudes or emotions, an availability of lost 
memories. The psychotherapy situation is one in which 
these aspects are often formally worked out and made 
sense of in terms of some system, but Gendlin notes that 
this "opening-up" or "dawning" is primary, and intellectual 
understanding or 'insight' come later. He writes : 
"··· .. some of the foregoing observations have been 
termed by others as 'insight'. I believe that this 
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is a misnomer ........ insight and understanding 
are the results, the by-products, of this process, 
as a few of its very many changed aspects call 
attention to themselves". (Gendlin,1964, p120). 
rt certainly seems that the experiences meditators report 
of confronting and re-claiming repressed memories or 
feelings are similar to those reported by psychotherapy 
clients. But, how can the meditation process facilitate 
the symbolisation of implicit meanings? The key to this 
problem seems to be in the role of the mantra in meditation. 
The meditator, as we know, is instructed to return to the 
mantra when he or she notices that other thoughts are present. 
We can suppose that this return to the mantra is equivalent 
to the therapist's keeping the client with the feeling. 
While the person is repeating the mantra, or, perhaps, 
listening to the mantra repeating itself, he or she is 
with whatever feelings he or she might have. As the meanings 
implicit in that feeling begin to come to awareness, presumably 
a train of thought is set in motion, perhaps a denial or 
rationalisation, and the actual felt meaning is lost. But 
then the person returns to the mantra, and is again able 
to be with the feeling. It may be in this way that meditation 
with a mantra can help individuals in the unfolding of meanings 
and the working-through of feelings. The relaxed posture 
and time set aside for meditating ensures that the person 
stays with the task, and the mantra ensures that he can stay 
with the feeling. 
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The kinds of effect which have been accounted for here 
in terms of a theory of experiencing, have also been 
compared to those produced by systematic desensitisation 
(see Goleman,1972). In systematic desensitisation, the 
person is taught how to relax and then encouraged to 
imagine himself in various anxiety-eliciting situations. 
The anxiety response is therefore put into conflict with 
a relaxation response. By starting with less anxiety-
evoking stimuli, and then working up to more and more 
fearful scenes, the person comes to master his fears. 
Very similar effects appear to occur in meditation. 
As Goleman (197~ p488) puts it 
"in meditation, relaxation is deep, the hierarchy 
of thoughts is innately experience-encompassing, 
and self-observation conditions are such that inner 
feedback for behaviour change is optimal. 
natural, global self-desensitisation". 
It is 
There are two of the ways in which tr.e meditation experience 
can be seen to produce the kinds of benefits that meditators 
claim - less anxiety, and an increased ability to approach 
problems dispassionately. These effects flow, to some 
extent, from the opportunity meditation gives for dealing 
with the emotional aspect of problems. However, as we have 
already mentioned, to meditate is to step outside the 
everyday world. It is a "withdrawal", to use Macmurray's(1961) 
word. The act of meditating cuts across the routines of 
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everyday life, it is a private and sacred area within 
that world. And this aspect of meditation has its own 
meaning and its own part to play in the reduction of 
anxiety and in the discovery of enhanced coping skills 
reported by meditators. 
When we talk about anxiety we refer to three areas of 
experience that anxious people typically encounter in 
their daily lives. These are: distorted time experience, 
heightened emotionality, and compulsive thoughts. Thus, 
when we say that someone is anxious we mean that, in the 
first place, they are unable to confront current reality 
to the extent they are involved with events that have 
happened or those that are about to happen. Berne (1974) 
uses the term "reach-back" to describe the habit of 
anticipating future events, and "after-burn" to describe 
the effects of allowing some episode to remain in one's 
thoughts long after it should have been dealt with and 
forgotten. So anxious people are often either waiting 
or remembering. There may be too much time, leading to 
despair and boredom, or there may be too little, leading 
to frenzy and fatigue, or paralysis. This, then, is the 
first everyday-life aspect of anxiety - distorted time 
experience. 
But of course such time distortion is associated with 
particular thoughts or ideas. Anxiety is often translated 
in colloquial terms as 'worry', with the implication that 
there is something 'about' which one is worried, either a 
future event for which one entertains 'catastrophic 
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expectations', or a past transaction which is in some way 
incomplete. In either case, the anxious person repeats 
over and over again scenes, ideas or conducts an internal 
dialogue which prevents the ongoing flow of current 
experiencing and relation to the world. 
This kind of repetition is different from mere rehearsal, 
daydreaming or reminiscing, for two reasons. The first is 
its compulsive quality. These thoughts are experienced 
as invading the consciousness of the anxious person and 
are not easily banished. Secondly, they are accompanied 
by unpleasant bodily feelings - various degrees of muscular 
tension, headache, twitching and so on. This is 
the aspect of anxiety we have labelled 'heightened 
emotionality', which appears to be discharged in certain 
ways discussed above. 
Thus the whole person is involved in being anxious. The 
personal accomplishments of remembering, of thinking, of 
feeling, are all involved in the experiencing of anxiety. 
So, when meditators claim that they are "less anxious and 
strung up" or that they "don't worry so much", and when these 
claims are backed up by psychological research and by 
observation of meditators, we can begin to understand how 
this might happen by looking at how the experience of 
meditating interferes or conflicts with the experience of 
being anxious. When people meditate they construct routines 
and experiences for themselves, which replace anxiety routines 
and experiences. How do they do this? 
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Meditators typically use at least some of their meditation 
period making plans and agendas for the time ahead. It 
would be a mistake to overemphasise this aspect of meditation 
_ meditators say that it is far from being their primary 
· However it does happen and it seems to have the effect a1m. 
of enabling them to put the concerns of timetabling, sorting 
out priorities and so on into the background to some extent 
and allow them, as many put it, "to live each day as it comes". 
In addition, many meditators report that doing TM facilitates 
problem solving. It seems as though the relaxed attitude of 
'witnessing' and 'letting thoughts come', and the essential 
passivity of meditation allows the kind of 'playing with the 
ideas' or 'regression in service of the ego' which has been 
shown to be an important part of the process of creative 
problem solving. Also, the space set aside for meditating 
gives the person an area in which problems can be identified 
and tackled. As one meditator said: 
" ..... if you have something bothering you, its much 
better that it comes up during meditation and not 
while you're trying to deal with other things at the 
same time. That way you can think about it more 
easily and come to a solution more easily". 
These two functions of the meditation experience - planning 
and solving problems - contribute to reduction in anxiety 
in the sense that they conflict with the anxious person's 
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efforts to distort time. After all, it is more difficult 
to worry about what is going to happen if it is already 
worked out. A problem resolved is one which does not 
persist. 
The sense of being able to attend better to the salient 
features of problems, the essentials, which many meditators 
report, and which is backed up by research on a method of 
meditation similar to TM (see Linden, 1973), is perhaps better 
understood in the light of certain observations on the art of 
writing poetry. Stephen Spender writes that : 
"the problem of creative writing is essentially one of 
concentration, and the supposed eccentricities of poets 
are usually due to mechanical habits or rituals developed 
in order to concentrate ....... (it) is different from 
the kind of concentration required for working out a 
sum. It is a focusing of the attention in a special 
way, so that the poet is aware of all the implications 
and possible developments of his idea ... 
..... De la Mare once said to me that he thought the 
desire to smoke when writing poetry arose from a need, 
not of a stimulus, but to canalise a distracting leak 
of his attention away from his writing towards the 
distraction which is always present in one's environ: 
ment". (Spender, 1952 p113). 
This is another way we can understand the mantra - it 
"canalises a distracting leak of attention". 
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What conclusions can be drawn about the experience of 
t . ? medita 1on. What meaning or significance does the 
experience we have described have for meditators? There 
appear to be two aspects of this experience which have 
meaning. The first is the existence of the mantra and the 
a 
means of using it. This constitutes/personal skill which 
meditators have, and which they learn to use properly, as 
we saw, through coaching and negotiation. Meditators use 
this skill to help them overcome everyday problems. 
But the mantra, although a powerful tool in itself, is 
only a means to an end. This end, the second sense in which 
the experience of meditation has meaning, is to produce in 
the meditation experience the interplay of values on which 
the TM movement is built. The act of meditation, then, 
symbolises the meditator's attitude towards life, and 
towards self, and this is its primary significance. The 
act of sitting passively, waiting for an inner silence, 
expecting the clouds to clear, typifies the meditator's 
approach to life as a whole. 
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conclusions 
our discussions have taken us through much different 
territory. The TM movement as a social force and as an 
organisation with a history and a future, the process 
by which people become meditators, and, finally, the 
experience of meditating itself, have all been examined 
with a view to discovering what each contributes to the 
total meaning of the meditation act for the individual 
meditator. 
Our final conclusion must be this : TM provides the 
meditator with an 'image of life' and also a role and 
the various means by which such a role can be sustained. 
The meditation experience itself, we saw, constitutes an 
arena in which the values of the TM movement are dramatised. 
The experience of meditating is one in which the person can 
see him or her self in the terms made available by TM 
language and philosophy. 
The benefits which are reported by meditators can then 
be seen as flowing from the new identity which can be 
attained through meditating. Meditation makes possible, 
through the skills it teaches and the roles it ascribes, 
the development of certain personal powers. We might say 
that the meditator allows himself to be more relaxed, more 
aware, better at solving problems. He is given permission 
by the TM world-view to go ahead and develop these powers 
to the limits of his ability. Other powers, those of anger, 
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or assertiveness, or independent, critical thought, are 
given a lower priority. Of course, we speak here of 
those who are most involved in this movement. The 
majority allow themselves to be transformed by the TM 
experience, and step back from it, retaining whatever 
it is they have a mind to keep. It is believed that 
perhaps as many as 50% of people who begin TM give up 
within a year. 
But this is to talk only of benefits. There is another 
sense in which can be said that people do TM for its 
intrinsic appeal. That is, the experience of meditating, 
the interplay of meaning and value in the arena that is 
the meditation act, appears to be an experience which 
is aesthetically satisying to many. We have talked about 
"inner silence", the "memory of a degree of inner peace". 
These, as much as benefits, are the reasons why people 
continue to meditate. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY IN THE BASIC 
ENCOUNTER GROUP 
Introduction -
The idea of the basic encounter group appears to have 
developed separately in different centres in the years 
following World War II. Perhaps the best known beginning 
was in the social science laboratories set up by Kurt Lewin 
in 1946 (see Back,1972, 1974; Benne, 1964). These labs 
were intended to give educators, social workers and other 
professionals "training in human relations". It was 
discovered, however, that the more formal aspects of the 
training programme were of less interest than the unstructured 
discussion groups where various issues brought up in other 
sessions were explored. Gradually these small groups 
became the core of what was to become the National Training 
Laboratory at Bethel, Maine and which began functioning 
in 1947, shortly after Lewin's death. NTL became the 
pioneer of small group work in the USA, setting up branches 
in other parts of the country and training many of the 
group leaders who were to contribute to the spread of the 
small group as a social movement during the late SO's and 
early 60's. 
At the same time, in the immediate post-war years, the 
psychiatrist W.R. Bion was developing small group methods 
for use, in the first place, with psychiatric patients 
(see Bion, 1961). The Tavistock Institute as a centre for 
education in group dynamics grew out of Bion's work and 
thinking, and represents a distinct approach to and tradition 
in group work. 
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In the early 1950's, also, Carl Rogers and his colleagues 
at the University of Chicago were experimenting with small 
groups as a means of training counsellors for the Veterans 
Administration (see Rogers, 1969). This work was to lead 
to the establishment of 'non-directive' groups, what Rogers 
has called 'basic encounter' groups, by Rogers and others 
influenced by his 'person-centred' philosophy. 
Finally, the Psychodrama technique, originally devised 
by J. Moreno in the 1930's, was imported to the USA at 
around about the same time. Many of the techniques pioneered 
by Moreno have found their way into other group-work 
approaches, particularly the Gestalt Therapy of Perls and 
Schutz. These latter figures were members of the Esalen 
Insti tue, the most prestigi ot.E of the Californian 'growth' 
centres set up in the early 1960's to fulfil the demand 
for group experiences (see Schutz, 1967). 
Thus the historical picture is a fairly complex one. 
It certainly seems as though the encounter or T (Training) 
group movement filled a gap in Western, specifically American, 
culture. The rapid penetration of the group experience 
though American social life is documented by Back (1972,1973). 
In Britain and Europe the picture is slightly different. 
While there do exist organisations which offer the intensive 
group experience to members of the public, these do not exist 
on anything like the scale found in the USA. The better 
established institutions such as the Tavistock Institute 
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concentrate solely on professional training. It is also 
of interest that while groups have achieved a certain 
popularity, albeit minimal compared to the situation in 
the USA, in Britain, Holland and Germany, one market which 
has proved impossible to break into is France. 
Each of the approaches mentioned above has its own rationale 
and way of working with groups. Yet most group leaders 
have had experience with various approaches and are t~us, 
to a greater or lesser degree, eclectic in their outlook. 
Partly this is due to the fact that there are few accredited 
training courses for leaders, and little supervision of what 
leaders do once they have received training. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that in their extensive comparative study, 
Lieberman, Yalom and Miles (1973) found that the description 
group leaders gave themselves bore little relationship to 
their actual activities. 
Therefore it is difficult to characterise the typical 
encounter group, T-group or 'sensitivity' group. Perhaps 
it can be best described as a setting in which people attempt 
to communicate with each other as honestly and openly as they 
can. However, further than this, any definition must run 
into contradictions. In some groups the leader may take an 
active, initiatory role, while in others he or she willbe 
'non-directive'. The group may even be leaderless. Some 
groups have rules, others do not. Members may be strangers 
or indeed all belong to the same organisation. And so on. 
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ThiS study describes what happened at two encounter group 
workshops held in Britain in the summer of 1975 and the 
summer of 1976. The unique flavour of these events should 
be apparent in what is written below. Yet, in the light 
of what has been said about the history and circumstances 
of the encounter group movement, certain comments are 
necessary. 
These workshops were staffed by group leaders trained 
primarily in the non-directive or 'Rogerian' approach. 
That is, they saw the role of the group leader as being 
that of a 'facilitator' - their task was to facilitate 
communication between group members. Also, the Rogerian 
approach demands that the group facilitator should be 
'congruent', that he or she should 'be a person~ in the 
group, express personal feelings and opinions rather than 
attempt to be in the group solely as a resource. However, 
all the staff had received training in other approaches -
Gestalt, Transactional Analysis and Psychodrama, mainly -
and they each had their own style of leadership within a 
broad non-directive framework. Also, the event was advertised 
as a Rogerian one, and this is what participants expected. 
Thus, while this study can be placed in a historical context 
as a piece of research into the Rogerian type of basic 
encounter group, and, indeed, comparisons with research on 
similar groups will be made when relevant, it is also a 
description of a uniquely complex event, one which can only be 
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categorised as 'Rogerian encounter' by discounting important 
aspects of the experience as a whole. 
The object of this work is to describe and give an account 
of the social ordering of experience in the basic encounter 
group, as observed at these workshops. The basic thesis 
expounded in the second part of the Chapter is that the 
encounter group constitutes a region of or context for social 
activity identifiable by characteristic behaviour and morality 
and with its own spatial and temporal boundaries. The third 
section examines how this situation influences the individual. 
It will be seen that the struggle to be - with - others in 
the group brings into focus many issues involved in being a 
person normally concealed in the routine activities of every: 
day life. A final, fourth part of the Chapter will offer a 
deeper interpretation of the meaning of the encounter group 
experience. First of all, however, it is necessary to set 
the stage. Part one of this work introduces the background 
information and description needed to make sense of later 
analysis. 
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participants and Staff -
The first workshop lasted for ten days and involved 44 
participents and four facilitators; the second 56 particip: 
ants and five facilitators over eight days. The author 
participated in both these events as research associate. 
Participants were almost all members of the 'helping' 
professions - counsellors, teachers, psychologists, priests, 
social workers or students of these profession. Four 
participants, as well as the staff, took part in both work: 
shops. There were slightly more women than men. Ages 
ranged from 23 to over 60. Half the participants paid 
personally for their attendance. Most of the remainder 
were financed partially or in full by their employers. 
A few were aided by partial 'scholarships'. Ten of the 
96 participants over the two workshops were attending their 
first such event. The rest had been, on average, to three, 
four or five basic encounter or similar type of experiential 
group before, although in few cases had these been of comparable 
duration to the present one. 
The workshop was advertised in the relevant professional and 
popular journals and through mailing lists as being concerned 
with "theory and experience in facilitating groups" and as an 
exercise in "cross - cultural communication". In the 
explanatory brochure, emphasis was placed on the organisation's 
espousal of the non-directive philosophy of Carl Rogers and 
its link with the Centre for Studies of the Person at La Jolla, 
California. It was stated that the organisation was non-profit 
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making· The brochure also mentioned that learning 
experiences in other group approaches, such as 
Transactional Analysis and Psychodrama, would be offered, 
and that there would be a "research evaluation" of the 
outcome of the workshop. 
In the light of recent controversy regarding the possible 
riskiness of the encounter group experience, it is of 
interest that the brochure played down the therapeutic 
aspect of the workshop in favour of education and learning 
aspects. Offering 'scholarships' also emphasised these la~( 
aspects. The brochure for the second workshop specifically 
stated that attendance was no substitute for psychotherapy. 
In any event none of the participants appeared to be under: 
going current psychiatric treatment or counselling and, 
although it is difficult to certain, probably fewer than 
10% had ever received such treatment. 
It should also be noted that completion of the workshop 
made participants eligible for a limited number of course 
credits at an American University. Although few of the 
participants made use of this offer, one of the facilitators 
reflected that it helped to give the whole operation a veneer 
of respectability. Indeed, the facilitators themselves had 
impressive credentials, set out in some detail on the brochure. 
All had extensive encounter group experience and were working 
professionally in teaching, counselling and clinical psychology. 
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Their reputations were apparently sufficient to draw 
participants from several countries, including Norway, 
Germany, Spain, France and even America. In all, over 
a dozen nationalities were represented. Proceedings 
were conducted in English. 
Although these group leaders were all nominally facilitating 
groups in non-directive, 'Rogerian' style, there were marked 
differences in their approaches, a fact which did not escape 
participants' notice. The issue of leadership style was made 
explicit, both in discussion between participants and 
facilitators (a group was set up to allow further exploration 
of this topic) and also, on more than one occasion in the 
community group, between the facilitators themselves. 
However, group leaders shared at least some basic elements 
of style. They did not instigate 'games' or 'exercises' in 
the groups, nor did they provide any formal cognitive input, 
or provide 'interpretations' of statements. Within these 




These workshops took place in University halls of residence. 
Features of these settings with some relevance to this 
account are: surroundings were comfortable and everyday 
domestic tasks (preparing food, tidying, cleaning) were 
taken care of. There was open parkland available, with 
the alternative of a busy city centre a short busride away. 
Although non-workshop residents and staff were generally 
around, certain rooms were exclusively at the disposal of 
participants. There were bar and dancing facilities, both 
of which were widely used. 
About three months after the end of each of the workshops 
there were follow-up meetings. One was held at the home 
of a participant; the other at the school of which a 
participant was headmaster. The follow-ups were week-end 
events, and provided some sense of continuity of friendships 
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~thods 
Back (1972,1973) has described how the encounter group 
movement emerged from the interests and activities of social 
and behavioural scientists during the post-war years. It 
is not surprising, then, that even though encounter groups 
have become more of a social or cultural phenomenon in the 
last two decades, they have continued to be the focus of 
scientific research. Back (1972) in fact claims that 
encounter as a social movement has used science to 
legitimate rather than test its procedures. 
The aims of this research are to describe the experience 
of being in an encounter group and to consider how that 
experience is made possible, or constructed, through 
participants' actions and beliefs, through the meaning the 
group has for these people. Thus its aims differ from that 
of most previous research in this area, and the conventional 
research methods - questionnaires, rating scales, inventories 
- are considered inappropriate. 
The existing research in encounter groups has been reviewed 
by Stock (1964), Campbell and Dunnette (1968), Cooper and 
Mangham (1971), Smith (1975) and Blumberg and Golembiewski 
(1976) among others. The monumental research effort of 
Lieberman, Yalom and Miles (1973) deserves mention in a 
category of its own. The conclusions drawn by all these 
reviewers are similar participants in encounter groups 
report a high degree of global, generalised positive feeling 
'I 
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toward both self and others. This positive effect is often 
not reflected in specific measures and tends to lessen 
markedly over time. There also tend to be increases in 
participative behaviour and risk-taking. 
However, in the methods and experimental design adopted 
by this type of research, the meaning of the event for 
participants is not considered. The most extreme example 
of research which omits meaning is McLeish's (1974) Skinnerian 
analysis of an experimental learning group. 
There do exist, however, pieces of research which take 
meaning into consideration. Two of these are journalistic 
accounts of the encounter group experience by Maliver (1973) 
and Gustaitis (1968). While these works are certainly 
valuable background reading, they hardly represent systematic 
research. 
The work of Rogers (1969,1977) is similarly difficult to 
evaluate. Rogers is a figure of such stature in the encounter 
group movement that one might suspect that his informants would 
be also out of the ordinary. Rogers (1969) has conducted 
research into group outcomes using open-ended questionnaires. 
This material, however, was not given detailed analysis of 
the kind outlined in Chapter 3. More useful, perhaps, is 
his description of 'group process' (Rogers, 1969), which, 
although not a piece of formal research per se, is at least 
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a well-observed account offered by one of the most 
experienced practitioners in the area. A more recent 
contribution by Rogers (1977) is a description of a 
workshop like the ones studied in this work. The reader 
is directed towards this source for an alternative perspective 
on such a workshop. 
Three further studies are of some relevance. Ottaway(1966) 
~ 
givesAbook-length account of a series of groups he ran on 
a weekly basis with social workers and others interested 
professionals. While this work contains much valuable 
material, some of which will be referred to below, its 
bias is towards a 'how to do it' manual rather than a 
theoretical treatise. Ottaway's group members kept 
diaries of their group experiences, a practice adopted also 
in this study. 
The final pair of works to be dealt with are those by Slate~ 
(1966) and Bion (1961). Both give detailed descriptions of 
the processes involved in small groups. Both suggest that 
the issue of the authority relationship is central to the 
life of the group, a conclusion at odds with the one offered 
below. However, closer examination of these studies reveals 
that the particular composition and raison d'etre of these 
groups made it unlikely that any other themes would surface 
to anything like the same extent. Slater's groups were 
experiential groups run as part of an assessed course in 
graduate school - the group leader was also the assessor. 
Bion's group members were psychiatric patients who were told 
that they were to be treated by a doctor with expertise 
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in group therapy (Bion himself). When the doctor remained 
obdurately silent in the face of their questions, speaking 
only to interject enigmatic comments from time to time, little 
wonder the issue of leadership and authority should be 
. t' prom1nen . 
Thus, while these other pieces of research form a context 
within which this research must fit, none of them are 
sufficiently similar in aims or methods to be seriously 
examined as a comparison study. Moreover, none of them 
employed the network of checks and controls suggested as 
being a necessary part of a scientific approach to the 
person. All these studies were written by leaders· of 
groups. This one is from the point of view of the 
participant. 
To move on to the act.ual methods used in this study, some 
mention needs to be made of its general aims. The author 
was invited to be research associate to the organisation 
which put on the workshops to be described. While it was 
clear that any material he might gather could be used for 
his doctorate, there was also an understanding that the 
primary purpose of the research was to elucidate the meaning 
of the group experience for the participants themselves. 
The organisation sent out bi-annual Newsletters to everyone 
who had ever attended a Workshop, and the research work 
was to be published there piece by piece (see Appendix B) 
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Thus, not only would participants be able to negotiate 
their accounts of the group experience with the researcher, 
they would also have available a source of recording and 
clarification in the research. The researcher's personal 
correspondence with participants was also an opportunity 
for developing ideas. This work continues. 
The material presented in this Chapter is continually 
being supplemented by correspondence, articles written 
by participants for the Newsletters, and so on. A Workshop 
held in the summer of 1977 has not been included in this 
presentation. 
The aim of the research then, is to describe and interpret 
the group experience in the interest of participants themselves. 
How was this done? 
In this study the method chosen to record and explore members' 
understandings and perceptions of what was going on was the 
medium of personal documents (Allport, 1942). Participants 
were invited to write freely about their expectations for 
the workshop, their experiences during the workshop and 
their feelings at the end of the workshop and on returning 
home. Open-ended questionnaires were sent out before and 
after the event. During the group, participants were 
asked to keep diaries or daily journals The co-operative 
aspect of the eo-research technique was maintained in the 
following ways. Firstly, participa•ts were sent a letter 
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which told them the aims of the research (to obtain a 
description of their experience during the workshop). 
They were assured that participation in the research was 
entirely optional and that confidentiality would be 
maintained regarding anything they wrote. Secondly, 
the research associate (the author) introduced himself 
at the beginning of the workshop and re-iterated these 
themes. He explained that he himself would be a 
participant at the workshop and that th~y could judge for 
themselves whether they wanted to share their experience 
(as written in a journal) with him or not. Thirdly, the 
researcher was available to discuss any problems that 
might arise regarding style of writing etc. Finally, any 
research reports that were written would be circulated to 
them for comment. 
Copies of letters and other research documents are available 
in Appendix B. 
Thus, a relationship was established between researcher and 
eo-researchers. Also, there was a personal pay-off for 
members in taking part in the research - they would have a 
record of the workshop (the researcher merely took a photo: 
copy of the journal and sent it on to them). Indeed, it 
seemed to be a meaningful task for most of those who completed 
journals, and they mention how the discipline of writing 
provided a welcome contrast to the intense involvement of the 
groups, even helping them to resolve issues raised there. 
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As for the relationship with the researcher, it seemed to 
be the rule (but by no means exclusively so) that those 
who took most care with their journals were those who liked 
the researcher and wanted to help him, while those who did 
not bother were unsympathetic either to the idea of research, 
that kind of research, or to him personally. It is of 
course difficult to be sure about this, although there is the 
evidence of one person who stopped keeping his journal for two 
days when he was annoyed with the researcher, beginning again 
when this difference had been ironed out. On the other hand, 
two people admitted to not handing in their journals because 
they felt that they contained material too personal to share 
with the researcher. Others found a way round this problem 
by taking the journals home and editing them, sending in only 
those portions they wished to contribute for research purposes. 
Many journal-keepers reported that they started off writing 
the journal for the research, and came more and more to write 
it for themselves. Similarly, many said that as time went 
on they had more and more to write about. Some stopped 
because they could not record everything that was happening 
to them. Some of these completed their accounts at home and 
mailed them to the researcher later. 
Another problem is that of honesty - are participants honestly 
reporting their experiences, their thoughts and feelings, in 
what they write for someone else? Firstly, the journal 
method surely captures more of the experience of participants 
than do questionnaires and rating scales. Also, there are 
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a couple of journals which certainly appear to disclose 
more intimate material than these particular people talked 
about in groups. Finally, in discussion with people who 
wrote journals, after the event, they assert their bias 
was more in not being able to write enough rather than in 
falsifying or <dissimulating~ through what they did write. 
The experience of the researcher as a participant was 
essential for this type of research. Quite apart from the 
opportunity it gave members to decide whether they trusted 
him or not, the data gathered through participant observation 
allowed for an independent check on the accuracy of journals. 
In other words, it was clear that the journals were not 
totally false, since the researcher had at least some 
insight into the experience of some participants. Also, 
it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
make sense of what was written in the journals without the 
shared background knowledge of the events that took place. 
Another important feature of participant research is that 
it is only possible given a sympathy for the point of view 
of informants. When research is carried out from an opposing 
point of view, the effect is to produce results which deny 
the reality of the situation as experienced by informants. 
While we may, as social scientists, be legitimately interested 
in re-interpreting common-sense ideas, surely our task is 
not to deny them. 
f 
I Less than half the participants took part in the research -
I 
I 
23 out of the 44 in the first workshop and 21 out of 56 in 
the second. These are the people who either kept journals 
l during the workshop (22 at the first workshop, 12 at the -255-
second)or who contributed substantial retrospective reports 
(longer than 1500 words). However other participants sent 
in partially completed questionnaires or letters or spoke 
at some length with the researcher, and there is no obvious 
way in which those who co-operated are different from those 
who did not (except of course in that they co-operated and 
they were, in general, more friendly with the researcher). 
That is, they did not differ in sex, age, previous experience 
in groups or occupation. 
The length and 'quality' of journals varied widely. The 
longest contribution was over 50 pages in length, the 
shortest about 8. Some were full of bald descriptions 
of "what I did", "who was in the group today", and so on, 
while others attained a poetic or novelistic level of 
expression. 
All quotations in thisthesis, unless otherwise referenced, 
are taken from these journals. The identity of participants 
has been concealed by using misleading initials instead of 





Although the main focus of this account is to explore 
people's experience at the workshop, it is necessary 
first of all to give a short description of what 'objectively', 
happened, what these people did during their time together. 
The organisation of both workshops was similar enough for 
us to treat them as one. 
On arrival, participants registered, were shown their rooms 
and met at least a few of the staff (facilitators) who were 
organisi•g all this. They were given name tags, and told 
there would be ~meeting in a certain room at a certain time. 
) 
At that time, when most, if not all, participants had arrived, 
the meeting was begun by one of the facilitators introducing 
himself and saying a little about how he hoped the workshop 
would develop. The other facilitators introduced themselves 
in similar fashion. The research associate talked about 
the research. Fairly soon participants began to announce 
themselves and their expectations and hopes for the workshop. 
This first meeting ended in time for the evening meal. 
At the second meeting, after the meal, the demands that the 
large group break up into small 'encounter' groups, became 
stronger. People began to drift off to form small groups 
in the rooms available, either inviting facilitators to join 
them, or being joined by facilitators. These small groups 




The next morning all participants met again in the large 
'community' room. Various ways of structuring the time 
at the workshop were discussed. At both workshops the 




Community meeting involving all participants 
Choice of options - eg psychodrama, Transact: 
ional Analysis, Poetry reading etc. 
Small group meetings, followed by dancing 
and general conviviality in community room. 
It was agreed that at the halfway point in the workshop the 
composition of the small groups should change, so that more 
participants could meet each other and experience different 
styles of facilitating. While some participants may truly 
have been exposed to the 'group process' others used their 
time in idiosyncratic ways. For example a few could not 
decide to stay in a particular group, changing several times. 
Others just walked out if they were bored or unhappy with 
what was going on. There were some who took little part 
in the workshop. Participants took time off to go sight: 
seeing or shopping. At most times there could be found a 





These meetings were held in a large room, in the mornings. 
usually at least 35 people attended. At the beginning of 
the workshop, topics of discussion centred on practical 
issues such as setting up groups, allocating times for 
options, and the like. Although there were voices raised 
in protest at what was seen as being a "flight into structure", 
the community soon adopted a fairly rigid routine. While 
the community meetings continued to be used to debate practical 
matters, this became less important as time went on. A notice 
board was also used to advertise meetings and counter-meetings. 
As distinct from these matters of common concern, many 
participants came to use the large meetings to make 'statements' 
in which they expressed their perception of what was going on 
in the workshop and their personal philosophical convictions. 
Some of these statements took the form of lengthy monologues 
while others were brief. However they appeared to be state: 
ments which had been previously rehearsed, either in whole 
or in part. There are tw~ :3c·urces of evidence for this. 
Th~ firs:t is th,at in the j e~nnals participants wrote for 
some days beforehand about the issues they were eventually to 
raise in the meeting, and mention in reporting their own 
'statements' that they waited for a convenient pause before 
beginning. Which leads to the second source of evidence, 
the tape recordings, which show that 'statements' seldom 
related to what went before, they were not made in response 
to what the previous speaker had said (dialogue). 
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i·r 
Another striking feature of the community meetings was the 
level of boredom. People said in the meetings they were 
bored, they also said this in journals and in discussion 
outside the meeting. They looked bored, stopped coming, 
and walked out. Can this general boredom be related to the 
'statements'? On one occasion when there was an extended 
dialogue in a general meeting, a confrontation between a 
facilitator and a participant (initiated by the latter) 
and it is significant that this event was probably the 
most powerful single event in that whole workshop. Not 
only were many people visibly distressed during the confront: 
ation and afterwards at mealtime, but the emotions raised 
during it were brought up again and again in the ensuing 
large and small groups. This event was also referred to 
many times in the journals. To return briefly to the reports 
of boredom, many participants stated that they were unable 
to follow what was happening in the large groups because of 
fatigue. They said that there were so many different issues 
being brought up that it required a great effort to attend 
to them all. It was noticeable that towards the end of the 
workshop talk in the large group was better ordered. There 
seemed to have been established a communal language and 
communal feeling for priorities which made communication 
easier and less fatiguing or boring. 
Towards the end of the workshop, topics of discussion were 
raised in the community meetings which are seldom mentioned 
in the encounter group literature. For example there were 
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I' 
explorations of the political implications of the encounter 
group movement, and of the financial aspect of the workshop. 
It is impossible to say whether these issues were unique to 
this workshop or whether they have merely been obscured by 
the typical assumption that encounter groups are wholly 
psychological events. Again it must be emphasised that the 
participants in this group used it in many different ways. -
as a holiday, a political forum, a place to meet people as 
well as in the more accepted way of a 'sensitivity', 'training' 
or 'growth' experience. 
The community meetings, then, provided a forum for the group 
~e~ 
as a whole, and~ used in the main to debate practical, 
organisational problems or wider philosophical and political 
issues. However, on those few occasions when personal matters 
were brought up in the community group, it became apparent 
that the particular features of these meetings - the larger 
audience, bigger room, necessity to talk more loudly so 





These consisted of from eight to twelve participants and a 
facilitator and met in separate rooms. Two leaderless groups 
were also set up by participants. At one of the workshops 
the composition of the encounter groups was the cause of much 
discussion in initial community meetings. Some participants 
wanted to be allocated to groups at random, others wished to 
choose themselves the group they would join. Important 
considerations for members were other participants they either 
did or did not want to be in a group with, and the facilitator 
they wished to be with or to avoid. It is of interest to note 
that groups were identified by the facilitator's name even 
when he had no part in its organisation. Groups were initially 
formed by individuals who walked out of committee meetings, 
inviting others to follow them. 
The small groups broke up at the halfway point in the workshop. 
Most of the first groups met again for a short session at the 
end of the workshop. What happened in these groups is the 
main topic of the rest of this Chapter. Suffice to say at 
this point that most participants became attached to 'their' 
group and the other members in it. They became protective 




In the afternoons there were a wide variety of optional 
groups which offered participants learning experiences 
in areas of interest. Most of these options were organised 
and led by the facilitators, although some came about through 
members' efforts. They ranged from more structured forms 
of encounter - Gestalt, Psychodrama - to discussion groups 
(on facilitating, the political implications of the encounter 
movement and sexuality), structured learning of skills 
(empathy training) and finally almost recreational activities, 






Facilitating groups group 
Family therapy 
Gestalt therapy 









These afternoon sessions offered an opportunity for many 
participants to explore unfamiliar areas of life. Many 
of the issues raised in these groups were examined again 
in the encounter and community groups. 
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THE ENCOUNTER GROUP AS A REGION OF SOCIAL ACTIVITY 
Introduction 
As members of a culture we possess knowledge about how to 
act in diverse circumstances. As Schutz and Luckmann (1974 
pp99-100) put it: 
"every actual present experience is inserted into 
the flow of lived experience and into a biography 
according to the set of types and relevance found 
in the stock of knowledge ....... each situation is 
defined and mastered with the help of the stock 
of knowledge". 
This knowledge comes from many different sources - watching 
other people, instruction in childhood and so on - and 
forms a reservoir of common-sense rules which we use to 
guide our actions. These rules are a resource we are 
seldom consciously aware of; they are most of the time 
taken for granted. Similarly, participants in encounter 
it 
groups have an understanding of what/is they expect to 
happen there. Sometimes these expectations are made explicit, 
as in the early discussions concerning how the workshop 
was to be organised. During these early sessions, group 
members talked about what they hoped and expected to happen 
at the workshop, and suggested methods of achieving such 
goals. Or expectations may be implicit in members' behaviour. 
For example, the entrance of the facilitator can be a signal 
for the group to begin. At one moment participants are 
talking in groups of two or three. Then the arrival of 
the facilitator brings into play the rules of being in an 
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encounter group, and those present fall silent, sit in a 
circle facing the centre and adopt the serious expression 
apparently required for 'encounter'. From now on if anyone 
talks it is publicly and for all the others to hear. Ottaway 
(1966 p7) writes: 
"the circle is a definite physical structure which is 
insisted upon. The members speak one at a time, and 
while one speaks the others are normally paying attention. 
This method structures the behaviour to some extent, 
and is a convention that groups soon come to accept". 
What is being suggested is that the encounter group constitutes 
a distinct social setting with its own unique rules of conduct. 
Just as the waiter's conduct is transformed as walks through 
the door separating the 'back-stage' kitchen from the 'front-
stage' dining room, the participant going into an encounter 
group must adapt himself to a new world with new rules of 
conduct. Goffman(1974) puts it thus: mwhen individuals attend 
to any current situation, they face the question: 'What is 
it that's going on here?'" For people in encounter groups 
their answer to the question 'What is it that's going on here?' 
is their definition of the situation, their plan and agenda 
which makes it possible to engage in co-operative action with 
other group members. Group members communally construct a 
social setting, "awareness context" (Glaser and Strauss,1964), 
"region of social activity" (Goffman, 1959), "frame of reference" 
of 
(Goffman, 1974) or "province/reality" (Schutz and Luckmann,1974) 
which transforms their experience of themselves. Argyris (1969) 
labels this an ''/Atypical interpersonal world" - "a world of 
high openness, trust and interpersonal competence". 
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The transformation or re-organisation of experience within 
this world is perceived by members in the following way: 
they claim that what occurs in the group is of a different 
order of reality. One of the most salient issues to emerge 
from the journals was that of 'reality'. One participant 
talked about others trying to "smile away his reality" 
It became a craze at one workshop to award "ARP" (a real person) 
badges to those who made authentic contributions. One 
participant wrote in his journal after a group - "A wonderful 
session with real people not opinions and theories". Or -
"I realise the important thing is to be 'real' without this 
becoming a totally selfish aim''· Another commented as the 
workshop came to a close: "It's almost as if we have moved 
back again into ·the 'real' world". 
Participants used the concept of 'reality' in two senses. 
One use of 'real' referred to the common-sense world of every 
day life. This sense of 'reality' made the city 'real' and 
the women who served the food 'real', and was characterised 
by consensual taken-for-granted definition and validation 
of meaning. On the other hand, a second sense of 'reality' 
made reference to the intensive group experience, where the 
meaning of action was grounded in felt experiencing or inner 
state rather than common-sense shared understandings. As has 
been mentioned, the workshops took place in residential settings 
which were nevertheless not completely insulated from the 
outside world (for example the women with the coffee trolley 
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getting on with their work and in the same room emotional 
scenes at a community meeting) these two realities clashed, 
leading to a consciousness of their separateness perhaps, 
not found in better insulated 'growth centres' (eg Esalen), 
psychiauric units or other 'total institutions'. 
Thus participants at these workshops point through their 
comments at a fundamental feature of all encounter groups -
the construction in such groups of a radically different 
social context or reality. In the following sections 
we examine some of the processes by which this reality 




one source of evidence for the claim that participants in 
encounter groups act to create a special social setting is 
in their expectations for the event. Members' expectations 
function as a pre-existing definition of the situation which 
summarises their ideas of what they would like to happen at 
the workshop, a set of personal goals to work towards. 
(See Note 3). There follows a selection of what participants 
wrote about their expectations: 
"I had several problems which I thought I might get 
worked out ..... 
I felt very confident that I would meet people I could 
get very close to" 
"I needed to work out my personal problem ..... " 
"My expectations were that I would be taught how to 
relate to ..... " 
"I knew from the literature certain things were likely ... " 
" ..... meet people .... in conditions which eliminate some 
of the usual conventional structures". 
"I like meeting people on a deeper than superficial level 
and hope to do so .... I want to learn more about w.yself 
and my feelings, hopefully to enable me to become less 
defensive and result in greater personal freedom". 
"Personal development expectations - self knowledge from 
feedback. Greater awareness of real feelings and opportunity 
to express these appropriately (and inappropriately!) 
Opportunites to experiment with self-assertion - new ways 
of behaving. 
Opportunity to learn from other individuals by observation 
and relationspips. 
Greater awareness of group pressures and learning about 
how groups work under the surface. 
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Expected opportunities to work on specific personal 
difficulties and general learning in the area of 
authority and responsibility and my attitudes towards it. 
Acquisition of skills in helping relationships. 
Acquisition of clues about my own creativity". 
It was also clear through observation that many participants 
had expectations and standards for the groups. Frequently 
in groupsmembers commented that what was happening was not 
what 'should' be happening. That is, they made reference to 
notions of the sort of conduct and experience they expected 
from that situation. For example, during a silence at the 
beginning of the first community meeting, a participant at 
his first encounter workshop stated that what was happening 
was like a Quaker Meeting. This remark, made in all 
seriousness, was treated as a joke. His 'reading' or 
'definition' of the situation was taken to be totally inapprop: 
riate by those who had different expectations. 
There were in fact'wide differences in the elaboration of 
expectations. Some participants (see the final quotation 
above) had very detailed and accurate expectations which 
they did their best to make sure were fulfilled. Others, 
usually those without much previous experience of encounter 
groups, helc few expectations and limited personal goals. 
Finally, members' expectations - of forming 'intimate' 
relationships undergoing personal learning and change, talk 
about personal problems and so on - were generally fulfilled. 
As one participant wrote: "If people come they will work to 
get what they came for". 
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Theories 
closely related to participants' expectations for encounter 
groups arE their theories of what happens in these groups. 
If expectations are the goal towards which members work, 
their theories are the means through which their efforts 
are channelled. Their theories are their ideas of "what 
will happen if or when" and represent their understanding 
of how to achieve group and personal goals. Here are some 
statements which reflect participant's theories of how 
groups work: 
"Should I resent it that some people don't want to 
be involved? .... 
Only very ?trong commitment will make things happent• 
"The small group still feels awkward and stuck to me. 
We're all so nice ..... I keep wondering if it is totally 
impossible for things to move or happen unless someone 
hurts''. 
" .... in an attempt to get into depth I gave an account 
of my ..... proplems". 
"Encounter groups are groups in which the individuals 
involved set up relationships with each other which 
mirror the ways they relate to others outside the group. 
As a result people are able to learn how they relate to 
others .... Groups are (also) places where people can 
learn other ways of being in the world by means of an 
unconscious group process whereby the members of the 
group respond, at a level be•eath the level of speech 
and expressed needs, to the needs of each other". 
"When others bare their weaknesses, we realise that 'the 
more intimate, the more universal', and this boosts our 
self-respect and self-esteem". 
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participants at these workshops possessed both pre-existing 
expectations concerning what would happen there and also 
theories of how they must act (give feedback, make disclosures, 
express feeling, be committed to the group) to achieve these 
goals and expectations. This body of knowledge makes possible 
their definition or understanding of the group situation. 
It could be argued that only those who had been in groups 
before would use expectations and theories in this way. 
This argument is reinforced by the refusal of some members 
to write about "how does the encounter group 'work'? in 
reply to a questionnaire request since, in their estimation, 
they did not know enough to be able to theorise. However, 
there ~·ere people who had never been to an encounter group 
who could write about their expectations and theories. And, 
finally, it seems unlikely that anyone would invest so much 
time and energy in a completely mysterious event. It must 
be concluded that even those who claimed to come without 
pre-existing ideas had at least simple, implicit expectations 
and were prepared to follow the example of those who appeared 
to have a better understanding of what was going on. Much 
of what happened in the opening sessions can indeed be 
understood as negotiation of expectations. Members either 
learned about what were seen as legitimate expectations, 
or modified their own plans in the light of what others had 
to say about them. 
Asking people about their expectations and theories gives a 
very incomplete picture of their understanding of a situation. 
To get a clearer picture it is necessary to observe how their 
understanding or definition of the situation is expressed through 
action. In the foliwwing sections we examine the ways that 
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.i. 
basic forms of activity - listening and talking - are used 




A very simple item of knowledge people have about encounter 
groups is that, in them, one listens to dher people's talk. 
For many participants in encounter groups the time spent 
in the group represents the longest spell of listening they 
have ever done in their lives. Some indirect evidence for 
this proposition comes from several reports that on immediately 
leaving the workshop, participants experienced the world as 
being very loud. The sound of traffic was overpowering, it 
was difficult to focus in one conversation in a bar, and so 
on. These temporary phenomena can be understood as the 
carry-over effects of intensive listening. 
This is not to say that when people are silent they may 
not be fanta.sying, daydreaming, remembering or rehearsing, 
but that in general members of an encounter group follow the 
rules of being-in-a-conversation rather than those of being-
at-a-lecture. In conversation we are expected to attend to 
everything that is said and we expect listeners to give us 
the same attention, whereas in lectures, the theatre, cinema 
and so on "time-out" is acceptable. Thus in recordings of 
group meetings there are many instances of "would you repeat 
that, I didn't hear it" but few of "sorry, I wasn't listening". 
What does it mean to do so much listening? 
In the first place listening confirms the listener as part 
of the group. Through sharing the same experience, listening 
to the same stretch of talk, members see themselves as being 
in a group to which other people do not belong. Conversely, 
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by turning off for a while, not listening, a person implies 
that he or she is no longer of the group for that time. 
one participant wrote about how pleased she was that other 
members could accept the idea of her going to sleep during 
a group session. Her anxiety about this implies a fear 
that rejection or resentment may be shown to anyone in the 
group who does not listen. So, if we talk about group 
cohesion or trust, we mean that, at least people in the 
group listen to each other. 
Secondly, there is a sense in which intensive listening 
mediates involvement and the feeling that what is perceived 
is 'real' . For example at the theatre when one is 'fully' 
atteRdi»g to the drama it is experienced as being real while 
one is 'half' attending and at the same time watching the 
audience, the stage apparatus etc., it seems not so real, 
it is more readily seen as being a performance. 
context, James (1901 p295) writes that: 
In this 
"reality means simply relation to our emotional and 
active life. This is the only sense that the word 
ever has in the mouths of practical men. In this sense, 
whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real; 
Whenever an object so appeals to us that we turn to it, 
accept it, fill our mind with it, or practically take 
account of it, so far is it real for us, and we believe it. 
Whenever, on the other hand, we ignore it, fail to consider 
it or act upon it .... so far it is unreal for us and 
disbelieved". 
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Thus, in an encounter group when one is listening very hard 
in an attempt to enter the world of the other to 'empathise', 
it all seems very real. But if one is not paying that much 
attention, or is maintaining a skeptical distance (as, we 
shall discover,happens) the events at hand can come to appear 
unreal, phoney, contrived, a theatrical performance. It 
seems that as participants become better at listening 
(become more empathic) they also become more convinced 
of the 'reality' of what it is they are hearing. 
To summaris~: Listening is a basic activity in 
encounter groups. Even people who have never been to an 
encounter group before somehow know that this is a situation 
in which they should listen. The contribution of this 
basic activity to group cohesion and trust, and to the feeling 




What do people talk about in encounter groups? We have 
already seen that members bring with them powerful 
expectations that they will talk about themselves, that they 
will disclose areas of their "information preserve" (Goffman, 
1959), their secrets and their feelin~, to other participants. 
But people also talk about themselves at parties, coffee 
mornings and many other social gatherings. What, then, are 
the particular features of talk in encounter groups which 
reflect its distinctiveness as a social context? 
Talk in encounter groups is frequently overtly 'therapeutic', 
in the sense of striving to bring 'unconscious' material 
to awareness. Goffman's (1974 p386) remarks about individual 
psychotherapy also hold good for encounter groups: "behaviour 
which would usually be treated as outside the main track, such 
as initiatory and terminal rituals, spurts of anger and the 
like ..... are to be treated as proper subject matter". TurDer 
(1972), in his analysis of talk in therapy groups, suggests 
that the patient's initiatives or questions are not followed 
by expected, 'normal', everyday replies on the part of the 
therapist. For example, a patient who attempts to step outside 
the therapy framework for a moment to ask "are we doing what 
we're supposed to be doing here?" does not receive the every: 
day kind of affirmative or otherwise reply. The therapist is 
likely to come back with - "what do you think you should be 
doing"?\" (Turner, 197 2 p392) . Thus the patients find that "any 
and all of their talk to be accountable" (393). Thus, 
1 
following Goffman, we see that anything anyone says can be 
! • 
l 
"treated as proper subject matter". The difference between 
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encounter and therapy groups is that in the former all 
group members, not just the therapist or group leader, 
engage in such talk. 
However, it is not enough to say that this way of talking 
is merely an attempt to be 'therapeutic' - it is also 
a response to some of the glocal features of the encounter 
group as a place. For example group members are likely 
to be strangers, and, after their few days together as 
intimates, will become strangers again. Thus they do not 
have any shared experiences, any taken-for-granted back: 
ground knowledge of each other or each other's life 
situations, from which to construct talk. Nor can they 
initiate talk on the basis of beginning a permanent relation: 
ship. 
Finally, there is no concrete task around whose demands 
the group can talk. The task is one of being a group and 
being with each other. 
Now it is no easy matter to characterise talk in everyday 
life. What do people normally talk about? Yet it is 
clear that very frequently people talk about their work, 
their shared roles - as teachers, students, housewives 
and so on. And, because they know each other already, 
they can assume a certain stance from the other person -
a lot is taken for granted. Or, if they are getting to 
I 
I 
know each other, there is the tactic of breaking off the 
relationship, or formalising it, if there is no chance of 
l 
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establishing a shared understanding. In an encounter group, 
there can be much less shared understanding or background 
knowledge. If a participant begins to speak about his or 
her job, the other group members will not know what the 
problems or personalities involved are. And, when someone 
tr·ies to make this sort of talk in a group, other members 
say they are bored. So, in an encounter group, the sort 
of talk we engage in most of the time, talk which relies 
on one form or another of shared understanding, is just 
not possible. 
When we enter an encounter group, we move out of our everyday 
world of consensual, taken-for-granted definitions and 
understandings, and into a world in which the only basis 
for meaningful talk is what is currently happening - thus 
we talk about our feelings, our reactions to other people, 




The "ethos of intimacy" 
An important feature of the 'region of social activity' 
that is an encounter group, is that it allows members to 
express in public sentiments and emotions they would 
normally articulate only in private with 'close' friends, 
family or s~ouse. Whereas in other public situations 
(work, courtroom) individuals construct performances 
according to role expectations with little scope for 
expressing 'personal' bias or feeling, the encounter group 
is a setting in which such personal matters are encouraged. 
If 'face' is taken-for-granted in everyday life, 'feeling' 
is taken-for-granted in the encounter group. Blumenstiel 
(1970) has identified some of the activities which sustain 
this "ethos of intimacy": 
Attitudes of facilitators: Blumenstiel (1970 p437) writes 
that "the propriety of intimacy is established in the T-group 
in part by declarations of trainers during initial group 
sessions ...... Delegates often infer, from such declarations, 
that ...... there will be some demand for personal revelation". 
Confidentiality: it is an 'unwritten rule' of encounter 
groups that confidence made in a group will not be divulged 
elsewhere. Certainly at these workshops many participants 
were concerned that the research work might threaten this 
norm. 
The "rejection of cool" Blumenstiel notes that in encounter 
groups it is acceptable to 'break down' display emotion and 
in general disregard conventional standards of reserve and decorum. 
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The transience of relationships: because it is unlikely 
that participants will meet again, they see the lowering of 
inter-personal barriers necessary for intimacy as being less 
risky than it would be in potentially permanent relationships. 
The irrelevance of biographical material : this rule forces 
members to attend to their here-and-now feelings for each other. 
The strategies observed by Blumenstiel could also be seen at 
work in the workshops being studied here. Yet it must be 
added that even simpler behaviours contributed to maintaining 
an "ethos of intimacy" - for example the universal use of 
first names. While some members may never "lose their cool", 
even the most skeptical or inexperienced group members will 
know that first names are used, even when there are wide status 
or age differences between conversants. Similarly, the 
greater frequency of hugging and touching sets the group 
apart from the everyday life experiences of most members. 
0\. 
Also,~group would not 'start' until everyone was present. 
The situational morality of the encounter group has been 
noted by other writers. Ottaway (1966), for example, terms 
it "the permissive climate". He writes that "the ordinary 
conventions of politeness and good manners are held to be 
suspended". Commentators are divided as to the value of 
~is climate. Rogers (1968) sees it as being the advance 
guard of a w~lcome change in cultural conventions. Koch 
(1971), on the other hand, argues that is the product of a 
false and inauthentic consciousness. 
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rt should be mentioned that this way of being, or implicit 
morality, in the encounter group is only partially rule-
governed. Participants who have been to many groups are 
perhaps obeying internalised rules. First-timers, however, 
often have to discover that other ways of being, and other 
moralities, are inappropriate in the group setting. Thus 
the morality is not only a set of rules - is is also the 
outcome of a set of processes. 
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Boundaries 
The encounter group is a region of social activity marked 
by spatial and temporal boundaries. The activity of the 
encounter group tended not to begin until the facilitator 
had arrived in the room set aside for the group meeting, 
and ended either at some set time or by negotiation - for 
example if many members claimed to be bored or tired. The 
entrance of the facilitator could be as abrupt a signal as 
the ringing of a bell, and members would assume the silent, 
serious posture of 'encountering'. At the end of the group 
members would'rise, stretch, make jokes and talk in couples. 
Exits during the group would similarly be marked by change in 
conduct once outside the group room - departing members would 
break into a jog, mock fight with each other or make wry 
comments once out of sight of the ongoing group. 
Places other than the group room might or might not be venues 
for encountering. Participants often wrote in journals that 
they were uncertain about how to react to group members they 
met at the dinner table, in corridors, in the park, the bar 
or the dance floor. To some extent this may have been a 
problem because of the increased chance of there being non-
workshop personnel at these places, but the uncertainty surely 
also derives from not knowing what side of the encounter -
everyday life boundary they stood at that moment. Some members 
reported difficulties during phone calls home. Those at home 
did not seem to be "on the same wavelength". 
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The existence of boundaries between the practical, concrete 
reality of everyday life and the 'person-centred' reality 
associated with experiencing, availability of feelings and 
'encounter' was also apparent at times in the 'optional' 
groups. Members were not always sure whether these were 
'experiential' or 'cognitive' events. As one participant 
commented after a discussion (ie non-encounter) group meeting: 
"Interesting to see all these people being serious, 
shrewd,all slipping into their professional roles. 
Helps to understand how much they have been exposing 
themselves here and how difficult it must be for many". 
This participant is startled when she sees people jumping 
from the gro~frame to the everyday life frame- they have 
re-defined the situation, re-set the boundaries, before she has. 
In this section it has been argued that the encounter group 
is best understood as being a place in which a certain 
definition of social reality prevails. This reality is construct: 
ed and maintained by members' activities such as talk and 
listening, its own situational morality (the "ethos of 
intimacy") and is contained within spatial and temporal 
boundaries. Within this reality, events have their own 
unique meaning, the experience of self and others is transformed. 
This is a reality which, as long as it lasts, many participants 
find more congenieal than the reality of everyday life. As one 
participant puts it - "What magic we created". Having established 
the nature of the encounter group - a unique way of organising 
experience - we can now turn to an examination of what it means 




THE INDIVIDUAL PERSON IN THE ENCOUNTER GROUP 
Introduction 
--------
Up to now we have discussed how a group of people can 
construct a social situation within which the taken-for-
granted rules of everyday life are replaced by other 
rules and permissions. This kind of analysis necessarily 
oversimplifies and generalises from an in fact enormously 
complex event. It omits the event as experienced by 
individuals 
1
and so the following section is devoted to 
exploration of the way being at these workshops had 
an effect on individual people. The account is largely 
in participants' own words as written by them in their 
journals. 
We have taken two perspectives on the individual's experience 
in the encounter group, awareness and performance. Firstly, 
the process of learning how to be with others in a group is 
viewed as equivalent to learning a particular kind of 
awareness. Secondly, the performance of being-a-person 
which carries members through everyday life does not have 
the same pay off in the encounter group - issues involved 
in being a person in our culture which are concealed, or 
taken - for - granted in everyday life are revealed and 




When we say that the encounter group is a particular frame 
of reference which serves to organise experience we imply 
that being in this frame involves being in a particular state 
of awareness. Participants' comments about 'reality' back 
up this point of view. However, the idea that what is picked 
up by those who attend encounter groups is a special kind of 
awareness, is most clearly demonstrated in their reports 
of what it was like for them when they finally left the group 
and went home: 
"For the first couple of days I was disorientated and 
felt very fragile". 
" ... went into the Common Room. It seemed to be full of 
ghosts, dim, half-seen people. I didn't want to talk 
to any of them. The usual chit-chat seemed like the 
twittering of sparrows". 
" .... life getting cold and detached again". 
" ..... when I meet people now I'm conscious of not really 
encountering them". 
" ..... my 'feelings' seem to be more accessible and 
manageable .... they are flowing more freely within me. 
"Physically, when I leave a workshop I am aware of 
heightened perception of and memory for detail and 
feel a need to live deliberately and slowly. I eat 
slower and less. This stays with me for quite a 
while until it gradually becomes no longer noticeable". 
It may be useful to think of what happens at encounter groups 
as a learning of or an immersion in a new reality, a new 
way of looking at the world, of making sense of it,a different 
kind of awareness or consciousness. It may be that prolonged 
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exposure to or use of the encounter frame of reference 
can bring about a change in awareness through the cumulative 
effects of listening, attending to feelings, examining the 
implicit messages in statement and all the other elements 
of the 'cognitive style' of being-in-a-group. We can 
further assume that some people are already familiar with 
this ~eality of kind of awareness (eg the facilitators) 
while others may pick it up very quickly (eg 'natural' 
facilitators). Still others will be struggling to grasp 
it, while some will be unwilling to give up their old 
world for this strange new one. 
This last group, those who appeared to make little or no 
effort tc learn the 'reality' or 'consciousness' of the 
encounter group, are of interest. 
These were the people who either said little throughout the 
whole workshop, or who maintained an dninvolved or sceptical 
attitude. As one wrote in his journal -
"I ...... accepted as accurate the criticism that I maintained 
a 'cynical' (that was the word used) detachment. I was 
not cynical but I did not suspend my mistrust of the 
shallowness of several 'encounters' and 'revelations'." 
There are two points to be made in relation to this statement. 
The first is to note that the process of achieving a new 
awareness involves at least temporarily suspending one's 
rational sense of 'doubt' or 'mistrust' which this person 
was not ready to do. 
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A second possible explanation is that it is widely held 
that the kind of disclosures and interactions that occur 
in encounter groups are in some way 'shallow' or 'trivial'. 
This is based on a misunderstanding. What is misunderstood 
iS the attitude of the person making the 'shallow' or 
'trivial' response. The critic believes that the person 
fools himself or is forced by the situation ('group pressure') 
into thinking that his or her contribution was deep, authentic, 
significant, etc., etc. While this may sometimes happen, 
more often the person is distressed at how inauthentic or 
trivial he has been. For example, one woman, who had in 
fact said a lot in her group, admitted in her journal that 
she was "still not in touch with myself". Others mentioned 
feeling 'empty, "brain-damagedm or "sterile". Another 
discovered: 
to think". 
"My sincerity is not always as great as I like 
These were also people who had been involved 
in the work of their groups, who had, in our terminology, 
been trying to pick up the encounter 'awareness' or 
'consciousness'. 
Indeed, part of the process of entering this province of 
reality seems to be the stage of perceiving and break through 
ways of acting which are not appropriate to the group setting, 
and are seen as being 'inauthentic'. Individuals who are 
seen by others as playing a role, for example being a teacher, 
patient, therapist or a mother in the group, are perceived 
in this way - as being 'inauthentic' - and may, themselves, 
feel 'inauthentic'. The movement of group members beyond 
this stage, into the group reality proper, involves what 
Rogers (1969) calls the "cracking of facades". Bebout 






"at each presentation of a form of deceit, the validity 
of the group is thrown into question in the minds of 
the members. Each unfolding lie is a test of the 
integrity of the group, and its failure to meet the 
challenge thereby defines its limitation ........ . 
through the succession of group self-deceit and its 
t)t-f... 
expose, and so on, is a basic mechanism underlying 
the dynamic process of encounter groups, and this 
spiralling process leads to ever deeper levels of 
trust, honesty and risk-taking". 
We might also say in groups people learn by their mistakes. 
We may suppose, then, that making 'inauthentic' or 'shallow' 
or ir.~ppropriate statements is necessarily part of the 
process of coming to terms with this new reality. Ordinary 
reality is characterised by consensual definition and 
validation of what is happening. In everyday life when we 
want to know what someone means we refer to the common-sense 
understandings that we all have and use, as members of a 
culture. Me~nings are not explicitly 'contained' in the 
words we use, they are found by following the way the words 
point to a shared understanding of the world. In an encounter 
group, however, as has already been argued, this kind of talk 
is ineffective. There is no agenda, there is nothing concrete, 
no part of the world of everyday life, that everyone wants 
to talk about or will understand. One member may begin to 
talk about their work difficulties but may find that this 
makes reference to issues others have no experience of. 
Talk of ordinary affairs and concerns turns out to be somehow 
ineffective, probably both because of the expectations people 
bring to the group and because of the 'indexicality' (reference 
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to a shared understanding of the situation or context) 
of everyday-life talk. Thus the group member is directed 
more and more towards his or her feelings, needs or interests 
in the here-and-now (the group) because this is the only way 
he or she can communicate meaningfully toother group members. 
Gradually present feelings, need or interests are expressed 
in ways that at first may seem 'shallow' or 'inauthentic' 
and only later become more satisfactory. In many participants 
this process was not a continuous one - they would return 
to the 'ordinary', outside world when things were getting 
on top of them. 
There follows a statement from one participant concerning 
just such a ·'retreat' into the external world. 
"· ... all the time I was walking I was trying to notice 
the physical reality of the people and objects around 
me, the feel of the road under my feet, the air, the 
smells and the noises. And I cane back, slowly, and 
I sat on a bench in the park and opposite me was a 
young Glaswegian boy, I presume, he looked l~e it, 
he was about 20, he was sitting, waiting, I don't 
know what for, perhaps he was cruising, as B calls it. 
And opposite him was a lady of about 33, she was also 
sitting and waiting, for time to pass, for her lover 
to come, I don't know. And as I sat and waited with 
myself I tried to figure out what the heck was going on 
and I thought about what C had said the morning before 
telling the world to "Fuck off" and some of the things 
H had said about the unreality of the whole situation 
here. Some of the experiences I'd had of listening 
to other people talking at one another. Some of the 
things that were going on inside myself about wanting 
to love and wanting to be loved ..... . 
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And then I went into the large group which was still 
meeting and it was now about 11 o'clock and the 
atmosphere was again so sick and turgid and I got a 
mug of coffee and left and sat outside and drank it 
and I came upstairs and lay on my bed and totally 
relaxed my body and just concentrated on my head and 
my being and I came to this kind of conclusion that 
I'd spent my life up until perhaps only very recently 
to arrive at a situation where I was no longer having 
to fight with my fantasies about 'do you love me?' 
'do I love me?' 'I'll listen to you if you'll listen 
to me' and all those kind of Laingian knots. I'd gone 
through all that and now I had what I call actual people 
- physical, present beings who loved me, who I knew loved 
me, who I loved, who listened. People like my wife 
and my child and my mother and my father, my brothers 
and my sisters, my neighbours and my best friends -
all in various degrees greater or lesser fulfilling 
my desires and my hopes and needs just as I was fulfilling 
theirs. It was no longer a question but a certainty. 
It was no longer a matter of hope but one of knowledge. 
And what had happened here seemed that I had been thrown 
willy-nilly out of control, out of my control, into a 
soup, a ,turgid fetid soup other people's uncertainties 
and fantasies and questions and Laingian knots. And I 
had been drawn, like a boat toward a sluice gate, by the 
sheer force of this emotional whirlp~ol, towards a state 
of mind which was so full of doubts and uncertainties, 
just from listening to other people's doubts and uncertain: 
ties, other people's projections and fantasies, that it 
had aroused in me all the:emotional anxiety and fear and 
funk and aspirations that I had been through in my child: 
hood and adolescent and early manhood. And that going 
out into Glasgow that night had brought me back in touch 
with actuality itself and it enabled me in fact to work 
out this solution this morning. 
And having worked out that solution it defused in me 
an area of uncertainty. And I spent quite an enjoyable 
-290-
day. I went down and I told H of my solution and 
later on I told C of my solution". 
Hora (1961) has written that "authentic group participation -
that is, genuine being-in-the-group- is only possible under 
conditions of open-ness, receptivity and responsiveness 
toward the world. These human capacities are more often than 
not thwarted, distorted and blocked to various degrees. The 
removal of these obstacles to cognition, to authentic inter: 
human communication and communion, is an essential feature 
of the existential group psychotherapeutic endeavour". 
For many group members, the struggle to achieve "authentic 
group participation" involved feelings of meaninglesness, 
despair, 'stuckness' and physical symptoms such as lethargy. 
constipation, diarrhoea, headache, even reports of impairment 
of vision : 
"····.and very disturbed night- a v~olent headache 
and sleeplessness. 
Feelings of despair and not knowing why ... 
At breakfast told them how I again feared finding out 
horrible things about myself - fear of the unknown". 
Or,from a differe~t point of view: 
" ..... one of the most important things I've learned 
in groups is to welcome ~ feeling of fea£, because it 
has always led, through excitement, to discovery. 
The fear is a feeling of being afraid of what it is I 
am about to learn (in case its something awful) about 
myself, and the excitement is the feeling of wanting 
to know what it is. I have learned to just wait 
until the fear of knowing and the wanting to know -
that is the mutual existence of opposites - come to 
such a pitch of conflict with each other that I have 
to burst through to awareness". 
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This, then, is one aspect of the individual experience 
of the encounter group - the struggle to master a certain 
way of being-in-the-world, a certain awareness. But this 
is only half of the story. As Macmurray has said, to be 
a person is not only to have the power to reflect, to be 
aware, it is to have the power to act, to be an agent. 
so we turn towards an examination of some of the ways that 
participants' actions, or performances, in the group, 














Goffman's dramaturgical model of society activity leads to 
a conceptualisation of personality as a performance. We 
can assume that the performance of being oneself in normal 
circumstances is a routine activity requiring little conscious 
effort. Rank (1956 p74) writes that "the average man 
always plays a role, always acts, but actually plays only 
himself". 
The peculiar reality of the encounter group brings into 
focus the individual's performance, or way of being a person. 
Some ways of being a person are not appropriate in the 
conditions of the group. Some ways of being a person were 
inappropriate, it seemed, under any circumstances - for 
example the woman who "built (her) life on the fallacy of 
being unloveable and unattractive and unacceptable". 
Here is the story of a woman whose behaviour was inappropriate 
for the social context of the group: 
"I use being very busy as a defence mechanism. In my own 
life there is a reality basis for this as I have had to 
work very hard ..... but it came as a surprise to me that 
I kept up this attitude of 'busyness' at the workshop 
when I had no more basis for it than anyone else -
rushing from one thing to another, trying to do too many 
things etc. This really did help me to realise that 
being busy has a dual function and to avoid getting 
properly involved with people. The workshop demonstrated 
to me how out-of-touch I was with some of my deeper 
feelings. There is a lot of difference between knowing 
these feelings are there and actually having the feelings 
eg I think that possibly I never really grieved or mourned 
over ........ because at the time the practical problems of 
coping on my own demanded all my energies". 
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The transfer from everyday reality to the being-with-others 
of the encounter group appeared to bring about for many 
people an intense awareness of the issues involved in being 
a person. Partially this came about because the freedom 
of the encounter group allowed people to question basic 
assumptions or raise 'taboo' subjects such as death or 
se~uality. 
Another possibility is that the focus on personal meanings 
of events, rather than on pragmatic aspects related to the 
task of getting-something-done, resulted in the meanings 
of incidents being followed-through. Often in groups there 
will be repeated clarification and analysis of the meaning 
of an interaction, perhaps long after the episode took place. 
Thus an interaction which was over in a moment became an 
'extended moment' - the taken-for-granted, or hidden, or 
denied, meanings and feelings implicit in that incident 
could be brought to the surface and examined. And in 
this way the issues involved in being a person, and being 
in relation with these other people, became apparent. 
But, also, of course, background issues emerge as figure, 
are thrown into relief, when they prevented the individual 
from entering the shared experience of the group, as 
illustrated above by the story of the busy person. 
Many people who have been to encounter groups state that it 
is their first exposure to its unique version of reality which 








on later exposures they may value the chance to use this 
group mirror, but the effects are rarely as powerful as 
that first time. Of course, for some the reality of 
the groups is frightening, or undesirable, as we sqw, and 









people in encounter groups talk a lot about feelings. 
Feelings are good, their expression is part of the "ethos 
of intimacy", intellectualisation is bad. The journal 
kept by N seems to centre right in on this issue. N wrote 
before he came that one of his personal goals was "keeping 
continuously in contact with my own feeling". In his 
description of himself he wrote that "my feelings come up 
quickly, but vanish the next moment - that is, before I 
see an opportunity say anything". Later, he wrote that 
"what troubles me is that the presence of other people 
seems to take my feelings away from me". Another excerpt 
from N's journal seems (almost too neatly) to state the 
problem -
"I am quite satisfied with not verbally participating 
in the community meeting - until A bursts out towards 
J, who 'sits next to me. There seems to be a fundamental 
contact, but I have no feelings about it, and cannot 
respond to J's opening to me. 
inadequate and lonely ..... 
I'm feeling selfish, 
Reading this excerpt makes one want to go back to that moment 
and tell N that he was feeling something about what was going 
on - he was feeling selfish, inadequate and lonely, quite 
justifiably in the circumstances. 
Here is a long quote from N's account of what was obviously 
an important group meeting for him: 
"J helps me to pick up on an actual feeling and to over: 
come it in a very gentle way, and E helps a lot in 
clarifying by asking just the right questions. Most 
of all I liked a) J's observation from my physical 
attitude that I at a certain moment just decided to 
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cut off - a thing which happens to me often, and 
about which I forget immediately; it is the thing 
of which I have been complaining to myself so often. 
I seem not to be able to give account of my own 
doings, I lose my actions immediately. 
b) his very tender way of simply being with me, by 
which he actually did give myself back to me. 
c) my figuring out what I am doing, being so cumbersome 
in dealing with my feelings, endlessly justifying them. 
d) my last words to D: that she keeps moving me by her 
facial expressions and her smile and her tears - because 
they are my truth of last week: I have mostly been 
living by that movement. 
We work till nearly midnight, I fear most of the time 
on me. 
Afterwards I talk and have beers with ..... until 5 a.m." 
From the evidence N has given us of the events of this small 
group session, largely devoted to the problem of his feelings, 
it appears as though the awareness he brought to the workshop 
of his distancing himself from his feelings has been extended. 
He is now a~are that he cannot accept certain feelings and 
that he holds on to other feelings rather than act on them. 
Yet the evidence from N's subsequent time at the workshop, 
and his reports from home suggest very strongly that this 
awareness has not resulted in any change. We can only 
speculate as to what might have happened to N: his extended 
awareness might have shown him that the way he dealt with 
his feelings was acceptable to him after all; he may have 
been afr~id of the consequences of changing his way of 
dealing with his feelings; or the awareness itself might 
have been painful. 
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i·· ... 
Another possibility - N's performance, his way of being 
himself in the everyday world, clearly included a 
dissatisfaction with his way of dealing with felt experience. 
This dissatisfaction was part of his definition of himself. 
The discussions which went on until 5 a.m. did little more 
than confirm N in his opinion that he was a man who could 
not handle feelings, and in fact reinforced this view by 






Day 1 "Very tentative beginnings. 
I have been a spectator most of the time .... ! wait 
for others to take the lead". 
Day 2 "I tried at various times to give people leads to 
my distress but they didn't seem to pick them up. 
I resented this but at the interval p had seen 
but didn't feel like commenting so I realised once 
more the responsibility was on me so I hunched out 
to see where it would take me. I know I haven't 
gone nearly far enough but hope that will happen later. 
My fear of missing out on close relationships, of 
only half living .... M recognised my feelings very 
powerfully. I felt such warmth and acceptance that 
I glowed". 
Day 3 "So many feelings today 
Talked with M till all hours on sexual problems 
mentioned things I'd never dared mention before and 
discovering I was still acceptable". 
Day 4 "I'm tackling things much more head on now. 
Talked of feelings of being a threat to men. Met 
eyes and did not flinch. Was admired". 
Day 5 "Heavy and depressed now all my confidence seems to 
have gone. Insecure at changing of small group?." 
Day 6 "Facing tensions with people head on. They cause a 
block to receiving and caring and however scarey 
are far less so when dealt with. 
I began to cling again but recognised it and let go -
that was painful but I gained from it. 
Realise I coullidn't describe myself when I came . 
.. ... now I've stopped trying I am examing what I 
set out to". 
Day 7 "A hellish day locked in my unwantedness - not open 
to receiving. Worked with many feelings and shed some . 
..... I'm not accepting myself today. I'm locked 
into myself waiting for someone else to break down 
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the barriers. Why the hell can't I do it? 
I'm a blood sucking spider spinning webs round 
people then shutting them out. 
My Gestalt fantasy is frightening and I daren't 
expose it in such an intense group. I the rose 
bush am not really there. I glimpse myself now 
and again but don't quite know where I am in 
relation to the scenery. 
I can't or won't experiment with ways of leaving 
people free as I wait in terror to see if they 
will come back". 
Day 8 "I feel a freedom today .... ! am tied to no-one and 
no-one is tied to me. 
There are so many unfinished unresolved feelings -
this is good - life is exciting. 
I feel so silly with some of my earlier feelings-
they were unnecessary but still real in me. 
I need to experiment with lots of people round me. 
I am alive and can enjoy being. 
I matter most". 
These are excerpts from one woman's journal. Little addition: 
al comment is needed. It is perhaps significant that although 
the group situation makes it possible for her to "launch out", 
she does not go ·"nearly far enough" and it is only later, while 
alone with M, that she mentions "things I'd never dared mention 
before". The central theme of this account appear to be a 
struggle for self-acceptance. Despite the oscillation between 
active ("launching" "head on" "experimenting") and passive 
("waiting", "a spectator") selves, which would suggest that 
although the story ends on a happy note, it is not over yet, 
there is a powerful insight in being able to say that a previous 







Everyone has their own style, their own way of being, of 
presenting themselves to others. An issue underlying 
personal style is - will my way of being a person be 
acceptable to others? Very often at these workshops 
people found that they were unable to accept, or believe 
.in, another person's style, or that others were unable to 
accept their style. This excerpt is taken from the journal 
of a man who certainly did not come to the workshop with 
a conscious intention to work on his 'style'. He reports 
that after he had talked for the first time in the small 
group -
"I provoked a good deal of anger - not overtly for 
my declaration but for my manner. I was told I 
was lecturing them: 
B said she found my manner made her very angry. 
Someone else said he found my 'spilling' turned 
him, off ....... It was a very disturbing experience. 
The real objections had been to my 'manner' which 
a number of people in the group found very off-
putting. J. said that he now sensed a real person 
in me which had not been there the first day when 
I had been a load of bullshit". 
Here is what two of the other people involved in this incident 
wrote: 
"He had arrived with it all pre-packaged. His problem 
was presented within 5 minutes of the start of the 
group with the histrionic impact of a Greek drama 
and much overt emotion". 
"I wish A would shut up. My god how he pontificates. 
I gather he has already been blasted for it and is 
hurt. I don't want to add to that hurt but its hard 
to keep my mouth shut". 
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A few days later this issue re-emerged dramatically. 
A had just taken the risk of confronting a fellow partic: 
ipant who had been worrying him for some time - whose 
presence frightened him. A had just admitted this in the 
community group and was "feeling very good" when, 
"I heard D's voice saying 'A, that was very 
EFFECTIVE'. Christ, I was thrown as I have never 
been thrown. I knew what he meant. moving, right, 
good, deep, meaningful, etc. etc. but as a man with 
a gift for words and a great and precise skill in 
their use with great care for the exact meaning, 
effective was to suggest planned, well acted, 
contrived - to ask for rounds of applause, curtain 
calls and bows. My whole integrity was called in 
question". 
"I seized the first gap to s.ay, 'I have an important 
thing to say, very important for me. The best thing 
I did yesterday was running from the room. I wanted 
everyone to know I was n~.running away. I was going 
out to ensure my integrity. I was rejecting the 
interpretation which the word 'effective' implied. 
I knew what D meant, but as a user of words, with 
skill in words and with a precise meaning for words, 
to me the use of 'effective' meant that it was all 
an act ...... That was an attack on all my sincerity, 
on my integrity. In running I utterly repudiated 
that ....... ' I was utterly in control of myself, 
felt very good and sat very upright. I spoke of 
my style ..... I would stick to my style. I would 
not change it to please anybody. It was part of me. 
I would modify it, yes, this was part of my coming 
here. If they did not like my style they could 
stuff it." 




"I learned from my participation in the workshop 
that I was arrogant: I talked too much. I did 
not listen enough ..... 
Other people have noticed that since I came back 
I am much quieter; 
I have a look of listening in my eyes". 
A's story is by no means unique - there were many instances 
of conflicts over style. What can we learn from his account 
of his 'struggle with style'? 
A's story portrays for us a series of events which ended 
in the modification of his personal style. It seems important 
to note that A did not have, in the first place, any 
6f 
expectationftmodifying his style. He only became aware that 
his style was in any sense a problem through the comments 
of group members. It is likely that being in an encounter 
group made it easier for these members to make such comments 
to A, although, presumably, they would have had the same 
feelings about his style had they met him elsewhere. Their 
comments, and especially the remarks of D at A's moment 
of triumph, forced A into an awareness of the effect Ge 
was having on others, an awareness of himself as seen by 
others. With this awareness, A was in a position to make 
a decision regarding what he could do about his style. 
There were presumably several options open to him - he could 
change in compliance with what he saw as being demands to 
change, he could ignore er deny these demands or he could 
affirm his own choice of style. In the event, A chose 
to "modify" but "not change it to please anybody". 
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A could have decided not to modify his style at all. 
This is not to claim that every time A listens rather 
than talks he makes a decision in the light of his new 
style. While this may happen sometimes, more often it 
is not necessary - once the 'big' decision is taken 
the new ways of behaviour take their place with the 
old in wherever it is we keep our repertoire between 
shows. 
These three examples represent some of the ways that 
participants' performance as individuals in the group 
reveal to them aspects of their being-in-the-world. The 
issues discussed above - feeling, self-acceptance and 
personal style - are among many moral issues brought to the 
surface in groups. Others were : love, sexuality, power, 
authority, relationship and responsibility. It is of 
interest to note that the idea of tragedy, the temporary 
and perhaps essentially doomed nature of relationships, 
emerged as an important theme. American observers of the 
encounter group movement (Koch,1971; Back 1973) have asserted 
that the denial of tragedy in enounter groups is a sign of 
inauthenticity. While this may be true in the USA, tragedy 
was certainly a salient theme in these predominantly 
European groups. 
How can it be that such issues emerge in groups? Goffman 














"in their capacity as performers, individuals will 
be concerned with maintaining the impression that 
they are living up to the many standards by which 
they and their products are judged. Because these 
standards are so numerous and so pervasive, the 
individuals who are performers dwell more than 
we might think in a moral world. But, qua 
performers, individuals are concerned not with 
the moral issue of realising these standards, 
but with the amoral issue of engineering a convincing 
impression that these standards are being realised. 
Our activity, then, is largely concerned with moral 
matters, but as performers we do not have a moral 
concern with them. 
of morality ...... " 
As performers we are merchants 
(pp 243-4). 
What appears to happen in an encounter group is that the 
particular circumstances of this region of social activity 
direct members' attention or awareness towards the actual 
moral standards upon which their performances are based. 
The encounter group is an arena in which moral themes are 
dramatised .and given shape. 
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Conclusion: 
The encounter group experience as 'deep play' 
The workshop may be seen as an interlude in the lives of 
participants - a retreat. They come to it with the interests 
and concerns of everyday life still dominating their thoughts 
and actions and eventually must return to that 'reality'. 
But while at the workshop, they become aware of another 
'reality', one in which they can express issues usually 
taken for granted or hidden. During the workshop, their 
actions become more expressive of themselves rather than 
goal-directed or instrumental. That is, participants come 
to live for a while at the level of being rather than doing, 
for, in fact, there is nothing to 'do' at an encounter group 
- there are no tasks to be performed. One woman puts it 
thus : 
"I vealised as I spoke that the most time I'd had 
for myself since 1955 ..... had only been three days 
at one time ..... That's the longest span I've had 
for myself, and that this was the third day of the 
course! What am I going to do tomorrow?" 
The workshop is a time for t~e self. Life can be seen not 
only as a struggle to fulfil practical needs such as food, 
shelter, sex ar.d. so on but also as a struggle to make sense 
of what is happening, to create a meaningful world, a 
i 
I personal identity, a sense of self. Group members begin 
I I to shift their attention from practical questions such as 





to existential questions such as what it means to be 
a man, a woman, a parent, a leader. 
But what effect does this retreat into another reality, 
this discovery of meaning, have on participants? While 
many mention their· increased awareness, or their feeling 
of closeness with and ability to understand others, it is 
clear that this does not last at anything like the same level 
of intensity for longer than a week or two. This report 
is typical: 
"At the end of the workshop I felt awfully scared 
to go home. I didn't know what was going to happen 
to my relationship with my husband. I knew it would 
be·changed, and I was afraid. Then I was afraid 
that I was going to lose all that I had found, 
when I got back to the old habits again and left 
the very special conditions of complete freedom 
which were realised at the workshop. I said to 
someone: "Now I can listen to myself and feel 
my~elf all the time. Back in the outside world it 
will be like trying to hear a small bird in 
Trafalgar Square at the rush-hour ..... 
..... The first week wer1t by in an absolute ecstacy: 
everything went so well that I couldn't believe it. 
Then came moments of utter despair, when I thought 
I had lost it all and the whole thing had been a 
dream, that the new self I had discovered had no 
reality". 
Another participant wrote that: 
"I find all these changes forcing me to recognise 
that the present and the future are going to be 
hard work, and rr.y false illusions of 'security' 




This transient change in level of awareness seems to be 
the only reliable effect of attending an encounter group. 
certainly, close examination of tapes, journals and follow-
up reports does not reveal any evidence of consistent 
patterns of change in the personalities of behaviour of 
participants. On the other hand, some members go home 
and change their jobs, finish their marriages, take a new 
stance towards their parents, and so on. But there are 
probably more members who seem satisfied to have been 
~irmed in the rightness of their way of being a person. 
What appears to happen is that the group process, the new 
reality of the group, makes it possible for the person to 
become aware of the options and issues involved in their 
life. Thus the group does not cause change or growth, it 
only creates conditions in which the person can choose to 
change, or, indeed, tc stay the same. (Moustakas(l956) 
put this ~ell when he wrote that : 
"true growth, actualisation of one's potential, 
occurs in a setting where the person is felt and 
experienced as sheer personal being. In such an 
atmosphere the person is free to explore his 
capacities and to discover for himself meanings 
and values of life consistent with the self". 
We might also say that such a setting is one in which the 
person can ~· Bruner(1972), writing about the functicn 
of play in child development, notes that: 
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"· .... it is a means of minimising the consequences 
of one's actions and of learning, therefore, in 
a less risky situation ....... Second, play provides 
an excellent opportunity to try combinations of 
behaviour that would, under functional pressure, 
never be tried". 
Shotter(1973 p76) writes abcut "the necessity for a risk-
free environment, a lack of circumstantial compulsion, a 
sense of being a free agent". 
Thus play, like encounter, is a safe setting in which to 
experiment. But encounter is more than just experimenting 
with behaviour. As we have seen, it enga~es the person at 
the level of being, and is therefore a peculiar type of 
play - it is 'deep play'. 
The concept of 'deep play' originates in the work of the 
philosopher Bentham, but has been developed by the anthro: 
pologist Clifford Geertz to describe forms of social activity 
which are not in any obvious sense functional. Geertz(1972) 
studied the social meaning of cockfighting in Bali and 
discovered that the outcome of contests made no practical 
difference, either financially or in status terms, to those 
involved. What seemed to be happening was that cockfighting 
provided an arena in which some of the fundamental concerns 
of Balinese life were dramatised. Cockfighting, is, for 
the Balinese, a form of art. Geertz(1972 p23) writes 
"The cockfight is 'really real' only to the cocks -
it does not kill anyone, castrate anyone, reduce 
anyone to animal status, alter the hierarchical 





hierarchy; it does not even redistribute income 
in any significant way. What it does is what, for 
other peoples witfi other temperaments and other 
conventions, Lear and Crime and Puni~.hment do; 
it catches up these themes - death, masculinity, 
rage, pride, loss beneficence, chance - and, 
ordering them into an encompassing structure, 
presents them in such a way as to throw into a 
relief a particular view of their essential nature. 
It puts a construction on them, makes them ....... . 
meaningful -visible, tangible, graspable - 'real' 
in an ideational sense. An image, a fiction, a 
model, a metaphor, the cockfight is a means of 
expression; its function is neither to assuage 
social passions nor to heighten them ...... but, 
in a medium of feathers, blood, crowds and money, 
to display them". 
It should be clear that the particular form of ritualised 
drama that is the basic encounter group also serves to display 
the essential themes to be found in the lives of group 
members. Like cockfighting, much of the group's time is 
spent waiting for that moment when something happens, some 
contact is made, when, as Geertz puts it, one's subjectivity 
is opened up to oneself. 
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Further similarities between encounter and drama are the 
performance of private talk in a public place, in a louder 
than usual voice. Rehearsal often precedes talk in groups 
as in drama. Performance can be seen as 'scripted' (see 
Berne, 1974). The stage is an environment with its own 
characteristic props and conventions. Finally, much of 
the time in the encounter group participants are engaged 
in witnessing or watching rather than acting. The idea 
that some of the learning that occurs in groups is produced 
by modelling or passive watching has been proposed by 
Peters (1973) and by McLeish (1972,1973). 
But wherea$ the cockfight as a Balinese form of deep play 
appears to dramatise a closed set of values, in our society 
it is necessary to have forms of art which illustrate a 
more open, or emergent, set of possible issues. Indeee, 
Smith(1976) and Harrison and Lubin(1965) have published 
research which suggests that the most effective groups 
are those which leave issues unresolved. Harrison and 
Lubin (1965 p300) write: 
"it may be that the groups which leave the most 
lasting impact are those which seem to drag on 
in conflict, never quite giving up, but never 
quite resolving basic disagreements among the 
members. It may be that the unresolves issues, 
the confrontations with differing outlooks and 
views, the feelings of outrage and dismay, 
puzzlement and challenges, last longer and are 
more of a force for learning than the feeling 
of completion and closure of a more 'successful' 
T-group experience''. 
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The point of all this is to take the encounter group 
out of the 'therapy' framework. Encounter is not group 
therapy. It can more profitably be compared to art, 
drama, literature and other means by which we inform 
ourselves about the meanings and values of our actions. 
While this may not be the only interpretation that 
can be placed on the encounter group experience, it is 
a liberating one. It is another step away from a 
mechanical, scientific view of ourselves towards a view 










"In order to illustrate the facts, to control them 
more effectively, to induce attitudes, or to 
inculcate ways of behaviour, artists, philosophers, 
theologians, and scientists have used various devices. 
An extraordinarily successful one often used to 
illuminate areas that might otherwise have remained 
obscure is the model or metaphor. Its use involves 
the pretense that something is the case when it 
is not. Hobbes pretended that the state was a 
many-jointed monster or leviathan; Shakespeare 
that it was a hive of honey bees, "Creatures that 
by a rule in nature teach the act of order to a 
peopled kingdom". Plato, however, presented the 
obscure facts of human nature as if they were 
luminous facts about the state. Descartes 
pretended that the mind in its body was the pilot 
of a ship; Locke that it was a room, empty at 
birth but full of furniture later; and Hume that 
it was a theatre. Theologians have pretended that 
the relation between God and man is that of father 
to son. Optical theorists have pretended that we 
see by geometry. Metal experts present the facts 
about~metals that break after constant use as if 
they suffer fatigue, while physicists make believe 
at some times that light moves in waves, at others 
that it consists of corpuscles, in order tc account 
for different observable facts in the motion of 
light". ( Turbayne, 1970 p3) . 
These words can set us on our way toward a deeper analysis 
of the meaning of 'growth' movements. As Turbayne has 
pointed out, in many fields of discourse, and particularly 
in science, metaphor has been used to "illuminate areas that 
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might otherwise have remained obsure". Scientific progress 
is marked by the exploitation of analogies which allow 
comparison betw~en diverse areas of experience. Popper (1963) 
has used the term "conjecture " to describe this strategy, 
and Hesse (1966 p157) has portrayed "tl:eoretical explanation 
as metaphoric redescription of the domain of the expla.nandum". 
What does this mean? These writers are referring to the 
process by which some problematic experience, something which 
~be 
needs~explained, is brought into line, made sense of, by 
being 'seen through' the frame of reference provided by 
a different area of life. Thus we might say - 'the universe 
is like a large machine' or 'man is like a wolf'. This 
metaphoric link is intended to communicate something new 
about the universe, or about man. The points of 
similarity between the two poles of the metaphor are thrown 
into relief. 
But this is not to say that there is any one-to-one 
identity between what is to be explained and its explanatory 
metaphor. Such reification results in a 'dead' metaphor -
what was illuminating or explanatory becomes merely a way 
of speaking. As Hesse (1966 p160) explains: 
"for a conjunction of items ..... to constitue a 
metaphor it is necessary that there should be 
patent falsehood or even absurdity in taking 
conjunction literally. Man is ~ot, literally, 
a wolf; gases are not in the usual sense collections 
of massive particles". 
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Metaphors which are 'alive' are those whose significance 
has not been fully explored. The phase of testing out the 
value of a metaphor might be thought of as Kuhn's (1962) 
'normal science'. Hesse (1966 p162) claims that "as long 
as the model (or metaphor) is under active consideration as 
an ingredient in an explanation, we do not know how far 
the comparison extends - it is precisely in its. extension 
that the fruitfulness of the model may lie". (emphasis 
added). 
It seems, then, that our analysis of growth movements, if 
it is to be successful, must offer a metaphor or model 
in terms of which to view these phenomena. And, indeed, 
there are many metaphors already available. The most 
commonly used one is the therapy model, but growth 
movements have also been seen as educational experiences 
(eg Training groups), pilgrimages (Back, 1972; Kopp,1972) 
and religions. These metaphors have made important 
contributions to our understanding of growth movements, and 
to the development of the movements themselves. However, 
there is another way of looking at growth movements which 
also promises tc be fertile, and it is to this alternative 
that we now turn. We shall consider growth movements as 
forms of art. 
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'Growth'movements as forms of art. 
What does it mean to look at growth movements through 
the framework of art? What do we gain by bringing 
to growth experiences our understanding of the experience 
of art? First of all, we can acknowledge that one of 
the functions of each of these areas of experience is to 
provide a particular 'reading' of life itself. Both 
growth movements and art create a world in which the 
individual's experience of self is transformed and the 
individual can come to see himself in terms of themes 
which link personal existence to social life in general. 
They are both areas outside the world of everyday life, 
even though they initially emerged from that world, may 
serve to nourish that world, and eventually may be 
assimilated back into it. 
In lite~ature, in art and in growth movements, there is 
a simplification of life. They give us a way of focussing 
on our lives and interest. Price (1968 p220) has this to 
say about the "framing· effect" of the novel : "its model 
of reality, by its very limits, creates a more intensive 
field than life can offer, and the eo-presence of all the 
elements felt more sharply". In this "intensive field", 
the person can come to confront himself: 
"there are moments when we are required to stand 
outside ourselves. We are suddenly forced to 
consider the self we have known from the inside 
and to consider it in terms that are not our 
own familiar words for our feelings and hopes. 
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We must describe ourselves in a language that 
applies to others as readily as to ourselves. 
We are cut off from the stream of private 
associations and personal history, and we must 
articulate what we have often felt but seldom 
needed to recognise much less had to capture 
in categories that will make sense to others. 
How difficult this proves is an index of our 
self-awareness. There are some who have seen 
themselves largely in the terms of public 
language; there are others who rarely have done 
so. (Price, 1968 p261). 
Price is here writing about the novel, but how neatly 
his account fits the experience of being in an encounter 
group or meditating, which are other frameworks of 
experience which force us to "consider the self we have 
known from the inside" in other terms, resulting in self-
awareness (note 3 ) . As in the dream, the self becomes 
an object for itself. The elements of everyday life and 
everyday experience become re-arranged, for a short while, 
into a new gestalt. 
This, then, is the 'framing' effect of the art experience. 
As we saw with TM and encounter, such a framing or trans: 
formation of experience can only come about with the 
active co-operation of the individual concerned, a willing: 
ness to participate. Willingness to participate has also 
been shown to be an important factor in the transformations 
brought about by hypnosis (Barber, 1975) and marijuana 
smoking (Becker, 1963). It seems to be the willingness of 
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the individual which gives the communication he or she is 
attending to the power to influence his or her mode of 
being in the world: 
"When I am reading an interesting novel, I think 
with and vividly imagine the corr.munications from 
the printed page. To the extent that I become 
involved in my imaginings, I do not have 
contradictory thoughts such as 'This is only a 
novel', or, 'This is only make-believe'. Instead, 
I experience a variety of emotions, while 
empathising and 'living with' the character" 
(Barber, 1975 p12). 
It may be useful to introduce here a concept developed 
by Williams (1961) -"structure of feeling". Williams 
argues that beneath all the external characteristics of 
a way of life there is the "actual living sense, the 
deep community that makes ..... communication possible" 
(p65) . That is, members of a culture share a way of 
feeling -about the world- a "structure of feeling". 
Williams suggests that it is in the art of a culture that 
structure of feeling is most likely to be expressed. 
In our examination of TM and encounter, we saw that both 
these approaches to personal growth, in their own ways, 
supplied participants with experiences of emotionality and 
awareness of feeling. In the encounter group, those who 
did not themselves express emotion were witness to the 
expressed emotions of others. In TM, somatic sensations 
such as tears or trembling, and moments of joy, were 
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often reported by meditators. These feelings were 
put into context by the cognitive frameworks of TM 
or encounter. Feelings were to be expected, and had 
significance. Similarly, in art the elicitation of 
feelings is for a purpose. We talk about the 'pornography 
of violence' when physical force is dramatised for the 
sake of excitement alone. It is only when violence has 
meaning that we consider it to be art. 
So far, we have compared art and growth movements in 
ot\~ 
terms of their framing effects ~ in terms of feeling. 
There is, however, another point of contact - the idea 
of value. TM and encounter, we realised, made reference 
to particular realms of acceptance in TM, the dimension 
of hope (see Note 4 ) common to them both, were elements 
of a particular moral stance. Maslow (1968) has suggested 
that the "search for values" is an important element in 
growth which results from psychotherapy: 
"we may soon even define therapy as a search for 
values, because ultimately the search for identity 
is, in essence, the search for one's own, 
intrinsic values" (p 177). 
Similarly for art. Gombrich (1970 p132) has written that:· 
"in freely submitting to a great work of art and 
exploring its infinite richness we can discover 
the reality of self-transcending values". 
The 'atypical interpersonal worlds' (Argyris)or 'provinces 
of reality' (Schutz) which constitue art and growth movements 
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are areas where taken-for-granted issues are brought into 
awareness and confronted. These issues are our basic 
decisions about life, our way of being in the world, the 
fundamentals of a moral order upon which we build our 
images of ourselves. As Goffman (1959 p244) puts it : 
"as performers we are merchants of morality". 
This is to say that art ~n~ growth movements serve to orient 
the individual in a moral universe. Many other comparisons 
could be made. For example, the sociology of these phenomena 
reveals similarities. Both art and growth movements spread 
from intitial innovations; certain fashions and styles 
are popular for a time, then become outmoded; new developments 
in each tend to reflect the influence of ch~matic leaders . 
Also, each has a fragile relationship with popular or mass 
culture. The self-disclosure game as part of a·. TV quiz 
show is no longer growth; the surrealist image in the 
cigarette advertisement is no longer art. As Cohen and 
Taylor (1976 p212-3) put it : 
"the ability of society to eo-opt, infiltrate, 
and subvert those very areas which we had hoped 
to hold sacred for the attainment of.meaning, 
progress and self has increased throughout this 
century. No sooner has a new road to the true 
self been encountered than it is boxed and 
packaged for sale in the escape - attempts 
supermarket, no sooner has a new vocabulary 
of meaning been articulated, than it is raided 
for concepts and slogans by calendar makers 
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and record producers, no sooner have we begun 
acting in an entirely novel way than we see 
coming over the horizon a mass of othernmimicking 
our every action". 
Yet art and growth movements are nevertheless part of mass 
culture. In a simple sense, they must be because they 
affect so many people. But in a more subtle sense, they 
are the source, as Cohen and Taylor point out, of many 
developments in popular taste. So art and growth cannot 
become too esoteric, they must maintain a balance between 
being exciting and outrageous enough to appeal to the 
consumer without at the same time losing their ability to 
take the person outside the reality of everyday life by 
becoming too popular, too much a part of 'paramount reality'. 
Other points of contact between art and growth arise from 
consideration of the nature of art. Artistic performance 
is a skill, a· personal power, which is made possible by 
study and practice. The knowledge that art makes available 
is a truly 'personal knowledge' (Polanyi) - it cannot easily 
be reproduced in written form or reduced to a set of rules. 
As McHugh, Raffel, Foss and Blum (1974 ch7) put it, the 
rule of art is "see it". That is, art only exists in the 
concrete experience of participating in a work of art. 
The art experience is a re-experiencing of the intentions, 
feelings or beliefs of the artist. And this is also an 
important feature of the growth experience. While it may 
take much preparation to put on the show that is a growth 
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'' 
movement, the show itself is nothing without the active 
seeing of the participant. Here is a basic difference 
between, on the one hand, art and growth, and on the other, 
therapy and education. Whereas the former take as their 
criterion the quality of a transient, felt, personal 
experience, the latter are judged on their efficacy in 
bringing about permanent change in ability or behaviour. 
What brings people back to art and to TM and encounter 
is that "existential moment" (Moustakas, 1966) when the 
individual is left with "the chill of self-exposure" 
(Becker, E, 1971 p7). Moustakas (1966) calls this moment 
when a per~on recognises his own existence in the world 
and the unique and incomparable nature of that existence" 
(p1) . 
This world, then, is one of positive experience, or 'good 
times' (Blumensteil,1973). It may be constructed by 
trickery, in the sense of art implicit in 'artifice' - the 
self may be tricked into revealing its secrets. Art and 
growth movements are in this sense illusions, existing in 
the interplay of symbols rather than the material objects 
symbolised. Thus we have argued that the mantra, a central 
element in the TM growth movement, is effective not because 
of its properties as a sound of whatever wavelengths or 
resonance or neural location or whatever, but because of 
its symbolic value as a sign of group membership, commitment 
and so on. 
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In bringing this look at TM and encounter through the 
framework of art to a close, some mention should be made 
of the kind of art these growth movements resemble· These 
forms of art, like most art in our culture, are in the 
service of the individual. Art as a means towards 
maintaining a sense of personal identity is very different 
from art which portrays a religious, hierarchical or 
socialist vision of the world. The art which is like 
growth movements is telling us about what it is like to 
be an individual person in our culture. The art of, 
for example, Communist China, is intended to communicate 
the values of the state. In that art, the individual is 
seen from the point of view of the group. In our art, 
the group is seen in terms of the individual. This is 
part of our unique structure of feeling. As Winnicott 
(1971 p82) puts it 
"We cannot easily identify ourselves with men and 
womell. of early times who so identified themselves 
with nature and with unexplained phenomena such 
as the rising and setting of the sun, thunderbolts 
and earthquakes. A body of science was needed 
before men and women could become units integrated 
in terms of time and space, who could live 
creatively and exist as individuals". 
We might add that a body of art was needed as well, to 
help maintain this image of the self as a unit "integrated 
in time and space". This problem will be re-examined later. 
Suffice to say at this point that both art and growth 
movements appear to contribute towards a sense of individual 
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rather than group identity. They are both concerned with 
the development, or growth, of the individual. 
Encounter groups and Transcendental Meditation, it has 
been suggested, can profitably be thought of as forms 
of art. We can gain new insights into these growth move: 
ments by comparing them with novels, films, paintings, 
drama, poetry and other art forms which create a world 
apart from everyday life in which moral issues normally 
taken for granted are dramatised and thrown into relief. 
Perhaps one of the most important effects of this metaphor 
is to offer participants in growth movements a new way of 
making sense of their own experience. The therapy metaphor 
is one which implicitly asserts that there is something 
'wrong', in need of repair, with people who use TM or 
meditation. The criterion of success in therapy is 
better functioning - a permanent change in behaviour. But, 
as we saw, ·and as other research has shown, this kind of 
change is not the most frequent product of the growth 
experience. Usually, people experience a heightened 
awareness of self which gradually dissolves. The art 
metaphor leads participants, in the first place, to accept 
that there is nothing 'wrong' with them, and, secondly, to 
expect no more than awareness or the "chill of self-exposure". 
From this point of view, any permanent changes must result 
from a willingness to change the everyday world and not 
from an imagined change in basic personality which occurs 
in the world of the growth centre. 
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In this section some of the similarities between growth 
movements and art have been traced. The metaphor of art 
has been seen to be an appropriate and fertile means of 
making sense of many of the observed and reported activities 
of participants in encounter groups and meditation. While 
there are surely ways in which these activities are not art, 
it has been suggested that art remains a metaphor which 
puts a different face on the growth movement, one which, 
on first sight at least, appears to be both liberating and 
to have implications for future development of these areas 
of life. 
a model. 
Yet we must not forget that art, here, is only 
In the following section we examine the 








Art or myth? 
Art has been suggested as a model for the growth movement. 
Yet there is another model - that of myth - which must be 
seriously considered. Growth movements can be said to 
offer their members a mythology of personal salvation. 
As we shall see, the difference between myth and art 
reveals important issues for people who invest in growth 
movements. 
What is myth? Myth is one variety of human activity 
that has been used by men of all ages to interpret their 
social and natural worlds. Maranda (1972 p12) has defined 
myth thus: 
"myths display the structured predominantly culture-
specific and shared.semantic systems which enable 
the members of a culture to understand each other 
and cope with the unknown". 
Kirk (1974 p28) writes: 
" ...... myths are on the one hand good stories, on 
the other hand bearers of important messages about 
life in general or life-within-society in particular". 
Schorer (1960 p355) puts it this way: 
"myths are the instruments by which we continually 
struggle to make our experience intelligible to 
ourselves. A myth is a large, controlling image 
that gives philosophical meaning to the facts of 
ordinary life; that is, which has organising value 
for experience. Without such images, experience is 





These definitions of myth disclose similarities between 
it and TM or enccunter. In both myth and growth movements 
the individual is exposed to a commentary on everyday life. 
He or she is taken to an area outside that of everyday life 
and provided with a framework within which the meaning of 
everyday reality is made clear. 
It is of interest that both myths and growth movements are 
resources which are called upon during times of transition 
or crisis. These are times when everyday values are re-
affirmed or called into question. Turner (1968) makes a 
strong case for considering myths as "liminal phenomena" 
with close connections with the ritual of the rite de 
passage. Turner claims that not only are myths often 
told at a time or in a site that is 'betwixt and between' 
but that myths are usually about the transformation of 
individuals from one status or state to another (see also 
Campbell, ~949, for a fuller account of the process of 
personal tramsfermation communicated in the structure of 
myths). Myths carry many symbols of birth, the growth 
towards new status, and death, the loss of previous status. 
The construction of a world of values outside the everyday 
world, a world which is entered in times of crisis - this 
would serve as a characterisation of both myth and growth 
movements. Yet there is an important difference between 
growth and myth, which was hinted at above. This difference 
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is best approached by defining myth in another way. 
Barthes (1957) asks the question "what is myth, today?" 
His answer is that myth is a "type of speech", a system 
of communication, a message, a form of signification. 
Therefore, for Barthes it is not necessary that the object 
or content of a myth have 'mythic' qualities, such as 
supernatural beings or events, although he does admit that 
"some objects become the prey of mythical speech for a 
while, then they disappear, others take their place and 
attain the status of myth" (Barthes, 1957 p110). Neither 
is it necessary for myth to be communicated ir. the form 
of stories - mythical speech can be conducted in photo: 
graphy, sport, advertising ....... and growth movements. 
Myth is characterised not by medium or by content but by 
the way it uses language. Myth is for Barthes a "meta: 
language", a second language in which one speaks about 
the first. 
The difference between myth and art exists somewhere in 
the area between these two languages proposed by Barthes -
a language of description and of experience, and a language 
of valuing, commentary and of mythologising. Mythical 
speech consists of talking about experience in terms of 
values or "controlling images" (Schorer). That is, what 
is apparently being communicated is only a symbol, or 
metaphor, for another level of discourse entirely. For 
example, a myth such as Beowulf is on the surface a 
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story of how the hero defeats a monster, Grendel. Yet 
at another level the tale symbolises certain moral values 
- courage, loyalty, the struggle of good against evil, and 
so on. Similarly, an example given by Barthes : advertise: 
ments for washing powder are, on the face of it, conveying 
information about the product in as positive a fashion as 
possible. But, as Barthes reveals, there is implicit 
in the text and picture a whole moral order, a valuing of 
life signified by the emphasis on softness, cleanliness 
and strength. 
To introduce an idea developed by Turbayne (1970), myth 
necessitates being used~ metaphors or symbols. That is, 
the gap between symbol and what is symbolised is forgotten, 
the metaphor is reified. Turbayne (1970 p22) writes: 
"What was before ....... a screen or filter is now 
more appropriately called a disguise or mask. 
There is a difference between using a metaphor 
and being used by it, between using a model and 
mistaking the model for the thing being modelled. 
The one is to make believe that something is the 
case; the other is to believe it". 
We are now ready to return to growth movements. TM and 
encounter become myths when those involved begin to believe 
that the particular ordering of reality provided by these 
experiences is true, is the ultimate reality. On the other 
hand, growth movements are forms of art when participants 
continue to believe that everyday reality is fundamental 
that 
and/they must eventually return to it. 
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Now, given this distinction between myth and art, it is 
clear that TM and encounter partake of some of the qualities 
of each. There are people who meditate or go to encounter 
groups in search of that "chill of self-exposure" or 
"existential moment" which occurs when the controlling image 
or metaphor dissolves. There are others who seek the 
opposite. They are intent on re-affirming the power of their 
myths and have no wish to question the certainty of the 
moral order provided. 
This is not to say that the mythologising function of growth 
movements is a negative aspect of these organisations. It 
is prob~bly true that people need some kinds of myth to 
believe in, and growth movements, we may imagine, are among 
those myths which "supply the symbols that carry the human 
spirit forward, in counteraction to those other constant human 
fantasies that tend to tie it back". (Campbell, 1949). 
The difference between myth and art can be seen more clearly 
if we consider how each is created. It seems as though 
myths are constructed as part of an unintended process whereas 
art is the result of an intentional act. 
Typical mythical figures in our culture are, let us say, 
the mental patient, the cowboy, the Freemason and the 
Highlander. We have some idea of how these myths come to be 
presented to us. For example Scheff(1966) has shown how the 
popular conception of the mental patient is a by-product of 
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of the way the news media report cases involving these people. 
Calder (1974) has written at some length on how the mythology 
of the Wild West has been disseminated through films and 
popular novels. Roberts(1972) in his book The Mythology 
of the Secret Societies tells us that the spectre of 
Freemasonry was spread across Europe in the 18th and 19th 
cemturies in the form of rumour and pamphleteering. Roberts 
documents in detail just how little basis in fact there was 
for these assertions. The mythology of the secret societies, 
he writes, was based on "errors", "delusions" and "nonsense". 
Finally, Prebble (1963) tells of how the lairds used phony 
clan gatherings and commissioned books for the purpose of 
resurrecting the myth of the Highlander after the clearances. 
that whatever 
It should be clear/these stories about mental patients, 
cowboys, Freemasons and Highlanders might be, they are 
certainly not art. But what are they? Esslin, (1975) 
would term such creations "folk literature", and the 
difference between the way folk literature and literature-
as-art is constructed will prove to be instructive. 
Esslin takes as an example of folk literature the television 
series. He points out that the prime concern of the 
programme-makers is to gain as large a viewing audience as 
possible. In this task they face some of the same problems 
confronted by bards and minstrels, whose function was to make 
up tales to amuse and flatter their patrons. The strategy 
adopted by both bards and programme makers issimilar. Firstly, they 
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call upon a limited number of stereotyped heroes, plots 
and situations which are of proven popularity. Secondly, 
their finished products are carefully monitored in the 
light of audience feedback. Esslin shows how the directors 
of a TV series will attempt to discover which are the most 
popular characters or types of episode, and develop these 
aspects of the drama to the exclusion of others. 
The result of all this, Esslin suggests, is drama which 
is "shaped by the audience's subconscious". He writes: 
"it is because the makers of the series are motivated 
by their desire to succeed that the series, the 
.longer they run, become more and more a product of 
the imagination, desires, fears and dreams of their 
audience". (Esslin, 1975 p194). 
Unlike an art which is the product of an artist's individual 
vision, folk literature is a reading of themes present in 
culture-as a whole : 
"folk literature is the very opposite of individual 
creativeness: it represents a common meeting-ground 
of the imagination of a people or civilisation where 
its preoccupations and interests are focussed. 
(Esslin, 1975 p195). 
It is impossible to create myth consciously or intentionally. 
The myth-makers of the twentieth century (see Rieff 1960) 
may be artists or authors (Lawrence or Tolkein)or scientists 
(Freud), but their work could only be swept into the world of 
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myth as a result of what must have been an unknowable 
popular reaction. 
Contrast this with art. A work which we recognise as art 
is effective in the seeing (or hearing or touching) of it, 
or in the memory of that seeing. It is art when we are 
participating in it, when we are experiencing or re-experiencing 
in the presence of the work. At these t~mes ~he art-work 
does not stand for anything else, it is not a symbol. All 
that there can be is the art-work and ourselves. 
et al 1974). 
(McHugh 
What are we saying here? Perhaps it will help to consider 
the example of painting as representation. There are many 
paintings of, say storms at sea. And yet, when we look at 
Turner's work, we are not so interested in whether he has 
accurately reported what happened when this ship ran aground, 
or went on fire, whether he has put in the correct number 
of masts, and so on. These matters are not important. What 
we want from this work of art is, perhaps, some symbolisation 
of a feeling we have. We are searching for another way to 
"consider the self we have known from the inside". 
It is easy to recognise that art is not, primarily, 
representation. There is a similar case which states that 
art is not mythologising. When art becomes myth, it starts 
to go beyond the immediate transaction with the art-consumer, 
and point towards some "controlling image". For example, 
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that theme from Beethoven's Fifth Symphony becomes a sign 
of courage in adversity, the opening bars from 'Thus spake 
zarathustra' signify everything wondrous. The Mona Lisa 
means enigma. These images which were art now become 
elements in a cultural symbolic universe - they become 
mythologies, to use Barthes' term. 
Now we can be aware of the distinction between the myth-
maker and the artist. Myths provide moral messages in 
the service of a wider system of thought or moral order. 
As Fromm has put it, the need for myth appears to flow 
from the "desire to submit to an authority who solves one's 
own problem of existence". The artist, on the other hand, 
while creating experiences which have to do with moral 
issues, designs these experiences to leave the individual 
in a state of confrontation with his or her self, in the 
"existential moment". The moral conduct which is made possible 
by the_awareness brought through art is a choice. Myths 
provide pre-formed ways of coping with recurring situations 
- Burke (1941) talks about these as being "equipment for 
living". 
Growth movements appear to be areas of experience poised 
between myth and art. TM and encounter to some extent 
provide 'images of life' and are to that extent myths. 
But they also offer areas in which individuals may discover 
or re-discover the taken-for-granted significance of every: 
day acts. They are also areas in which individuals construct 
or maintain .their sense of personal identity. 
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The need for such forms of activity appears to arise 
from the structure of feeling in contemporary society. 
Laing (1960) talks about "ontological insecurity", the 
lack of any sense of: 
" ...... integral selfhood and personal identity, 
of the permanency of things, of the reliability 
of natural processes, of the substantiality 
of others ..... (of) any unquestionable self-
validating certainties" (p39). 
May (1969) describes the avoidance of close relationships 
and inability to feel in our "schizoid world". Matza (1964) 
mentions the "m·ood of fatalism" in society. 
From these analyses of the contemporary "human condition", 
at least as it is experienced by people in those sectors 
of society from which growth movments draw their support, 
it seems that personal identity is problematic· That is, 
the myths of whatever kind which offered the individual 
a secure place in a universal system are no longer credible. 
Science, skepticism, the 'global village' ......... whatever 
the reasons, modern man is caught in a cultural relativism. 
He no longer is ascribed on identity; he must construct 
an identity, either through returning to myth, or moving 
on to art. 
The writer who has seen this most clearly is Otto Rank 
(see Rank, 1956,1959; Hudson 1976). Rank suggests that 
personality, or personal identity, is best understood as 
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constituting an individual's work of art. Thus he 
tags the neurotic condition a "failed art-project". For 
Rank the healthy person is one who is continually re-
inventing his or her self : 
"we can define self-determination as a voluntary 
and conscious creating of one's own fate. This 
means to have no fate in an external sense, but 
to accept oneself as fate and fate-creating power" 
(Rank, 1956, p70). 
Rank argues that while the 'average man' believes in religion, 
folk-lore or myth, the neurotic 
"perceives himself as unreal and reality as unbearable, 
because with him the mechanisms of illusion are known 
and destroyed by self-consciousness" (page 72). 
The only way out of this impasse, the state of "ontological 
insecurity" or "mood of fatalism" mentioned above, is if 
the individual "strives for the acceptance of himself as 
fate-determining{p72). If a sense of self is not to be 
given in everyday social life, Rank is saying, then we must 
face up to the fact that the only alternative is to create 
selves, to exist in a "temporary and limited constructiveness", 
to be artists. 
From this perspective, that of the person .. as an "artist of 
life" (Suzuki; 1960), growth movements can be seen as art-
forms, places in which art is carried out within certain 
constraints and in a certain style, places where people do 
art. But, further, we can begin to come to terms with the 
personal meaning of art. 
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Cohen and Taylor (1976) make a distinction between "reality 
work" - the activities we undertake to maintain an orderly 
social world - and "identity work" - the activities which 
provide us with a sense of self. They write : 
"we do not simply have to get through life; 
socialisation isn't just a matter of learning 
how to do reality work. We also require a sense 
of ourselves as a person who is getting through 
life in ways which are at times quite distinctively 
different from even those who follow very similar 
life plans ....... . 
...... living in contemporary society involves 
us in 'reality work' and 'identity work'. 
These writers are agreeing with Winnicott, (pp19-20) 
who, earlier, suggested that the ability to live as an 
individual "integrated in terms of time and space", was 
a relatively recent historical development. 
So, it seems, we do art to maintain our sense of personal 
identity. We need to have some such activity if we are 
to exist as individuals. Traditional forms of art -
painting, poetry, the novel - and newer forms such as 
growth movements are arenas in which we re-discover, 
or re-create, our selves. In Rank's words, we experience 
ourselves as "fate-creating powers" in these safe, protected, 
'unreal' worlds. 
What we are creating in these worlds is a sense of 
intlividuality. Goffman (1961) talks about "role distance" 
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as the means by which the holder of role - say that 
of teacher - can express other aspects of self, or other 
selves, in the way he or she goes about playing that role. 
There is, then, always a sense in which the individual 
is playing the role of himself. Weaving in and through 
all the social or other-directed roles within which 
people act, is the continually evolving role of being 
oneself. 
We can conceptualise this project of planning who one 
will be, of constructing a biography, as a personal art 
project. The person or artist creates an identity from 
culturally available symbolic resources. Activities 
such as TM and encounter extend the range of symbolic 
worlds which can be drawn upon. From this perspective, 




Where does all this leave the idea of personal 'growth' 
or 'change'? This work began with the aim of saying 
something about 'growth' movements and 'growth' experiences. 
What can now be said? 
The sense of self or personal identity which people have 
can be seen as something which is maintained through 
continued use of areas outside the 'paramount reality' of 
everyday life. By dipping into these areas, these "identity 
sites" as Cohen and Taylor would have it, we remind ourselves 
of the meaning and significance of otherwide taken-for-
granted aspects of life. 
For example, TM makes that "inner silence' meaningful. 
Encounter may leave us with a memory of what it was like to 
have -acted 'spontaneously', or what it means to have a certain 
approach to life. This is what becoming a person (see Rogers, 
1961) seems to be about. Shotter (1974) talks about claiming 
natural powers as personal powers. That is, things that 
just happen to us become, through processes of negotiation, 
things that we do. 
When we talk about the 'taken-for-granted' we mean that 
which has also been referred to as 'myth' - the desire for 
a definite, fixed, identity or way of being. But, as we have 
seen, identity is not something that one has, it is something 
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one makes. As Schachtel(1961) puts it, those who attempt 
to escape from the challenge of making themsleves: 
"want to substitue a fixed, reified personality 
for the on-going proces~ of living, feeling, acting 
and thinking in which alone they could find themselves. 
They search for a definite, stable shell called 
'personality' to which they want to cling. Their 
quest is self-defeating, because what they search 
for is an alienated concept of a thing rather than 
a living,dev.e·loping person. Their wish is a symptom, 
not a cure. In this symptom, however, both the malady 
of alienation and the longing for a more meaningful 
life find expression, even though in a way which 
perpetuates the ill from which they wish to escape. 
The self-conscious preoccupation with this wished-for 
magical object called 'personality' interferes with 
the actual experience of living". (pp75-76). 
As Erikson (1956 p57) has it, a sense of identity "is never 
gained once and for all. Like a good conscience, it is 
constantly lost and regained •...•• " 
Growth movements such as TM and encounter, we have seen, 
are like art in so far as they provide arenas in which the 
moral issues upon which we build our identities are dramatised 
and thrown into relief. Growth movements are sources of 
symbols which can be used to carry forward our lived related-
ness to the world, our being-in-the-world. And thus we 




Note 1 Sensory deprivation and isolation. 
Some of the effects reported by people who meditate for 
long periods are similar to those observed in 'sensory 
deprivation' experiments or in individuals who have under: 
gone lengthy spells in isolation because of imprisonment, 
natural disaster, sea voyages and the like (seeLilly,1956; 
Vernon,1963; Haggard,1964;Miller,1962) All these types 
of isolation or withdrawal from the world appear to involve 
severe alterations in levels of cognitive, perceptual and 
emotional functioning. In the most extreme cases,this 
alteration takes the form of regression. As Lilly(1956 p8) 
puts it: 
"if body-libido is not discharged somatically, discharge 
starts through fantasy; but apparently this is neither 
an adequate mode nor can it achieve an adequate rate 
of discharge in the presence of the rapidly rising level. 
At some point a new threshold appears for more definite 
phenomena of regression : hallucinations, delusions, 
oceanic bliss, etc." 
Miller (1962) suggests that isolation sets problems for the 
individual's ego- autonomy 
"the solitary prisoner experiences the emptiness of his 
world as a threat to his sanity and endeavours to make 
himself less affected by the emptiness - that is, to 
maintain ego - autonomy from the environment - in order 
to retain his capacity for rational thinking and for 
distinguishing the real from the unreal - that is, to 
maintain ego-autonomy from the id." 
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The struggle to maintain a sense of self, a functioning ego, 
in conditions of isolation, can have positive effects. As 
Lilly (1956) notes, "most survivors report, after several 
weeks exposure to isolation, a new inner security and a 
new integration of themselves on a deep and basic level" 
Haggard (1964 p438) writes that: 
"there are indications that in cases where an individual 
has repeatedly experienced the conditions of experimental 
isolation, adoptive mechanisms develop which tend to 
reduce the disturbing aspects of the experience and, 
in fact, may result in integrative and lasting personality 
changes". 
Meditation appears to provide a setting in which the effects 
of isolation and sensory deprivation are harnessed in the 
interest of a certain type of change. Meditators on 'rounding' 
courses, particularly, report isolation phenomena - halluc: 
inations, libidinal urges, oceanic bliss and the like. It 
is just at these times that the individual is also exposed to 
the effect of intensive interaction with other meditators and 
cognitive input in the form of video-tapes of Maharishi. 
Perhaps, then, the long periods of isolation serve to 'unfreeze', 
to use Lewin's term, the individual's way of seeing the world, 
and the exposure to the TM world-view shifts his perspective 
on to a level which is "re-frozen" on return to everyday life. 
Similar procedures are used in Naikan and Morita - the 
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Japanese systems of psychotherapy (see Iwai and Reynolds, 
1970; Kitsuse,1965; Gibson,1975; Kora,1965; Takeuchi,1965 
and Murase and Johnson,1974). The core of these systems 
of treatment appears to be a period of bed rest, social 
isolation and self-reflection lasting for a week or more. 
One of the effects of this regime is, as Kora(1965) has 
put it, the patient's re-discovery of his "desire to live". 
The period of isolation brings the person to such a pitch 
of tedium that afterwards his surroundings are seen as 
possessing a fresh charm and delight. Again, this is 
an effect reported by meditators on long courses. 
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Note 2. The significance of the mantra. 
This whole question of the significance of the mantra 
recalls Winnicott's(l971) discussion of the meaning of 
those certain objects - pieces of cloth, wool, blankets 
and so on - to which babies display marked attachment 
and affection, and which Winnicott has termed "transition 
objects". Winnicott argues that the transition object 
stands for the breast, or the mother, the first relation: 
ship which, in the early stages of the mothers total 
adaptation to her child, appeared to the baby to be under 
his or her magical or omnipotent control. The object 
remains a symbol of such satisfaction during the period 
when the mother "disillusions" (Winnicott's term) the baby. 
Winnicott (1971p17) puts it thus: 
"the object represents the infant's transition from 
a state of being merged with the mother to a state 
-of being in relation to the mother as something 
outside and separate". 
An important feature of the transition object is that the 
claim of the infant to it is respected by adults: "the 
infant assumes rights over the object, and we agree to this 
assumption" (pS). It appears to the infant to be an object 
which gives warmth, and is treated with affection. Through 
time, the object loses its meaning, to be replaced by a 
wider territory of intermediate experience - culture in its 
larger sense. 
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The mantra can be seen as a kind of transition object. 
It is a symbol of the individual's relationship with a 
guru, from whom the mantra ultimately comes, and with a 
system of thought and social organisation which promises 
enlightenment and complete satisfaction. But also, like 
the transition object, it exists in that intermediate 
area of experience between the totally subjective and the 
totally objective. And here we might recall Miller's 
(1962-see above Note 1) discussion of ego-autonomy. Miller 
suggested that the isolated individual struggles to maintain 
a sense of self, an ego, separate from the powerful demands 
of inner, id, forces, on the one hand, and environmental 
pulls on the other. It is in the area of experience that 
the mantra appears to function. The mantra is a sound which 
is a valued personal possession, a part of the individual's 
inner life but not a product of his own subjectivity, which 
gives succor and withstands all attacks on it. In these 
ways .the mantra is similar to the transition object. And 
also, like the transition object, it is not a spontaneous 
product of the inner life, it also exists in and is received 
from the external world. 
So, it may be that, like a transition object, a mantra is 
a means of maintaining the illusion of perfect relationship 
in the face of reality. But, unlike the transition object, 
the mantra may be used for many years. However, the meaning 
of the mantra does, to some extent, become lost, or fade -
the 'advanced techniques' include adjustmeflts to the mantra 
which appear to restore its potency. 
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This way of looking at the mantra raises other questions. 
Could it be that those who benefit from meditation are those 
who underwent difficulties at the stage of development in 
childhood characterised by the presence of transition objects? 
This hypothesis has yet to be tested. 
However, not only those who experience such childhood 
difficulties may be likely to seek a perfect relationship 
as symbolised by the mantra. The evidence for the import: 
ance of relationships in psychological well-being has been 
recently reviewed by Henderson(1977). And Bowlby(1976) writes: 
"evidence is accumulating that human beings of all ages 
are happiest and able to deploy their talents to best 
advantage when they are confident that, standing behind 
them, there are one or more trusted persons who will 
come to their aid should difficulties arise. The person 
trusted, also known as an attachment figure •.•. can be 
considered as providing his(or her) companion with a 
secure base from which to operate". 
Bowlby is here referring to the secure bases which are most 
prevalent in Western society - husbands, wives, mothers, fathers, 
friends, and so forth. We do not have to accept Bowlby's 
theoretical point of view to see the truth of this observation. 
But meditators appear to be exploiting quite a different form 
of "secure base". Their base is, ultimately, their relation: 
ship with their guru, and the word he has given them, and also 
their relationship with others who share this commitment. 
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Note 3 Self-awareness 
Self-awareness is a central theme of this thesis but one 
which has escaped direct examination. How do people become 
aware of themselves? What does it mean to be self-aware, 
and what effect does this have on personal functioning and 
personal identity? 
Unfortunately there is not space to give these questions 
the attention they deserve. Some aspects of this question 
can, however, be approached. In their series of experimental 
studies, Duval and Wicklund(1972) demonstrate various ways 
in which people are reminded of their "status as an object 
in the world", are thrown into a state of "objective self-
awareness". Perhaps because of the behaviourist bias, Duval 
and Wicklund suggest that objective self-awareness is a 
response to certain stimuli - catching sight of oneself in 
a mirror, hearing one's recorded voice, being watched by an 
audience. They add that this response is felt as a 
negative experience 
" ...... we would argue that the objective state will 
be uncomfortable when endured for considerable time 
intervals. As the individual examines himself on one 
dimension after another he will inevitably discover 
ways in which he is inadequate .•....•. "(Duval and 
Wicklund,1972 p4). 
These writers believe, as is made apparent in this passage, 
that objective self awareness is always accompanied by 
negative self evaluation. 
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Yet we know that people enjoy preening themselves in 
front of mirrors. Some people are even stage performers 
because they like being watched by an audience. How can 
these facts be reconsiled with Duval and Wicklunds's theory? 
The answer comes from a rather different source - the pheno: 
menological studies of Sartre. Sartre tells us that we are 
only "reminded of our object - like status" when the 
appearance of other (another person) undermines our central: 
isation of the world in ourselves. Sartre offers us the 
famous example of the voyeur (Sartre,1969: Pt.3.chl). When 
the voyeur, spying through a keyhole, realises that someone 
is looking at him, he suddenly becomes no longer master of 
the situation, he is in a "world which flows toward the 
Other" In that moment, he exists for the Other. 
Now it is easier to understand the nature of objective 
self awareness. It occurs when we are surprised, or tricked, 
into losing control of the situation. Goffman(1974) has 
used the term "flooding-out" to describe this experience. 
Thus it seems that we become aware of ourselves as objects, 
become able to evaluate ourselves 'objectively', with all 
that implies, when the carpet is figuratively pulled from 
beneath our feet. Much more could be said about this 
experience. Yet it should be clear that good art, and good 
growth experiences have just this effect, or turning the 
world upside-down, of leading us to the point of being able 
to see ourselves from the outside. 
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Note 4 Hope. 
In growth movements the work ethic is replaced by the 
hope ethic. Many of the personal benefits reported 
by participants in growth movements can be seen to flow 
from the discovery of hope. As Kopp(1972), writing 
about psychotherapy as a form of growth, puts it: "the 
patient's longing for growth is the central force of 
his pilgrimage". 
Frank(1961,1974) places much emphasis on the supplicant's 
belief in improvement as a factor in therapeutic change: 
"the chief problem of all patients who come to 
psychotherapy is demoralisation and ••..• the 
effectiveness of all psychotherapeutic schools 
lies in their ability to restore patients' morale .•. 
••.. despite their differences, all therapeutic 
rationales and rituals have certain effects in 
. common. They heighten the patient's sense of 
mastery over the inner and outer forces assailing 
him by labelling them and fitting them into a 
conceptual scheme, as well as by supplying success 
experience§". 
Finally, Jourard (1971) mentions "dispiritedness" as an 
element in various kinds of illness. 
The growth movement appears to offer an 'image of life, 
which is, in Jourard's terms,"inspiriting", which sets out 
the possibility of a better future. 
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APPENDIX B Research Documents 
Contents: 
Meditation research 
1) Letter given to people about to learn TM 
2) List of items in open-ended questionnairegiven 
to those about to learn TM 
3) List of items in open-ended questionnaire sent 
to experienced meditators 
4) Letter sent to experienced meditators 
5) Discussion paper sent to meditators 
Encounter group research 
1) Letter sent out before first workshop 
2) Items in pre-workshop questionaaire 
3) Items in post-workshop questionnaire 
4) Journal instructions (same on both occasions) 
5) Letter sent out before second workshop 
6) Items in pre-workshop questionnaire 
7) Items in post-workshop questionnaire 
8) Paper published in Newsletter 
Actual samples of the open-ended questionnaires sent 
out are not included. In these questionnaires each 
question or suggested topic was followed by a considerable 
space in which people could write at length. To have 
inserted such bulky documents would have resulted in an 
unnecessary and undesirable increase in the thickness of 
this volume. 
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 
Department rf Psychology 
6o PLEASANCE, EDINBURGH EH8 9TJ 
03 I-J-46 po3 
667 1011 ext L~ 305 
Dear meditator-to-be, 
You are being invited to participate in a research 
project, under the auspic8s of the Department of Psychology at Edinburgh 
University, into the practice of Transcendental Meditation. The purpose 
of this research is to attempt to find out what effect TM has on people's 
lives. 
You will find along with this letter a questionnaire and 
two short exercises. Please feel free to answer the questions in t~1e 
questionnaire as briefly or in as much detail ns you think is approprinteo 
The two exorcisvs may seem a bit strange to you, but don't be dism~yed -
there are no right or wrong answers. 
F'inally, it must be emphasised that anything you \airi t e 
in the questionnaire or communicate to me personally is treated as 
strictly confidential information, and will be used only for research 
purposes. When you have completed the questionnaire and the other 
~tcms please return them, sealed in the envelope provided, to the 
Centre when you come to be initiated. 
Thanking you for your co-operation, 
Yours sincerel~l\ N ~ 
John ~1cLeod. 
Items in open-ended questionnaire given to those about 






How did you find out about Transcendental Meditation? 
How many people do you know who meditate? 
What relationship are they to you (family,friends, 
colleagues)? 
Do you have any experience of other meditation or 
yoga techniques? Please specify 
Do you have any experience of consciousness -altering 
drugs (eg marijuana)? 
Are you at present receiving any psychiatric treatment? 
Why do you think you decided to learn TM? 
What effects do you think TM will have on the 
.way you are and the way you live your iife? 






How often do you meditate? 
When were you taught to meditate? 
Have you even given up meditation for any period of 
time? (Please specify) 
How often do you attend group meditations? 
How often do you receive checking? 
How often have you attended rounding courses? 
Do you lve with people who meditate? 
How many people do you know who have learned TM? 
How many of them still meditate, as far as you know? 
How did you find out about TM? 
Why do you think you decided to learn TM? 
Do you think TM is worth the money you paid for it? 
Do you have any experience of other meditatation or 
yoga techniques? Did you try these before or after 
taking up TM? 
Do you have any experience of consciousness-altering 
drugs (eg marijuana)? 
Have you ever received any psychiatric or psycho-
therapeutic treatment? 
What effect do you think TM has had on the way you 
are and the way you live your life? Please give 
as much detail as possible. 
How is that TM can have such effects on you - how 
do you think it 'works'. 
Dear medi te.tor, 
1trn'l.- ·- --- --· _., -- -- -"m 
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 
Dep~rtment of Psychology 
- -. _, ... .1-- ., 
4 Roxburgh Street, Edinburgh EH8 9TA 
031-667 1011 ext 4305 
You ?.re being invited to particip2te in a reseDrch 
project, under the nuspices of the Depnrtment of Psychology at Edinburgh 
University, into the practice of Transcendental MeditRtion. The purpose 
of this research is to attempt to find out what effect TM has on people's 
liv~s. Even if you no longer meditate, your comments would be most 
welcome. 
Your name and address, but no other information about 
you, were provided by the Edinburgh TM Centre. 
You will find ~long with this letter a questionnaire 
relating to your meditation experiences. Plea· se anstver the questions 
in as much detail as possible. 
Finally, it must be emphasised that anything you write 
in the questionnaire or communicate to me personally is treated as 
strictly confidential information, and will be used only for research 
purposes. When you hDve completed the questionnaire please return it, 
sealed in the envelope provided, without delayo 
Thanking you for your co-oper8tion, 
Yours sincerely$(\ M L..l.;e&el.. 
J·ohn McLeod. 
,.The personal meaning of Transcendental 
Meditation a discussion paper"o 
John McLeod 
Depo of Psychology 
University of Edinburgh 
July 1977 
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This paper has been written to stimulate commento It is concerned to describe 
and interpret the experiences that people have when they do Transcendental 
Meditation, and is thus addressed to these individualsa The criticisms, 
elaborations, and identifications of areas of agreement and disagreement with 
which I hope they (you) will respond will indicate the extent to which this 
undertaking has been successfula 
In the first place it is necessary to say a little about the social and 
historical background to the TM movement. Transcendental Meditation is one 
of the meditation techniques developed in the Indian Hindu tradition and passed 
on through generations of masters, or gurus, and their disciplesa TM itself 
was introduced to the West by an Indian guru, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. The details 
of this story will be familiar to readerso And yet it is surely of interest that 
a meditation technique, and, indeed, a whole system of thought, which evolved in 
one culture, could have become so important to members of a very different culture. 
How can this happen? 
Several commentators have noted that science, bureaucracy, technology, the 
mass media and all the other trappings of modern industrial society have altered 
man 1 s sense of who he is and what is his place in the worldo \fuereas we can 
imagine that primitive, pre-industrial man lived in a moral world of unquestioning 
religious belief and a social world ln which his identity and status were fixed 
and stable, modern man is faced with the dilemma of relativity- he must choose 
his beliefs, he must construct his own identity. So, for modern man (and woman), 
the sources of right action and conduct - his beliefs and his concept of self -
are problematic as they have never been before. 
The sociologist Peter Berger argues that this 'existential crisis' has come about 
primarily through the secularisation of society, the dioinishing in importance of 
organised religiona He writes: 
"through most of empirically available human history, religion has played 
a vital role in providing the overarching canopy of symbols for' the 
meaningful integration of societyo The various meanings, values and 
beliefs operative in a society were ultimately 'held together' in a 
comprehensive interpretation of reality that related human life to the 
cosmos as a whole". 
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This "comprehensive interpretation of reality" once provided by religion has 
been largely replaced in modern society by the essentially impersonal, ever-
chan~.ng world-view provided by science. No doubt Berger speaks for many 
when, commenting on the consequences of the scientific world-view, he writes 
that "there is nothing very funny about finding oneself stranded, alone, in 
a remote corner of a universe devoid of human meaning •••• "o 
The popular appeal of the Tt-1 movement can only be understood in this context. 
The context is one of generalised feelings of alienation, dissatisfaction 
with present-day ways of life and a sense of insecurity and lack of direction. 
The act of meditating can be seen as an attempt to escape from this chaos, 
a bid to find a space where one can be oneself, outside the demands and routines 
of everyday life. Yet at the same time TM helps the person to make sense of 
that everyday world - its philosophical basis offers a "comprehensive interpretation 
of reality". But perhaps there is a sense in which meditation fulfils a deeper 
personal need than just that of adjustment to society. Andrew Weil has suggested 
that the "desire to alter consciousness is an innate normal drive analogous to 
hunger or the sexual drive". He notes that: 
"the need for periods of non-ordinary consciousness begins to be expressed 
at ages far too young for it to have much to do with social conditioning. 
Anyone who watches very young children without revealing his presence 
will find them regularly practising techniques that induce striking changes 
in mental states. Three-and-four-year-olds, for example, commonly whirl 
themselves into vertiginous stupors. They hyperventilate and have other 
children squeeze them around the chest until they faint. They also choke 
each other to produce loss of consciousness". 
To Weil's observations we might add the age-old and cross-cultural preoccupation 
with consciousness - changing agents such as drugs, alcohol, trance, dance and 
song. This is merely to introduce the idea, without expa~ding on it at this 
point, that it may be in the very nature of consciousness to periodically demand 
its transformation, both through sleep and through invented, culturally -
transmitted techniques such as meditation. 
That is some of the background to the research which is reported in this paper. 
It is research which has evolved from an interest in the symbolic rather than the 
biological side of human nature. That is, it attempts to discover what 
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meditation means to the people who do it. Why they do it, the ways it 
makes sense to them. Behind questions such as these lies an assumption 
that people have reasons for acting as they do - their acts mean something 
to them and to other people involved. It may be difficult to find out 
just what these reasons or meanings are in any instance, because people may 
deny or conceal their intentions, or they may be working from beliefs and 
assumptions that are so 'common-sense', 'obvious' or 'taken-for-granted' 
that they have difficulty talking about them. Nevertheless, it seems to 
be true that, if called upon to do so, people can in most circumstances 
give an account of their actions. 
This is to say : people do not respond automatically and mechanically to 
physiological changes in their hormone levels, blood lactate levels and 
the like. People are not 'meat machines'. They must interpret these 
bodily events, they must learn how to make sense of them. For example, 
the physiology of pregnancy and labour is presumably the same for all 
women in all cultures, yet there are vast differences in how these factors 
- pain, immobility, hormonal changea and so on - are interpreted. While 
women in some societies are back at work within hours, in our culture new 
mothers are typically taken care of !or some time after labour. So we 
can see that the same· physiological Btate can produce very different 
behavioural outcomes when the people involved possess contrasting frames 
of reference or systems of interpretation. 
It has been necessary to make thi8 point - that physiological states have 
symbolic significance - at some length because all of the celebrated research 
on meditators has concentrated on the bodily changes that happen during 
meditation. I take these report~ as read. I assume that all the people 
in this study are experiencing profound changes in their body chemistry when 
they meditate. However, it seem~ implausible to me that these physiological 
changes are enough, by themselves, to explain what happens to meditators. 
After all, meditators have expectations, reasons for meditating, knowledge of 
what should, or what might, happen, and so on, and I hope to be able to show 
that these ideas, beliefs and expeetations interact with the bodily phenomena 
to produce the experiences meditators report and the benefits they claim. 
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It is worth remembering, in this context, that the physiological event of 
meditating is caused, in the first place, by the will, or intention, to meditate. 
Similarly, it seems to me that the person begins with the wish or intention to 
live a better life, and in various ways uses the practioe of meditation to help 
achieve this goalo 
How the study was done 
The purpose of this study has been to find out what meditators have to say 
about meditating their reports on its effects, their ideas, theories and 
expectations. These reports have been brought together to form a description 
of what happens when people meditate, and this description has been used as a 
basis for further interpretation and analysiso The information used in this 
research has been gathered in the following manner: the author has been a 
meditator for more than six years his observations and experiences have been 
called upono Seo~ndly, open-ended questionnaires were sent to 185 long-term 
(more than one year since initiation) meditatorso 72 questionnaires, one letter 
and a postcard were returned and these documents have provided most of the 
statements used below as examples. The author also talked with 20 people 
beginning meditation, some of whom also wrote about their experienceso There 
were also informal, unstructured interviews with over 30 meditators of whom 12 
were close friends or family and whose testimony is therefore particularly 
reliable. In addition, a small group of six people who have given up meditation 
were also interviewed informallyo Finally, public documents such as newspapers, 
newsletters and books have been consulted. 
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What do meditators say about meditation? -
Before presenting a more detailed analysis of meditators' accounts it might 
be useful tn give an example of the kind of material being usedo Here are 
the res::ponses of three experienced meditators to the question - "what effect 
do you think TM has had on the way you are and the way you live your life?" 
"1. SELF CONFIDENCE; am generally more assuredo Hands shake less, 
breathing less disturbed in tense situationso Better in public 
situations, although still nervous when called on to speak publicly etco 
2o ENERGY; probably more stamina or merely distribute energy better instead 
of having 'bursts'o Excess energy, rather disturbing eg after rounding, 
because not dissimilar to experiences when hypermanico 
ORDER; approach to study, paperwork, etc much more orderedo First 
degree, before learnt to meditate, more taxing and stressful than present 
postgrado courseo 
4o VALUES; some values changed, eg no longer eat meat, but probably going in 
these directions anywayo 
50 SENSITIVITY; I think I am more sensitive to nature and all senses are 
finero Reactions more consistent, less subjectiveo 
6o ~10TIONS; much more independent emotionally and take misfortunes with 
no paina Find this disturbin~as I feel very isolated, but am rarely 
upset or depresseda" 
"It has made me able to cope with a long hard day of study I feel TM stops 
me from getting as 'screwed-up' as I used to get with the worries of being able 
to cope with only 24 hours a day and the seeming need for ?fJ hourso I seem to 
be able to organise myself more and apply logic more often and more determinedlyo 
The feeling of being more able to apply myself and feeling relaxed and able to 
cope with anything applies across tke board and not only to studyingo 
There was a time before I started meditating where the endlessness of work 
and the increase of burdens of responsibility, ie money matters, house management, 
being able to cope with the emotionalism of fellow students who were finding 
their studies overpowering, began to wear me down to the extent that I was physically 
tired almost permanentlyo I feel that I am still pressurised in the same manner, 
but since starting TM the tiredness and apathy have left mea" 
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Greater sense of relaxation 
"It made me relax" 
"I do feel more relaxed" 
" •••• helps me to relax when feeling tense and gives a feeling of 
well-being afterwards" 
Better organised life 
"I'd say that I live a more regulated life, or, at least, that TM makes 
it easier to live a regulated life autonomously" 
"I feel calmer, hence better able to decide and discriminate between how 
to divide my time" 
"I seem to be able to organise myself more and apply logic more often and 
more determinedly" D 
These five effects - less anxiety, increased ability to cope with problems, 
greater energy, sense of relaxation, and better organisation of life, - are 
found over and over again in meditators'reports, in conversations with them and 
in the official claims made by the movement as a whole (for example in summaries 
of research and in newsletters). Later on some more unusual (in meditators) 
effects of doing TM will be reviewedo For the moment, however, we shall see 
that an examination of the process of becoming a meditator and doing TM regularly 
will take us a long way towards understanding why meditators should report these 
'main effects' D 
Becoming a meditator 
The process by Which people become meditators is described in this section. 
The first question which must be asked is ----- how do people find out about 
medi ta ti on? And then, how does the manner of discovering meditation affect 
their expectations and subsequent experience? To throw some light on these 
problems, the questionnaire sent to meditators contained the following questions: 
'how did you find out about TM?' and 'why do you think you decided to laarn TM?' 
Analysis of their replies reveals that 57% of this group of experienced meditators 
found out about TM through personal contact - either by knowing someone who 
meditated or by having TM recommended by a yoga teacher or doctor. The remaining 
43% learned about TM by reading newspaper or magazine articles, watching a TV 
programme, picking up a leaflet, spotting an advertisement or poster, or dropping 
in on an introductory talk. A detailed breakdown of sources of contact with TM 
is given below. 
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Source of first contact 
Friend or family member who meditated 50% 
Informed by yoga teacher or doctor 7% 
Poster/advertisement/leaflet 21% 
Articles/books/TV programmes 16% 
Introductory talk 6% 
Total no. of informants: 72 
It appears, then, to be the case that most people who become meditators already 
know quite a bit about TM- from friends, advisors or articles - even before 
they are exposed to the introductory talk which precedes initiation and learning 
the technique itself. And it is of interest that many of those Who attend 
these introductory talks, and who decide to start TM, do not ask questions 
about it at that time. Some of them will surely have made up their minds even 
at this stage that meditation is likely to be beneficial for them. It might 
be added that the cost of learning meditation is also likely to ensure that only 
those who suppose it will benefit them will follow up their initial interest in 
the technique. 
So it certainly seems as though people who begin TM are well prepared for it. 
They typically talk to friends or read about TM in as much depth as possible 
before taking the plunge. But what are their reasons for dcing·eo? What 
is there about TM and about these people, which leads them to meditation? 
Both experienced meditators and new initiates were asked their reasons for 
taking up TM. The reports from experienced meditators, which provide the basis 
for the analysis presented below, may be biased in the sense that they could 
well re-interpret their initial reasons for starting in the light of their 
subsequent experience. However, the reasons they give are similar to those 
given by the smaller sample of beginning meditators interviewed. 
The most frequently offered explanation f0r taking up TM is that it appeared 
to be a way of relaxing and reducing tension or stress. Informants mentioned 
"pressure of work", they were told it "might help nerves" or they admitted to 
be "going through a period of emotional instability". This reason was often 
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accompanied by another - the person had seen the effect of TM on a friendo 
A third reason given was that of seeking personal growth or self-realisationo 
People in this category wrote that they thought TM would be "an avenue to 
unexplored parts of the self" or mentioned their "desire for self-improvement". 
Fourthly, some said that they had heard about TM and were curious to try it out. 
A fifth group were impressed by the scientific evidenceo Another set of meditators 
said that TM seemed a natural follow-on from Hatha Yoga or their reading in 
Eastern religiono Finally, a seventh group comprised those who claimed they 
started TM "in the hope of a transcendental experience", "to fathom the enigma 
of creation" or because they "wanted to find God"o One person "had no idea" 
why he begano Other idiosyncratic reasons were "intuition" and "it seemed to 
be what I was searching for"a The relative strengths of each category of reason 
is given belowa 
Reasons for taking up TM 
To reduce stress; pressure at work 
Personal growth and self-realisation 
Curiosity 
Its effect on a friend 
Follow-on from Yoga or reading 









Total noo of informants: 68 
Total noo of reasons given: 82 
It seems clear that the most frequently offered reason for taking up TH parallels 
the reported main effects of actually meditating. That is, people see TM as a 
way of reducing stress and tension, relieving their anxieties and helping them to 
relax both before they start and after they have been meditating for some timea 
As we shall see later, there are certainly processes that happen during meditation 
which reduce anxiety. However, it is worth emphasising that the new meditator's 
expectations of and hope for personal benefit also have a part to play in leading 
him or her to interpret what happens during meditation in this lighto Furthermore, 
when the new meditator consults meditation teachers or experienced meditators about 
his meditation experiences, he will be encouraged to accept whatever happens as a 
sign of "stress-reduction" and therefore as an indicator of the benefit he is 
receiving from the technique. 
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To turn to another issue : sometimes it is claimed that certain types of people 
are particularly likely to be interested in TM or to benefit from it. What does 
appear to be true is that the vast majority of meditators might be categorised as 
"middle-class". The people in contact vli th the Tl1 Centre in Edinburgh are mostly 
students, teachers, lecturers, professionals, housewives and civil servants. They 
are of all ages, although a majority are in the university student age-group. 
But apart from these very general education variables, there are wide differences 
in the people who find TM beneficial. There are successful meditators who are 
extravert and those who are introverts. There are a few who are disturbed while 
others are very stable. It seems that all types of people can find something 
worthwhile for them in meditation. Apart from tantalising clues which are 
difficult to interpret - for example an unusually large proportion of meditators 
are highly musical - there would appear to be little that an examination of 
meditators predispositions or personalities might reveal about how or why they 
become meditators. 
So, to return to our task of describing the process of becoming a meditator, we 
confront the question - how does someone go about becoming a meditator? Given 
that they have found out about TM from friends, advertisements, books or television, 
what is the next step? 
In brief, what happens is that the would-be meditator attends an introductory talk, 
often held in a TM Centre but possibly also conducted in a church hall, university 
lecture theatre, community centre, hotel etc. This talk is in two parts. In 
the first part the meditation teacher giving the talk describes the history of the 
TM movement, its aims, the mechanics of meditation and the benefits to be gained 
from it. There are questions. At the end of the question period the teacher 
asks those who intend to learn the technique to stay. After the others have 
left (some people attend several introductory talks before deciding to start) 
the teachers may go into more detail about the technique, if there are further 
questions but primarily uses this time to arrange times for initiation. The 
would-be meditators fill in a form at this point in which they are asked such 
things as their psychiatric history and whether they use drugs. People who are 
recciv1n~ psychiatric help are told to discuss the matter of starting TM with 
their doctor before going any further. Those who use drugs are given instructions 
to stay free of them for a specified period before being initiated. 
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These matters are discussed privately with the initiator during a brief interviewo 
The meditators - to -be are also told what they will be charged (approximately 
three-quarters of one week's income) and what they must bring to the initiation 
ceremonyo 
The initiation ceremony usually takes place within the fortnight following the 
introductory talko It consists of a short ceremony conducted in Sanskrit by the 
initiator and using the symbolic gifts brought by the learner - fruit, flowers and 
a new white handkerchief. At the end of the ceremony the person is taught how to 
meditate - he or she is instructed in the use of a mantra, or sound and the correct 
posture, breathing and attitude of mind required for correct meditationo The 
person then meditates aloneo After this meditation the initiate is asked by the 
teacher to describe the experience he or she has hado The teacher may at this 
point repeat the initial instructions and give recommendations on how the new 
rr.editator should proceed with the technique at homeo 
The initiate has three further meetings with the teacher on subsequent days. These 
meetings may be group meetings, if there are a group of people being taught at the 
same time. The purpose of the meetings is to check that initiates are meditating 
correctly and to impart more information about the technique and its philosophical 
backgroundo 
This, then, is how people learn to do TMo It is a process in which the initiate 
is exposed to the great faith that the teacher has in this technique, and in the 
learner's ability to master it and benefit from it. The first meditation in 
particular, but also to some extent the following communal meditations at checking 
meetings, are often reported as being profoundly relaxing and liberating 
experiences - new sides of their being may be revealed or it may simply be "the 
first time I've felt relaxed in ten years". 
However, for many meditators this is only the beginningo There is a whole career 
structure open to those interested in the particular kind of spiritual or personal 
growth offered by the TH movemento The first step in this career is to move from 
"new" to "experienced" meditator statuso This distinction- between "new" and 
"experienced" meditators - is revealed in various forms throughout the TM movemento 
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For example, special group meetings are arranged for the former and they are 
gently discouraged from attending meetings intended for their more experienced 
colleagues where more advanced ideas are discussedo The rationale appears to 
be that new meditators are still learning how to use the technique properly, 
whereas 'old hands' are less likely to want to talk about basic problems such 
as finding privacy and peace for meditation, ~~owing when to stop meditating, 
and so ono So the "new" - "experienced" dichotomy seems to be a pragmatic 
one from the point of view of meditation teachers. Yet from the point of view 
of the initiate it appears as though he still has some way to go before he can 
truly see himself as a meditatoro From his perspective there is a barrier which 
can only be oversome by meditating regularly, going on courses and the likeo ~~d 
when he has reached the other side of the barrier he lmows he has "arrived" in 
the TM movemento The achievement of "experienced meditators" status, however 
informally it may be bestowed, functions both to motivate the beginner and to 
provide him with a measure of his progress towards the final goalo 
This first task - that of learning to use meditation over a period of time - is 
only one stage in the career of the meditatoro The experienced meditator is 
0ncouraged to take 'rounding' and 'SCI' courses, learn advanced techniques and 
train to be a checker and eventually a teacher of meditationo These options are 
described belowo 
'Rounding' courses: These are residential courses lasting for between three and 
seven days and usually conducted in some quiet rural setting such as a convent, 
monastery, country hotel or TM - owned centreo During these courses 
meditators are expected to meditate four to six times a day rather than the 
us~al twice, and are taught yoga and breathing exercises which are done 
between meditationso This programme is supervised by a meditation teachero 
In addition, emFhasis is placed on rest and relaxation- the course is designed 
to be a complete retreat from the worries or pleasures of everyday lifeo 
Finally, tape or video - recordings of talks given by Maharishi are played 
and discussedo 
'SCI Courses: Courses in the 'science of Creative Intelligence, the philosphical 
and theoretical system expounded by Maharishi o The basic tea~DS material 
used in these courses consists of a set of 'Tideo-tapes of Maharishie 
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•Advanced techniques' : Additional meditation techniques, taught after a short 
ceremony by certain senior meditation teachers during rounding courses. 
'Checking' training: Experienced meditators may learn to check the correctness 
of others' meditation. The would-be checker must pass a stiff examination 
before being permitted to carry out this function. 
Teacher training: A lengthy course of instruction in the philosophy and techniques 
of TM. Those who aspire to become meditation teachers (initiators) must undergo 
at least one year of full-time training ending in personal examination by the 
leader of the movement, Maharishi. 
In addition, there are a variety of roles for meditators associated less with the 
spiritual than with the organisational side of the movement. For example, there 
is now in most areas a TM Centre - a flat or house used for introductory talks, 
initiations and so on. The administration of the Centre is the responsibility of 
a committee formed of experienced meditators. Members will be elected to 
secretarial, financial, publicity and other positions. 
What is the significance of this Whole process of becoming a meditator and then 
following the career of a meditator? The importance of these social factors 
becomes obvious when we remember that people not only learn to meditate, they 
also learn how to become meditators. They gradually adopt this new sense of 
themselves, this new identity - that of being a meditator. They gradually 
internalise the values of the TM movement- detachment, calm, creativity and 
so on. At each stage in this process those further along the path give encoufu~t/ 
and coAching to those encountering the familiar problems that meditators have to 
deal with. Such problems as claiming space and silence in a household, or feeling 
that it is all worthless, or having strange experiences during meditation, are all 
landmarks on the route to enlightenment, and are interpreted and put in their 
place by teachers, experienced meditators, even by Maharishi himself. The 
meditator has decided that he would like to be more the sort of person described 
in the books he has read or talks he has heard and the TM movement provides a 
social setting in which he finds support for this attempt at self-transformation. 
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And yet this is only a fragment of the whole picture. Certainly the process 
of becoming a member of a group with a particular world-view and set of values 
has a part to play in bringing about the benefits and experiences reported by 
meditatorso 
now turno 
But there are other processes at work too, and it is to these we 
Meditation and everyday life 
TM is very much a part of the everyday lives of meditatorso Therefore, when 
meditators report that they have changed in various ways since taking up TM, 
it makes sense to look first of all at how this new element of practice has 
re-arranged and disturbed that previous daily routineo When we do this, we 
find that TM seems to have a big effect on the everyday-life routines and 
habits constitutive of anxietyo 
\~en we talk about anxiety we refer to three areas of experience that anxious 
people typically encounter in their daily liveso These are: distorted time 
experience, heightened emotionality, and compulsive thoughtso Thus, when we 
say that someone is anxious we mean that, in the first place, they are unable 
to confront current reality to the extent they are involved with events,that 
have happened or those that are about to happen. Eric Berne uses the term 
"reach-pack" to describe the habit of anticipating future events, and "after-
burn" to describe the effects of allowing some episode to remain in one's 
thoughts long after it should have been dealt with and forgotten. So anxious 
people are often either waiting or rememberingo There may be too much time, 
leading to despair and boredom, or there may be too little, leading to frenzy 
and fatigue, or paralysis. This, then, is the first everyday-life aspect of 
anxiety - distorted time experience. 
But of course such time distortion is associated with particular thoughts or 
ideas. Anxiety is often translated in colloquial terms as 'worry', with the 
implication that there is something 'about' which one is worried; either a 
future event for which one entertains 'catastrophic expectations', or a past 
transaction which is in some way incomplete. In either case, the anxious person 
repeats over and over again scenes, ideas or conducts an internal dialogue which 
prevents the ongoing flow of current experiencing and relation to the world. 
--
-15-
This kind of repetition is different from mere rehearsal, daydreaming or 
reminiscing, for two reasonso The first is its compulsive qualityo These 
thoughts are experienced as invading the consciousness of the anxious person 
and are not easily banishedo Secondly, they are accompanied by unpleasant 
bodily feelings - various degrees of muscular tension, sweating, headache, 
twitching and so ono This is the aspect of anxiety vre have labelled 'heightened 
emotionality' o 
Thus the whole person is involved in being anxiouso The personal accomplishments 
of remembering, of thinking, of feeling, are all involved in the experiencing of 
anxietyo So, when meditators claim that they are "less anxious and strung up" 
or that they "don't worry so much", and when these claims are backed up by 
psychological research and by observation of meditators, we can begin to understand 
how this might happen by looking at how the experience of meditating interferes 
or conflicts with the experience of being anxiouso \fuen people meditate they 
construct routines and experiences for themselves, which replace anxiety routines 
and experienceso How do they do this? 
Meditators typically use at least some of their meditation period making plans 
and agendas for the time aheado It would be a mistake to overemphasise this 
aspect of meditation- meditators say that it is far from being their primacy aimo 
However it does happen and it seems to have the effect of enabling them to put 
the concerns of timetabling, sorting out priorities and so on into tl1e background 
to some extent and allow them, as many put it, "to live each day as it comes"o 
In addition, many me~tators report that doing TM facilitates problem solvingo 
It seems as though the relaxed attitude of 1 \·ri tnessing' and 'letting thoughts 
come', and the essential passivity of meditation allows the kind of 'playing with 
the ideas' or 'regression in service of the ego' which has been shown to be an 
important part of the process of creative problem solvingo Also, the space set 
aside for meditating gives the person an area in which problems can be identified 
and tackledo As one meditator said: 
" oooe if you have something bothering you, its much better that it comes 
up during meditation and not while you're trying to deal with other things 
at the same timeo That way you can think about it more easily and come 
to a solution more easily11 o 
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These two functions of meditation- planning and solving problems - contribute 
to reduction in anxiety in the sense that they conflict with the anxious person's 
efforts to distort timeo After all, it is difficult to worry about what is 
going to happen if it all already worked out, and a problem solved is one which 
does not persistu The question of emotionality is less clear-cut, howevero 
Some writers on TM have argued that it works in similar fashion to the behaviour 
therapy known as 'systematic desensitisation 1 o In systematic desensitisation, 
the anxious person is taught how to relax and then encouraged to imagine himself 
in various anxiety-eliciting situationso The anxiety response is therefore put 
in conflict with the relaxation responseo If the client begins with situations 
of relatively low anxiety and only gradually moves on to scenes of which he is 
truly fearful, he learns in time not to be anxiouso 
To some extent this happens in meditation tooo When the person is meditating, 
he or she is profoundly relaxed, as has been shown by physi~logical studies, ru1d 
has adopted a posture which I!laintains this-level of relaxation whatever happcnso 
So, when feelings of emotionality appear along with the thought content of the 
person's anxiety, he or she is disposed to 'ride out' these feelingso Meditators 
often report twitching, feelings of tension and even tears when they meditate, and 
it makes sense to suppose that these are the emotional responses, or emotional 
meanings associated with what the person is thinking about at that timeo However, 
it is difficult to show that this ie the case since the act of meditating properly 
is one in '·1hich particular thoughts are not noted or remembereda The ideal 
attitude of mind is one of passivity and acceptancea Therefore it is not possible 
to correlate emotional feelings with thought content during meditation, and 
therefore not possible to corroborate directly the 'systematic desensitisation' 
hypothesis. On the other hand, many meditators report that during meditation 
they suddenly stopped being worried about some evento One woman, for example, 
was in an anxious state about an impending driving testo She reported, soon 
after starting TM, that the worry associated with the test had disappeared, or 
"dissolved11 o 
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But the balance between relaxation and emotionality may sometimes tip the other 
wayo Meditators often report that, particularly during the first year or so 
of doing TM, they remember stressful childhood eventso We migl1t imagine that 
the passive attitude necessary for successful meditation induces a kind of 
regression in which such buried memories become more accessibleo Nevertheless, 
theee memories often return with powerful emotionso Also, very strong emotions 
may be felt during meditation when the person is going through a stressful or 
crisis period in his or her lifeo What sometimes happens, then, is that these 
emotions become so powerful that it is no longer possible to meditateo Much 
depends on the support available for the person at these timeso If he or she 
receives reassurance and advice from other meditators, it is usually possible 
to overcome the difficultieso Indeed, such difficulties are seen as proof that 
the person is making progresso However, many others find all this too much to 
take, and give up TM during such timeso To some extent they may be un~repared 
for such experiences by the TH publicity, which wholly emphasises the positive 
aspects of the experienceo 
This is to say that becoming less anxious through doing TH is a process,. The 
person may indeed feel more anxious at times, but this would appear to be a 
necessary component of any programme to combat anxietyo 
The feature of TM which seems to make the biggest contribution to reducing anxiety 
is the attitude of acceptance and pa5sivityo It is almost as though the person 
is put in a situation - that of sitting silently for 20 minutes - which is certain 
to make him or her feel frustrated or anxious sooner vr latero But the person 
has also been taught to accept whatever appears during this period, whereas the 
anxiouc person is engaged in various strategies designed to control and manipulate 
his experience of the worldo This seems to be the basic way that Tl-1 cuts across 
habitual everyday-life routines and assQmptionso 
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CONCLUSIONS: some unanswered questions about TM = 
There is little reason to doubt that people who meditate are generally 
well-adjusted, happy, productive and creativco They are in many ways similar 
to the 'self-reliant personality' described by the psychiatrist John Bowlby or 
the 'self-actualized' person described by Maslowo In this paper we have tried 
to trace some of the various processes which contribute to this state of well-
beingo In particular we have noted the symbolic meanings which meditators 
attribute to the events of becoming a meditator and the practice of meditation 
in everyday lifeo Many of the experiences meditators report and the benefits 
they claim can be understood in this context - meditators are learning a 
"comprehensive interpretation of reality" which enables them to function more 
effectively, be happier and so ono 
However, there are aspects of TH which require commento For example, Bowlby 
agrees that a "secure base" is necessary for the development of the 'self-reliant 
personality'o He writes: 
" evidence is accumulating that human beings of all ages are happiest and 
able to deploy their talents to best advantage when they are confident 
that, standing behind them, there are one or more trusted persons who 
will come to their aid should difficulties ariseo The person trusted, 
also known as an attachment figuroooooo can be considered as providing 
his (or her) companion with a secure base from wbich to operate"o 
Bowlby is here referring to the secure bases which are most prevalent in 
Western society - husbands, wives, mothers, fathers, friends, and so fortho 
But meditators appear to be exploiting quite a different form of "secure base"o 
Their base is, ultimately, their relationship with their guru, and the word 
he has given them, and also their relationship with others who share this 
commitmento 
This is a'"l unusual arrangement in our socie+.y and seems to lead to certain 
experiences about which meditators are sometimes ambivalent or unhappyo 
That is meditators often report feelings of detachment or emotional isolationo 
One woman wrote - "once I was meditating and felt as if I was outside myself 
and could see myself quite clearly- as 'other'"o 
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This is an extreme case - others simply say that on occasion they have felt 
that they were observing themselves doing something, that they were not totally 
involved in the part they were playing at that memento 
To some extent this kind of experience must be a consequence of turning away 
from familiar sources of identity - other people - to a new source, the guru 
and his system of thoughto Also, however, it will be a result of the attempt 
to transform the person's self-consciousnesso As we mentioned at the beginning 
of this paper, there appears to be an innate urge to alter consciousnesso The 
TM movement can be seen as a communal project to explore this urge to its limitso 
Maharishi himself claims that regular meditation over a long period will result 
in a permanent transformation of consciousnesso It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to comment on such a possibility - it is hard enough to account for the 
more mundane aspects of personal change which happen when people meditateo But 
perhaps meditators themselves might like to comment on these issueso I would 
be glad to receive such commentso 
So, in conclusion, it has been argued in this paper that the process of becoming 
a meditator and doing meditation regularly has the following effects on the 
everyday - life experience of meditators - they feel less anxious, more relaxed, 
better able to cope and have more energyo These outcomes flow from the symbolic 
meaning attributed to the processes involvedo However, the longer-term effects 
of doing TM remain problematico \Vhat· does it mean to have a guru as a "secure-
base"? What does it mean to attempt systematically to chru1ge one's self-
consciousness? These questions await further studyo 
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Dear participant, 
18th July 1975· 
Facilitator Development Institute: Glasgow Workshop. 
You may have noticed on the leaflet describing tnis 
event that there is to be an "independent research evaluation 
of the short and longer term effects of the program." Although 
the primary purpose of this letter is to invite you to fill 
in the enclosed questionnaire, I would also like to say a. few 
things about the form this research is to taKe. As you are 
probably aware, there are many different ways of doing 
psychological research, from strictly controlled experimentation 
to subjective introspection. Since my aim is to learn something 
about individual people's experience of the group situation, 
the method I intend to use is to collect individuals' reports 
of what is happening to them. lt is clearly impossible to 
do this effectively without the help, indeed the active 
participation, of those involved. However, it is equally 
clear that participation must be voluntary. Thus, while I 
hQpe that evryone will choose to play my psychology-games, 
and enjoy them too, there will certainly be no compulsion 
to do so. 
The few questions I have sent you are just for 
background information, and I would be grateful if you 
could answer them before coming to the workshop. Please 
feel free to answer them as fully or as briefly as you 
wish. Anything you write will of course be treated as being 
complete:y confidential. 
I looK forward to meeting you in sunny Glasgow 
at the end of the month, 
Yours sincerely, 
John McLeod. 
First pre-workshop questionnaire 
Expectations: this is an invitation to you to 
examine your reasons for attending the Glasgow 
Workshop, and your expectations regarding what 
is likely to happen there. Please write as 
little or as much as seems appropriate to you. 
Previous experience of groups: please list below 
your previous experience of encounter or other 
types of group. Feel free to write as much 
or as little as seems appropriate to you. 
First post-workshop questionnaire 
Going home there are many elements in the encounter 
group experience. One of the most mysterious is 
going home. In the group, you may have new insights, 
learn new ways of doing things. Then you go home to 
the same old problems and conflicts at work and in 
your family. What happens when new insights meet 
old problems? The sentence stems listed below are 
intended to help you explore your experience of going 
home. They are only meant to set you thinking in 
certain directions - finish them with sentences, 
paragraphs, anything you like. 
1) Encounter groups are .. 
2) I learned from my participation in the Glasgow Workshop 
that .•.. 
3) The best thing I did there was .. 
4) The worst thing I did there was .. 
5) Other people have noticed that since being at 
Glasgow I .•. 
6) I have noticed that since being at Glasgow I •.. 
7) The group leaders .•. 
8) The research evaluation of the Workshop ... 
This questionnaire was taken home by participants at 
the end of the workshop. 
The journal 
The journal is meant to be no more than a systematic and 
methodicnl version of the kind of diary or personal journal 
that many people use to rocord what happe~s in their daily 
lives. The experiences that people have when attending an 
event such as this workshop arc all too often lost or at best 
inaccurately recorded afterwards. By usinc this journal it 
should be possible to capture or save some of the experiences 
you are having which might otherwise be lost. The journal is 
also a particularly appropriate research tool for a workshop 
such as this since many people find that recording their 
experiences facilitntes self-discovery and und,:rstanding. 
It is also a research tool which allows us to work with meanings 
rather than behaviours. 
It is important to remember that whatever you write in this 
journal is to be treatvd as absolutely confid8ntial information. 
No matter in what form the results of this research arc 
published, it will be impossible to identify individual 
participants. Therefore I encourage you to be as open and 
honest as if you were writing for yourself alone. 
Some general instructions 
The purpose of the journal is to obtain a record of what you 
are experiencing during this week in as systematic and methodical 
a manner as possible. This does not mean that there is a "right" or 
i 1wrong 11 way of usine the journal. Indeed, different p;_;ople tend 
to evolve their own individual styles of working in it. There are, 
however, a few general su~sestions you may find us0ful. 
Firstly, always begin each entry with the date. 
Secondly, give yourself a few minutes, sitting quietly alon·-·~;·:· 
when you decide to write in the journal. Even if you don•t think 
you have muvh to write, ideas can oftGn spring up once you hnve 
begun writing, and it can be frustrating not to have given yourself 
enough time to have developed them. 
I suggest that a good g~ncral rule for writing in the journal is 
to avoid the temptation to analyze or interpret your experiences -
it is often more useful to try to record what you felt at the time. 
Don't be afraid to include material such as dreums, flashbacks, 
fnntasics or images you might have. These communic~tions c~n often 
turn out to be p2rticularly important, yet ~re too often forgotten. 
Also, don't restrict yourcslf to writine about your 'experiences 
durine org:1nized, 11 offici~l··· events in this workshop - you may 
well hnve important encounters outside these situations. 
-. - ..--. -... -.. 
THE RESEARCH OPTION 
To nll participants at the summer workshop: 
It is the policy of the Facilitotor Development Institute 
to investiGate the processes and effects of those summer workshops throueh 
a programme of ongoing resenrch. As the person r0sponsible for this . 
research, I would like to share with you some of my thouehts and feelings 
conccrnine; it. 
I feel that it is important to do research on encounter 
groups, both to deepen our understanding of v1hat happens in them, and 
also ~o communicate this understanding to tl1ose who may not have had the 
GXperience of being_).n such a group. And, it is possible thut research 
may ultimately lead to better ways of using croups. 
However, I am avJU re that the v1ay in which much previous 
Gncountcr group research has been done has not captured adequately the 
experience of what it is like to live throueh an encounter group. All 
too often the rich cxperiemcc of participants is reduced to u set of 
variables. ·I don't want to do that. What I want to do is to find out how 
each of you in your own individual ways experience and make sense of the 
works~op. · 
. So the research option I am inviting you to take part in 
will use what I hope you will sec as being a common-sense method of 
finding out what is going on with each of us - the method of keeping n 
journal of your daily experiences at the workshop. At the workshop last 
year, more than half the participants kept journals. ~any of them seemed to 
find this a beneficial exercise, allowing them to work on their own us 
well as giving them a record of incidents or insights that might otherwise 
have been lost. It is my belief, than, thGt the journal method of doing 
research will make a positive contribution to this workshop. Paper, folders 
and so on will be provided. Thoro will ulso be u limited number of cassette 
recorders available. 
~hat I am suggesting is: 
That, if you wish to do so, you keep a journal during the workshop, 
to be used for research purposec, 
That you allow me to tape record some of the proceedings at the 
workshop 
That you feel free to tell me if you don't want to do any of'thcse 
things. 
My side of tha contract includes pt least the following: 
To keep my copies of the journals secur~, and to treat them as being 
strictly confidential information, · 
To edit, extract thsmos from and reflect on the material you give 
me to the best of my nbility and to give you this back by sending 
you copies of my reports. ! 
Fianlly, I would like to emphasise that this, like all ~he 
options at the workshop, is entirely voluntary. If it doesn't fool right to 
y~,don't do it. If it does feel right, start with the next two pages. 
If you're not sure if it feels right, maybe we can talk about it at York. 
John NcLeod 
Department of Psycholoey 




Second post-workshop questionnaire 
This questionnaire was sent to participants a week after 
the Workshop. It was accompanied by a covering letter. 
Expectations: Use this page to write about what your 
expectations for the Workshop were, and whether 
they were fulfilled by what happened there. 
Changes: Do you feel that you have changed in any way 
as a result of participating the the workshop? 
Incidents: What were the important things that happened 
to you, the recollections that really stand out.when 
you look back? 
Going home : How did you feel at the end of the 
workshop, and what has it been like since you went 
home? 
How does it work? I would like you to use this page 
to write about your own personal theory of how 
encounter groups function .. 
A RESEARCH PACKAGE 
I 11 -1-h. ' ea ~ lS a research packace' t ecause it's a 
conglomeration of different things - ~uotes from you, some of my 
in t er p re t in g o f "'ha t ~ · o u have w r i t t en , and so r1 e o f m~· t he or i E i n f: • 
I t is a 11 d e 1 i b e r a t e 1 y 1 e f t u n f in i shed , b e c nu se I \·:an t t o :- e ::-t : : ~- or~. 
you, and hecause it doesn't feel right to clairr to have conc.:'..u.sion~ 
when there are still so many of the journals and so much of the t~rc8 
that remain a mystery to me. 
A note on the use of abbreviations for peoples' names : I didn't wa::t 
to make the cant en ts of journEtJ.s totally public (or semi-pu :--1 ic, 
since only FDI participants will he reading this version). It seems 
a reasonable compr0mise to use initials rather than trying to 
disguise excerpts( which probably \·Jouldn' t worl< any•.·Jay) - this way 
only folk who were involved in a particuJ.ar incident are likely 
to be able to euess who it is who is writin~. 
This stuff is a selection of the work I've been doing. I !·ave other 
papers on the methodology of the research (nearly finished) and on 
the theoretical work of Rogers and Gendlin (just started). If anyone 
is interested in this other stuff, which I thought would be of less 
general interest, just ~et in touch and I'll send you a copy. 
My style •••• can be a bit odd. Retween the demAnds of preparing this 
material for a PhD thesis and trying to report back to you I have 
evolved a style which probably doesn't suit either. 
I make no apologies for the obviousness of what I say. This kind of 
research must start from descriptions of experience that participants 
(you) can recognise, which can sometimes seem like stating the 
obvious. 
My thanks to all of you who have let me shnre your journals and 
your experience at these workshops. I am very eager to get your 
feedback on this research- there's no point in waitinr; until its 
published and then saying, "you missed this, or that bit of the 
workshop." 
John NcLeod 
Dep of Psychology 
University of Edinburgh 
lt, Roxbur gh St 
Edinburgh. 
How do encounter groups work'? 1 
"fT\rnditionally, encounter is for non-directed, \v0rrr.ly-assisted self-
discovery. The norms that have d0veloped have resulted in~te~d in 
encounter becoming centres for e~o-strokinr, ~l1~re acccrta~l~ 
h e ha v i our is a s rip; i ct 1 y d e f i n e d rt s i n a n y ' eau r o c r ~ c y ; t h i s i ::: ~ ;. 
illusion of openness and freedom and the illu~ion is ~aintnine~ ~~ 
all costs, eg by insistin~ on thinrs like non-directiveness, the 're2l 
person' etc. If there is a 'real person' it will never emerge in 
encounter and Berne's real messa~e is that everyQne plays games; 
encounter should be an exploration of the games on the understanding 
that we're all playing them and that game-playing is not necessarily 
Machiavellian or psychopathic. It can be, and encounter could instead 
try to show hbw~this distinction is-Io be made. Perhaps there should 
be two kinds of encounter, one 'conventionol' and the other less 
naive; the criterion for participating in the second would be a 
willinf,ness to tolerate and even create ambiguity in relationships. 
Encounter is about as un-free as any other ideology, in its present 
form, and has outlived its usefulness. Not that I can provide a 
blueprint for chanee, but I have seen and done things in other groups 
that have certainly been freer and more rewarding." 
How do encounter groups work? 2 
''1. Perhnps it does not work. Cognitive dissonance ensures that ~eople 
think it does work. The reality may be very different. 
2. Perhaps it works for a few days. Hack to the daily routine with 
old relationships wears away the useful change and leaves only a very 
small residue. 
3. Perhaps it cements or freezes a change already in progress. Public 
expression of a new attitude does much to freeze that attitude. 
4. Perhaps it provides a catalyst. A person leading a lack-lustre 
existence may be jolted out of the rut and for~ to re-evaluate his 
whole life style. 
5. Perhaps the people who attend such groups are so 'odd' that one 
cannot r,eneralise. The fact that people pay a lot of money to attend 
means tha.t they have a special need \·Jhich groups fulfil. However, such 
people may be in need of constant.reassurance which they can get hy 
selecting the most 'comforting' people at such groups- they want a 
shoulder to cry on but in fact may need a different kin& of relationship." 
Listeni:1r~ 
~-
:·o.~t r'e~_:;t.:~~-t·c!l on ''t~co;l!:l~er r~roup;~ i..:c- ··chil.viouri:;t in t!:e se?!se 
t ha t i t 1 o o k s ~ t o n l y t 11 a t ·. rl1 i c l 1 i ~3 o b se r v 0 b 1 c • Eo w e v c r , t n e :r 0 s : 
f reo u en t • b eh a v i our ' in V r o u P ~ ~ .i :_:.; no t r: i v i r: r: f P e d ha c k , se l f- d i s c ~. 0 <:..;. , . ·. . , I-re 
or ex p re ss i n g f e e l in g G , b u t l i ~d. e n i n r; • Par t i c i r a n t :.:; i n e n c o u n t e r c- r · ~ 
- ' · - ·- CU"<:: 
s pen rl. far rn ~)re t i me 1 is ten in g than they do an ;y 0 f these other r:1 c t i vi t ~: 
indeed for many o:f them the time in a grour rcnresents the longest -~s­
spell of listening they have ever done in their lives. This is not to 
say tha~ when peopl~ are silent they .ma~ not b~ fantasying, daydrearnin£. 
remeber1ng, rehears1ng or whatever, Just that 1n reneral ~embers -
follow the rules of being-in-a-conversation rather than those of 
being-at-a-lecture. In conversation we are expected to attend to 
every t hi n g t hat i s sa id 8. n d we ex p e c t 1 i s t 0. r; er s t o give t h e sa r: e 
attention whereas in lectures etc 'fime-out' is acceptable. Thus 
in recordings of group meetings there are plenty of instances of 
''could you repeat that, I didn't hear it" but few of "sorry, I v:c..sn't 
listening."\·jhat does it mean to do so much J istening? 
Listening has something to do with he~ng a part of 
the group. T-'y turning off for a while, not listening, a person 
implies that he or she is r!o lonr;er of the group for that time. -~here 
are fears that there may be resntment shown to someone who does not 
affirm the group identity by at least listening. Ono participant ~rote 
about ho~ pleased she was when other members accepted the itiea of 
her ~oing to sleep during a croup session. ~o if we talk about group 
cohesion or trust we mean that, amor1g other things, they listen to 
each other. 
Listening is also part of the process of entering the 
world of the other,of hecominr aware of what their experience is 
ljke. Hogers has used the term 'empathic' to describe this aspect 
of a relationship - "very early in my work as a therapist I discovered 
that simply listening to my client, very attentively, was an important 
way of being helpful •••• It seemed surprising to me that such a passive 
kind of interaction should be so useful." This kind of listening is a 
skill that can be learned. In a group we hecome aware from time to 
time that someone else has picked up some message we have not heard. 
In this way we may learn we have been listening for the wrong things 
and we can set about i m T1 roving our l is t en in ~r, • 
Finally, the act of listening effecfs the listener. 
Beinv, involved in list·.'ning (or looking at, or touching) another 
person stills the 'internal dialogue', which is another competing 
source of talk, thus enabling the person to listen to himself, 
rather than talk to himself. 
An unfolding 
Day 'I ''Very tentative beginnings. 
I have been a spectator most of the time •••• I wait for others 
to take the lead." 
Day 2 ''I tried at various tjmes to give people leads to my distresE 
but they didn't seem to pjck them up. I resented this but at 
the interval P had seen but didn't ~eel like commenting so 
I realised once more the responsibility was on me so I launched 
out to see where it would take me. I know I haven't gone nearly 
far enough hut hope that will happen later. 
My fear of missing out on close relationships, of only half 
living ••• ~M recog11ised my feelings very powerfully. I felt such 
warmtb and acceptance that I glowed." 
Day 3 "So many feelings today., 
Talked with M till all hours on sexual problems mentioning 
things I'd never dared mention before and discovering I was still 
acceptable." 
Day 4 "I'm tackling things much more head on now. 
Talked of feelings of being a threat to men. Met eyes and did 
not flinch. 1das admired." 
Day 5 "Heavy and depressed no\v all my confidence seems to have gone. 
Insecure at changing of small group?" 
Day 6 ''Facing tensions with people head on. They cause a block to 
receiving and caring and however scary are far less so when 
dealt with. 
I hegan to cling again hut recognised it and let go - that was 
painful but I gained from it. 
Realise I couldn't describe myself when I came • 
••••• now I've stopped trying I ar.1 examining what I set out to." 
Day 7 "A hellish day locked in my unwantedness - not open to receiving. 
Worked with many feelings and shed somee 
••• I'm not accepting myself today. I'm licked into myself waiting 
for someone else to break down the barriers. Why the hell can't 
I do it? 
I'm a blood sucking spider spinning webs round people then shutting 
them out. 
My Gestalt fantasy is frightening and I daren't expose it in such 
an intense group. I the rose bush am not really there. I glimpse 
myself now and again but don't quite know where I am in relation 
to the scenery. 
I can't or won't experiment with ways of leaving people free as I 
w a i t in t error t o s e e i f t hey \vi 11 come back • 11 
Day 8 "I feel a freedom 'toda:y .... I am tied to no-one and no-one is tied 
to me. 
There are so many unfinished unresolved feelings - this is good -
life is exciting. 
I feel so silly with some of my earlier feelings - they were 
unnecessary bit still real in me. I need to experiment with lots of 
people round me. 
I am alive and earl ~njoy being. 
I matter most." 
• The solution 
, 
•·~~.all the time I was walking I was trying to notice the 
physical real6ity of the people and objects around me, the feel of 
the road under my feet, the air, the smells and the noises. And I 
came back, slowly, and I sat on a bench in the park and opposite me 
was a young Glaswegian boy, I presume, he looked like it, he was about 
20, he was sitting, waiting, I don't know what fory perhaps he was 
cruising, as B calls it. And opposite him was a lady of about 33, she 
was also sitting and waiting, for time to pass, for her lover to come 
I don't know. And as I sat and waited with myself I tried to figure ' 
out what the heck was going on and I thought about what C had said 
the morning before telling the world to "Fuck off" and some of the things 
H had said about the unreality of the whole situation here. Some 
of the experiences I'd had of listening to other people talking at 
one another. Some of the things that were going on inside myself--
about wanting to love and wanting to be loved ••••• 
And th~n I went into the large group which was still 
meeting and it was now about 11 o'clock and the atmosphere was again 
so sick and turgid and I got a mug of coffee and left and sat 
outside and drank it and I came upstairs and lay on my bed and 
totally relaxed my body and just concentrated on my head and my 
being and I came to this kind of conclusion - that I'd spent my life 
up until ~erhaps only very recently to arrive at a situation where I 
was no longer having to fight with my fantasies about 'do you love 
me?' 'do I love me?' 'can I love you?' 'will you let me love you?' 
'will you listen to me?' 'I'll listen to you if you'll listen to me' 
and all those kind of Laingian knots. I'd gone through all that 
and now I had what I call actual people - physical, present beings 
who loved me,~who I knew loved me, who I loved, who listened. People 
like my wife and my child and my mother and my father, my brothers 
and my sisters, my neighbours and my best friends - all in various 
degrees greater or lesser fulfilling my desires and my hopes and 
needs just as I was fulfilling theirs. It was no longer a question 
but a certainty. It was no longer a matter of hope but one of knowledge. 
And what had happened here seemed that I had been thrown willy-nilly 
out of control, out of my control, into a soup, a turgid fetid soup 
of other people's uncertainties and fantasies and questions and Laingian 
knots. And I had been drawn, like a boat toward a sluice-gate, by 
the sheer force of this emotional whirlpool, towards a state of mind 
which was so full of doubts and uncertainties, just from listening 
to other people's doubts and uncertainties, other people's projections 
and fantasies, that it had aroused in me all the emotional anxiety 
and fear and funk and aspirations that I had been through in my 
childhood and adolescence and early manhood. And that going out into 
Glasgow that night had brought me back in touch with actuality itself 
and it enabled me in fact to work out this solution this morning. 
And having worked out that solution it defused in me 
an area of uncertainty. And I spent quite an enjoyable day. I went down 
and I told H of my solution and later on I told C of my solution. ~ 
struggling with style 
Everyone has their own style, their own way of being, 
of presenting them6elves to others. And yet we tend to helieve that we 
are more than just our style - that there is a 'real me' underneath 
that gloss. We get upset if someone else mistakes the style for the 
person, and we develop strategien for 'seeing-through' the styles of 
others. For example, one person wrote in her journal: 
"Maybe the people I think look like hippies are just trendy and 
are as within the system ,, s we all are. And can be as chauvinist·ic 
as anybody else. I suppose the only cue I can trust is e;yes." 
Very often at these workshops people found that they were unable to 
accept, or believe in, or trust another person~ style, or that others were 
unable to accept their style. This example is taken from the journal 
of a man who certainly did not come to the workshop with a conscious 
intention to work on his 'style'. He reports that after he had talked 
for the first time in the small group -
"I provoked a good deal of anger - not overtly for my 
declaration but for my manner. I was told I was lecturing them: 
B said she found my manner made her very angry. Someone else 
said he found my 'spilling' turned him off •••• It was a very 
disturbing experience. 
The real objections had been to my'manner' which a number of 
people in the group found very off-putting. J said that he now 
sensed a real person in me which had not been there the first 
day when I had been a load of bullshit." 
A few days later this issue re-emerged dramatically. 
A had just taken the risk of confronting a fellow particip?nt who had 
been worrying him for some time - whose presence frightened him. He 
had just admitted this in the community group and was "feeling very 
good" when, 
"I heard D's voice saying 'A, that was very EFFECTIVE.' Christ, 
I was thrown as I have never been thrown. I knew what he meant, 
moving, right, good, deep, meaningful, etc, etc, but as a man with 
a gift for words and a great and precise skill in their use 
with great care for the exact meaning, effective was to 
~ · suggest planned, well acted, contrived - to ask for rounds 
of applause, curtain calls and bows. My whole integrity was 
called in question." 
And A left the room in some emotional turmoil. 
However, next day, 
"I seized the first gap to say,'I have an important thing to say, 
very important for me. The best thing I did yesterday was 
running from the room. I wanted everyone to know I was not 
running away. I was going out to ensure my integrity. I was 
rejecting the interpretation which the word 'effective' implied. 
I knew what D meant, but as a user of words, with skill in 
words and with a precise meaning for words to me the use of 
'effective' meant that it was all an act •••••• That was an attack 
on all my sincerity, on my integrity. In running I utterly 
repudiated that" ••••• ' I was utterly in control of myself, felt 
very good and sat very upright. I spoke of my style •••• I would 
stick to my style. I would not change it to please anybody. 
It was part of me. I would modify it, yes, this was part of my 
coming here. If they did not like my style they could stuff 
it." 
Finally, in his replies to the follow-up questionnaire, A wrote: 
"Ilearned from my participation in.the workshop that I was 
arrogant; I talked too much. I did not li~ten enough ••• 
Other people have noticed that since I came back I am much quieter: 
I have a look of listening in my eyes." 
A's story is by no means unique - there were many instances of conflict 
over style. What can we learn from his account of his 'struggle with 
5 
style'? 
. A's story portrays for us a series of events which ended 
in the modification of his personal style. It seems important to 
note that A did not have, in the first place, any expectation of 
modifying his style. He only became aware that his style was in 
any sense a problem through the comments of group members. It is 
likely that being in an encounter group made it easier for these 
members to make such comments to A, although, presumably, they 
would have had the same feelings about his style had they met him 
elsewhere. ~heir comments, and especially the remarks of D at A's 
moment of triumph, forced A into an awareness of the effect he was 
having on others, an awareness of himself as seen by others. With 
this awareness, A was in a position to make a decision regarding 
what he could do about his style. There were presumably several 
options open to him - he could change in compliance with what 
he saw as being demands to change, he could ignore or deny these 
demands or he could affirm his own choice of style. In the event, 
A chose to "modify" but "not change it to please anybody." 
The significant observation that has been made possible 
through examining A's report is that personal change comes about 
as a result of individual choice. The feedback A received from 
group members was not what caused ~<..•1-:- change - it only made change 
possible. A could just as easily decided not to modify his style 
at all. This is not to claim that every time A listens rather than 
talks he makes a decision in the light of his new style.While this 
may happen sometimes, more often it is not necessary - once the 'big 1 
decision is taken the new ways of behaving take their place with 
the old in wherever it is we keep our repertoire between shows. 
Picking up on feelings 
People in encounter groups talk a lot about feelings. 
Feelings are good, intellectualisation is had. ~he journal kept by 
N seems to centre right in on this issue. N wrote before he came 
that one of his personal goals was "keeping continuously in contact 
with my own feeling.~ In his description of himself he wrote that 
"my feelings come up quickly, but vanish the next moment - that is, 
before I see an opportunity to say anything." Later, he wrote that 
"what troubles me is that the presence of other people seems to take 
my feelings away from me. 11 Another excerpt from N's journal seems 
(almost too neatly) to state the problem -
"I am quite satisfied with not verbally participating in the 
community meeting- until A bursts out towards J, who sits 
next to me. There seems to be a fundamental contact, but 
I have no feelings about it, and cannot respond to J's 
opening to me. I'm feeling selfish, inadequate and lonely ••• " 
Reading this excerpt makes one want to go back to that moment and 
tell N that he was feeling something about what was going on - he 
was feeling selfish, inadequate and lonely, quite justifiably in 
the circumstances. 
Here is a long quote from N's account of what was obviously 
an important small group meeting for him: 
"J helps me to pick up on an actual feeling and to overcome 
it in a very gentle way, and E helps a lot in clarifying 
by asking just the right questions. Most of all I liked 
a) J's observation from my physical attitude that I at 
a certain moment just decided to cut off - a thing which 
happens to me often, and about which I forget immediately: 
it is the thing of which I have been complaining to myself 
so often. I seem not to be able to give account of my 
own doings, I lose my'·actions immediately. 
b) his very tender way of simply being with me, by which 
he actually did give myself back to me. 
c) my figuring out what I am doing, being so cumbersome 
in dealing with my feelings, endlessly justifying them. 
d) my last words to D: that she keeps moving me by her 
facial expressions and her smile and her tears - because 
they are my truth of last week: I have mostly been living 
by that movement. 
We work till nearly midnight, I fear most of the time on 
me. Afterwards I talk and have beers with ••••• until 5am." 
From the evidence N has given us of the events of this 
small group session, largely devoted to the problem of his feelings 
it appears as though the awareness he brought to the workshop ' 
Of his diL:;t::•tcinr; hj r·lSelf from hi_,:; feel inp.:~; hcU.) been extended. 
He is now a\-: a r e t h ~1 t h 0~ can no t a c c e p t c er t n i n f e e l in p: s < 1 n d t h Cl. t 
he holds on to other feelings rather than act on them. Yet the 
evidence from N's subsequent time at the workshop, and his reports 
from home, suggest very strongly thRt this awareness has not 
resulted in nny change. We can only speculate as to what might 
have happened to N: his extended awareness might have shown him 
that the way he dealt with his feelings was acceptable to him 
after all; he may have been afraid of the consequences of changing 
his way of dealing with his feelings; or the awareness itself might 
have been painful. An example of the last possibility is this 
piece from R's journal: 
"Boredom drove me into the Find Your Child Option. At first 
I enjoyed the fun, but I soon began to find my child and 
it really brought hack to me how scaring my childhood was. 
I developed a head-ache and withdrew, just as I did as a 
child. I had completely forgotten this part of me and 
found the memory scaring." 
The en c o y_n t e !.:~ o up as a f ram f: 
'I'he encounter ~roup, or in these v1orkshops, the lartze 
community group, is seen by participants as being a s~ecial situation, 
context or settinr, which 'keys' behaviour. That is, participants 
behave differently in the group, but, more important, they have 
a different understanding of the same behaviour. In other words, actions 
which would have a certain meaning if performed at a party, or 
in a one-to-one situation, or at a business meeting, take on a 
different meaning when seen in the context of an encounter group. 
The group setting acts as a 'frame' for actions, making us look at 
them in a different light. How is this 'keying' or 'framing' made 
possible? 
As members of a culture we possess knowledge about how to 
act in diverse situations. This knowledge comes from many different 
sources - watching other people, instruction in childhood and so on -
and forms a reservoir of common-sense rules which we use to guide our 
actions but are rarely aware of. Similarly, participants in encounter 
groups have expectations concerning what is going to happen there, 
based on previous experience in groups, knowledr,e of the rules governing 
other, similar, situations, their reading, the news media, what other 
people have told them and the advance publicity. Sometimes these 
expectations are made explicit, as in the early discussions on 
how the workshops were to be organised, but more often they are implicit 
in people's actions. For example the entrance of the facilitator may 
often serve as a signal for the group to 'begin', and members stop 
talking to each other, sit in a circle facing the centre ~ if 
anyone talks it is publicly and for all the others to hear. 
What has been suggested so far is that people have a 
different understanding of an act, or a statement because they see it 
has been made in a group rather than an 'everyday life' framework. 
A specific class of statements that seem to take on a different 
meaning, that are radically're-keyed' by being made in a group are 
statements of affection or positive regard from one person to another. 
Hugging a stranger, admitting love for them and so on are typically 
construed in our culture as indicating sexuAl interest. However in 
an encounter group this interpretation is not placed on such behaviour. 
Conseauently it seems as though it becomes easier to act in this way -
as if the group frame gives us permission to express affection ( in 
a similar manner the frame of the boxing ring gives permission to express 
aggression). 
However a frame has effects not only on behaviour within 
its boundaries but also on behaviour outside these boundaries. For 
example, the workshops concerning us here took place in a residential 
setting. This residential setting constitutes another level of framing. 
The meaninG of people's behaviour was therefore transformed or keyed 
in the first place by being seen as within the context of a residential 
week, and then further transformed hy the group frame. This may seem 
very complicated. Imagine you are walking through the grounds of the 
university campus where the workshop was being held. You meet a 
member of your encounter group. Do you 'eneounter' him, talk bo him 
just as someone who is at a conference with you, or as someone who 
is merely a stranger~ 
Very often in this type of situation it appeared to be unclear to 
participants ,,.iltich was the appropriate frame to use. Possi~ly as the 
week went on more people stopped making the distinction between the 
'group' frame and the 'residential' frame, although probably not with 
all other members or at all times. This may go some way towards 
explaining what some people see as being the greater 'effectiveness' 
of residential rather than occasional groups - it may he in some sense 
'easier' to break down or blur the encounter group-residential 
barrier or frame boundary than it is to do the same with the encounter .. 
home frame boundary. The residential frame may act as a transition 
between experimental behaviour in the small group and trying out 
that behaviour at home or at work. 
There again in cases where members are confused about 
frame they may become aware through this rreakdown of their taken-
for-granted competence of the routines and assumptions that make up 
that competence. And finally, it may become possible to exploit the 
properties of the encounter group as a frame in idiosyncratic ways, 
as the following report suggests -
"I got a lot out of the workshop in terms of getting my thoughts 
and feelings together better. I got this mainly from talking 
with individuals like ••••• The community or small group 
meetings did little or nothing for me. And yet, when I think 
about it, maybe I wouldn't have got so much from individuals 
if we hadn't had something definite to talk about eg what 






t AHareness and yersonal growth 
One of the' most salient issues to emerge from th··· journnls 
and tape s has to do \'' i t h t he pro h l em o f 1 re .:1 1 i t y ' or ' a ut he n t i c i t ;y • 1 
One participant talked about others trying to "define his rcRlit~:" 
for him or "smile away his reality." It ~·ecame the craze at one 
workshop to award "ARP"(a real person) ~adges to those who made 
'authentic' contributions or who were acclaimed as being 'real' ~eople. 
One participant wrote in his journal after a group - "A wonderful session 
with real people not opinions and theories." anothc:r wrote - "Had 
lunch near W who made me feel human again." j· et another refers several 
times to his feelings of "sterility" and "detachment", his "inner 
desert." 
These uses of the concept of 'reality' seem to be grounded 
in the experiencing or expression of feelings in the group setting. 
In the discussion of the encounter group as a frame, it ·was suggested 
that the group was seen by participants as constituting a special 
situation with the result that they acted differently in that 
situation and they also interpreted actions in that situation in a 
different way. Part at least of the way the group frame transformed 
understandings of the way others were acting was to introduce a 
specific kind of critical attitude to others' statements. Statements 
would be scrutinised for hidden meanings, expressions of feeling 
and so on. The question was - what is behind what this person is 
saying, what is it. he is trying to say? The group frame kept 
directing members' attention to the inner state of the person making 
a statement, whether it be self or other. Only when this inner 
s•te, or feeling, was detected was an action 'real'. When someone else 
did something you had no feeling about, or when you said something 
you had no feeling about you or they were not being 'real'. 
However there was a second sense of the concept of 'reality' 
in use, and that referred to the 'real world' - the ordinary 
common-sense world of everyday life. This second sense of 'reality' 
made the city 'real' and the women who served the food 'real', and 
was characterised by consensual validation and definition of 
situations, in contrast to the definition in terms of inner state 
in the groups. 
Thus there were two 'realities' or 'frames' within which 
the workshops can be perceived. The first is the ordinary, mundane, 
concrete reality of everyday life. The second is the personal 
reality associated with experiencing, availability of feelings 
~nd 'encounter'. These are separate realities, as can be seen in the 
comments of one participant on a discussion (ie non-encounter) group 
meeting 
"Interesting to see all these people being serious, shrewd, 
all slipping into their professional roles. Helps to under-
stand how much they have been exposing themselves here and 
how difficult it must be for many." 
This participant is startled when she sees people jumping from 
the group frame to the everyday life frame - they have re-keyed the 
situation before she has. 
It may be useful to think of what happens at encounter groups 
as a learning of a new reality, a new way of looking at the world 
' of making sense of it, a different kind of awareness or consciousness. 
It may be that prolonged exposure to or use of the encounter frame 
of reference can bring about a change in awareness through the 
cumulative effects of listening, attending to feelings, examining 
the implicit messages in statements and all the other elementt of 
the 'cognitive style' of being-in-a-group. We can further assume 
that some people are already familiar with this reality or kind 
of awareness (eg the facilitatmrs) while others may pick it up very 
auickly (eg 'natural' facilitators). Still others will be struggling 
to grasp it, while some will be unwilling to give up their old 
world for this strange ne w one. 
This last group, those who appeared to make little 
or no effort to learn the'reality'or 'consciousness' of the 
encounter group, are of interest. These were the people who either 
said little throughout the whole workshop, or who maintained an 
ininvolved or sceptical attitude. As one wrote in his journal -
"! •••• accepted as accurate the criticism that I maintained 
a 'cynical'(that was the word used) detachment. I was not 
cynical but I did not suspend my mistrust of the shallowness 
of several 'encounters' and 'revelations'." 
There are two points to be made in relation to this statement. The 
first is to note that the process of achieving a new awareness 
involves at least temporarily suspending one's rational sense of 
'doubt' or 'mistrust' which this person was not ready to do. The 
~' 
second is that it is widely held that the kind of disclosures and 
interactions that occur in encounter groups are in some way 'shallow' 
or 'trivial'. This is based on a misunderstanding. What is misunderstood 
is the attitude of the person making the 'shallow' or 'trivial' 
response. The critic believes that the person fools himself or is 
forced by the situation ('group pressure') into thinking that his or 
her contribution was deep, authentic, significant,etc,etc. While this 
may sometimes happen, more often the person is distressed at how 
inauthentic or trivial he has been. For example, one woman, who ~ad 
in fact said a lot in her group, admitted in her journal that she 
was "still not in touch with myself." Others mentioned feeling 
"empty","brain-damaged" or "sterile". These were also people who had 
been involved in the work of their groups, who had, in our terminology, 
been trying to pick up the encounter 'awareness' or 'consciousness'. 
We may suppose that making 'inauthentic' or 'shallow' 
statements is necessarily part of the process of coming to terms w~th 
this new reality. Ordinary reality is characterised by consensual 
definition and validation of what is happening. In everyday life 
when .we want to know what someone means we refer to the common-
sense understandings that we all have and use, as memeers of a 
culture. Meanings are not explicitly 'contained' in the words we used, 
they are found by following the way the words point to a shared 
understanding of the world. In an encounter group, however, this 
kind of talk is ineffective. There is no agenda, there is nothing 
concrete, no part of the world of everyday life, that everyone 
wants to talk about. One member may begin to talk about ~:he~ work 
difficulties but may find thDt this makes reference to issues others 
have no experience of. Talk of ordinary affRirs and concerns turns out 
to be somehow ineffective, probably hoth hecause of thP ~xpectations 
people bring to the group a~d because of the 'indexicality'(reference 
to a shared understanding of the situation or context) of evryday-
life talk. Thus the group member is directed more and more towards 
his or her feelings, needs or interests in the here-and-now(the group) 
because this is the only way he or she can communicate meaningfully 
to other group members. Gradually present feelings, needs or interests 
are expressed in ways that at first may seem 'shallow' or 'inauthentic' 
and only later become more satisfactory. In many participants this 
process was not a co~tinuous one- they would return to the tordinary', 
outside world when things were getting on top of them. 
The idea that what is picked up by participants 
in encounter groups is a special kind of awareness rather than 
specific learnings, insights or behaviours, is most clearly shown 
in their reports of what it was like for them when they finally left 
the group and went home : 
"For the first couple of days I was disorientated and felt 
very fragile." 
" •••• went into the Common Room. It seemed to be full of 
ghosts, dim, half-seen people. I didn't want to talk to 
any of them. The usual social chit-chat seemed like the 
twittering of sparrows." 
" ••• life getting cold and detached again." 
" ••• when I meet people now I'm conscious of not really 
encountering them.'' 
" ••• my 'feelings' seem to be more accessible and manageable •• 
they are flowing more freely within me." 
"Physically, when I leave a w~rkshop I am aware of heightened 
perception of and memory for detail and feel a need to live 
deliberately and slowly. I eat slower and less. This stays 
with me for quite a while until it gradually becomes no 
longer noticeable." 
The workshop may be seen as an interlude in the lives 
of participants. They come to it with the interests and concerns of 
everyday life still dominating their thoughts and actions and eventually 
must return to that 'reality'.While at the workshop, according to 
this analysis, they become aware of another 'reality', during this 
time their actions become more expressive of themselves rather than, 
as in the outside world, instrumental, or goal-directed. That is, 
participants at the workshop come to live for a while at the level 
of being rather than doing, for, in fact, there is nothing to do 
at an encounter group - there are no tasks to be performed. One 
woman put it thus : 
"I realised as I spoke that the most time I'd had for 
myself since 1955 •••• had only been three days at one 
time ••• That's the longest span I've had for myself, and 
that this was the third day of the course! What am I 
going to do tomorrow?" 
~ life can be seen not only as a struggle to fulfil practical 
needs such as food, shelter, sex and so on~ but also a struggle to 
make sense of what is going on, to create a meaningful world and 
achieve some sense of personal identity.~hen we can suppose that 
group members gradually or even abruptly shift their attention t·rom 
practical to existential questions. Even in what they wrote concerning 
their intentions in attending the workshop, they differed in this 
respect, from those who wanted to pick up professional skills or 
discover what to do about their marriage, to those who wanted to 
explore "being a mother" or "being a woman". 
What effect does this interlude or retreat into another 
reality have on group members? While many mention their increased 
awareness, or feeling of closeness with people, it is fairly 
obvious that this does not last at anything like the same level of 
intensity for longer than a week or two. Therefore when we talk 
about personal change resulting from participating in groups, we 
cannot mean a permanent change in level of awareness. In fact 
it is difficult to talk about any kind of change resulting · •. J ... 
from participating in the groups apart from this transieht change 
in level of awareness. Certainly close examination of tapes and 
journals does not reveal marked personality change or alt~rations·~ 
in patterns of behaviour during the groups - all that emerges is 
this learning of a new kind of awareness. On the other hand some 
members go home and change their jobs, finish their marriages and 
so on. It seems as though the group process makes possible an 
extended awareness of the options open to the person, and allows them 
to then make a decision. This decision or choice is the personal 
growth or development - the moment of deciding to take one's life 
in another direction. Thus the group does not cause change or 
growth, it only creates conditions in which the person can choose to 
change, or, indeed, to stay the same. The extracts "Picking up on 
feelings" and "Struggling with style" are chosen to illustrate this 
point. Change does not inevitably follow from attending an encounter 
group. The group process, as described by many writers, the'cognitive 
style' of being-in-a-group and the very fact of being outside the 
pressures of daily life for a while, combine to bring the person to 
a level of awareness at which choice is possible, at which the 
'unfinished business' or 'blocks' which prevent choice no longer 
seem important. Another perspective is that the climate of trust 
generated makes people feel secure enou~h to change their ways. 
' .) . 
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